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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Ruth Wedgwood	Al Qaeda, Military Commissions, and American Self-Defense
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FROM THE FOREWORD...

"September 11, 2001, is, as President Franklin Roosevelt said about December 7, 1941, "a date which will live in infamy." As with analysis of the 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, political scientists and others will examine for generations why and how Muslim extremists mounted a surprise attack during peacetime by crashing hijacked American airliners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, causing some 3,000 deaths, mostly of civilians. What the articles in this book attempt to do is to disseminate the first considered thoughts of leading scholars on the implications of the September 11 attacks for American foreign and military policy. . . . Among the authors are Richard K. Betts, Robert Jervis, Walter LaFeber, and Ruth Wedgwood. Six of the articles were commissioned by the editor and were completed from four to eight months after the attacks. The other four came from unsolicited submissions to *Political Science Quarterly*."

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY
President, Academy of Political Science
Editor, *Political Science Quarterly*

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

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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

RUTH WEDGWOOD critically examines the U.S. detainment of al Qaeda prisoners and others accused of visa violations or of being enemy combatants. She explains that "In a world where terrorist action flirts with catastrophic weapons, the competing paradigms of crime and war may provide no more than analogies. Fitting the law to this unwanted new world thus will require tact, judgment, and the weight of a heavy heart."

WILLIAM D. JACKSON examines the nature and evolution of threat discourse within the Russian military command. He finds that while Russia's civilian leadership has generally pursued policies that have downplayed serious external threats, Russia's military leadership has increasingly embraced a new world view that describes a range of objectively-determined aggressive threats encircling Russia.

AN CHEN examines China's capitalist development in the reform era as an "artifact" invented by the communist state. He argues that in a somewhat spurious capitalist context, China's entrepreneurial class and other middle classes must rely heavily upon arbitrary political power for survival and thriving.

ROLAND PARIS uses historical metaphors in the speeches and statements of American policy makers during the Kosovo crisis of 1999 to argue that American policy makers used competing historical analogies as a proxy for debating the merits of different responses to the crisis.

SEYOM BROWN reviews the RAND Corporation study of military coercion by Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman. Brown commends the authors' comprehensive mining of the record and conceptual literature for the factors that need to be taken into account when the United States attempts to forcibly influence an adversary's behavior. But he criticizes the cogency of their theoretical argument that "escalation dominance" is the key to successful coercion.

GREGORY L. BOVITZ examines the electoral consequences of seemingly risky political decisions by members of the U.S. House of Representatives to support termination of other legislators' pork-barrel programs. He finds that strategic choices to defect from the pork-barrel game, thereby establishing or enhancing a reputation for fiscal responsibility, can help—and never hurt—legislators' reelection bids.

SCOT SCHRAUFNAGEL and JEFFERY J. MONDAK use survey data from Project Vote Smart to compare the issue positions of Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. House. Results reveal significant differences in eighteen of nineteen issues. The divide between the parties most often is moderate in magnitude and consistent with a depiction of the parties as center-left and center-right.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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Al Qaeda, Military Commissions, and American Self-Defense

RUTH WEDGWOOD

The toppling of the World Trade Center towers on September 11 broadcast live to the world that radical Islam must be taken seriously. This was a holocaust, forcing us to witness the planned deaths of 3,000 people and to imagine their anguish and suffering. Anyone could have been there. The rampage struck at the financial center of the world, at a city that symbolizes cultural diversity and inclusion, and perhaps not by chance, at the city that became home to so many European Jews fleeing from fascism.

This has been a decade in coming. After abandoning his family's construction empire in Saudi Arabia and fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden had the foul imagination to conceive of a holding company for globalized terror. His ease with corporate forms has allowed him to provide financing, training, and materiel to Islamic insurgents around the world, and to escalate the destructive range of their work. In most political confrontations, there is an unspoken norm of proportionality, a customary law of violence, even an expected pattern of terrorist tactics. The techniques of terrorism are a way to get on television, to drain the good feeling out of life and demoralize resistance, to undermine the credibility of a regime that cannot offer protection. But at the hands of ordinary insurgents, the deaths of innocents usually are sought in numbers of five, ten, or one hundred. Al Qaeda's jihad against Judaism, Christianity, and the West has chosen to move the decimal point and increase the scale of destruction by several orders of magnitude with no apparent hesitation. Though one must speak with reticence and care about the past, bin Laden's imagination resembles that of Hitler, scaling up from pogrom to extermination.

RUTH WEDGWOOD is professor of law at Yale and Johns Hopkins universities and a former federal prosecutor in the Southern District of New York. She has served on the secretary of state's advisory committee on international law and as an independent expert for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

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When George W. Bush spoke of bin Laden as the "evil one," even a sophisticate could accept the reference.

Al Qaeda's heedlessness poses an unprecedented threat, because the usual rules of deterrence have no evident application. In military defense, as in criminal law, we ordinarily assume that an adversary can be dissuaded by increasing the cost of his action. The stability of the nuclear era, dangerous as it was, depended on deterrence—the notorious "mutually assured destructive capability" of two state adversaries who wished to have their people and polity survive. A nonstate actor such as al Qaeda has no population or territory held in thrall, and its cult of martyrdom sees death as unimportant. Thus, the daunting task is to anticipate and intercept specific operations, aided perhaps by disruption of al Qaeda's infrastructure. Al Qaeda's interest in weapons of mass destruction makes this a high stakes game.

Al Qaeda in the 1990s

Bin Laden and al Qaeda were viewed as an escalating threat in American policy circles over the last decade. The United States was occupied with other problems, to be sure, and these were more than enough to tax the limited attention of a president who never warmed to foreign policy. It was worthwhile trying to quell the civil wars in Bosnia and Rwanda, and important to counter North Korea's bellicose gestures toward Seoul and Tokyo. The United States was tending the confrontation between the Chinese and Taiwanese in their hot standoff across the straits. It had to think through the post-cold war evolution of Europe and to craft a new relationship with Russia after communism. Terror by nonstate actors was nothing new. The 1984 attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon killed over 200 personnel.

But there was the nagging sense in some parts of Washington that bin Laden and al Qaeda were different and dangerous. Their program of activity has been steady, paced, and increasingly effective in its destruction. American soldiers on their way to Somalia were killed in Aden by al Qaeda in 1992. In the famous episode of "Black Hawk Down," eighteen army rangers were killed in a shoot-out in 1993 on the streets of Mogadishu by Somali fighters trained by al Qaeda. The loss of two Black Hawk helicopters and mistreatment of the corpse of an American soldier, dragged through the alleys of the Somali capital, brought about the abrupt withdrawal of American forces, on the mistaken ground that "peacekeeping" was the culprit. Bin Laden may have been emboldened to suppose that the United States would leave the region altogether.

Jihad on American soil began in early 1993 with the truck bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City. The explosion shattered the lower levels of the complex and knocked out its utility systems. Thousands of civilians evacuated the building down smoky stairwells. Six office workers died. But several conspirators were quickly traced and arrested, and this good fortune and

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good police work may have added to the dangerous conceit that the United States could thwart terror networks by criminal law enforcement alone.

World Trade Center conspirator Ramsey Ahmad Youssef returned to the Philippines to stage-manage the plans of al Qaeda's growing regional network. Al Qaeda's southeast Asian division, in cooperation with the radical Filipino terror group, Abu Sayyaf, hoped to assassinate President Bill Clinton on a visit to Manila in 1994, to assassinate the pope, and to bomb two United Airlines jets en route to Hong Kong. The midair bombings were to be simultaneous, a marked feature of al Qaeda's aesthetics of violence. Other ongoing plans included a diabolical version of a Busbee Berklee water ballet, staging the destruction of eleven American jetliners crossing the Pacific as they prepared to land at American airports. The bombing operation was near launch when a fire broke out in Youssef's Manila apartment; authorities responded and stumbled on the plans. Ramsey Youssef was later arrested by American agents in Karachi. The Asian group carried out the successful bombing of a Philippines airliner bound for Tokyo. Throughout, bin Laden and al Qaeda continued to show a talent for friendly takeovers, contacting local Islamic groups and offering the money and plans to multiply their capabilities. Nor did the network abandon ambitions for attacks in the United States. A plan was hatched to fly a small aircraft laden with explosives into the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters. Another plan was underway to bomb the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels in New York City and to blow up the United Nations. This was interrupted only when an informant was infiltrated into the group.

Bin Laden's terror bombings continued in the Middle East. In 1995, the U.S. training center for the Saudi National Guard near Riyadh was truck-bombed, killing five Americans. In June 1996 (five weeks after bin Laden was expelled from Sudan and was forced to regroup in Afghanistan) he sent another TNT-packed truck to the Khobar Towers military barracks in Saudi Arabia. American sentries lacked an adequate alarm system to empty the dormitory in time. Ten American soldiers were killed and many were wounded. The Saudis awarded the contract for reconstruction to a firm owned by bin Laden's brothers. The Saudis beheaded four prime suspects without allowing the FBI to debrief them.

In 1998, with practiced logistics and coordination, bin Laden commissioned catastrophic attacks on American embassies in East Africa. Truck bomb explosions toppled the embassy buildings in Nairobi and Dar es Saleem, killing 224 people, including fourteen Americans, and wounding 4,500. In a sense, at this moment bin Laden crossed an escalatory threshold. FBI agents were again dispatched to look for usable evidence, but Washington finally resorted to the use of military force. Two volleys of Tomahawk land attack missiles were launched from American naval vessels against sites in Afghanistan and Sudan. One target was al Qaeda's training camp near Khost, Afghanistan. The second was the al Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan, serving as an alleged transfer point for chemical weapons. The press scoffed that this was a wag-the-

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dog diversion from the Monica Lewinsky-Bill Clinton scandal and assumed the al Shifa plant was an ill chosen target.[1]

FBI director Louis Freeh also chipped away at the decision, complaining in a unique account of the national chain of command that he was not consulted on targeting. Some critics argued that any response should wait until the end of the criminal investigation, even when other American embassies were under threat from the al Qaeda network. Others suggested that Washington should share its available intelligence with the UN Security Council. The UN role was further complicated by the decision of senior staff of the Hague chemical weapons monitoring secretariat to publicly air their skepticism about U.S. methodology in target assessment, perhaps in an attempt to distance their own inspection activities from the American use of force.

The White House lacked the courage of its own convictions in the execution of the air strikes. The prime target was a scheduled meeting of bin Laden's senior lieutenants (and perhaps bin Laden himself) in a camp near Khost. But the Tomahawk launch was delayed for several hours, until 7:30 p.m. Sudan time and 10 p.m. Afghan time, in order to avoid any chance of collateral damage in the strike against the secondary target in Khartoum. By then, the meeting of bin Laden's lieutenants in Khost was over. Military value must be weighed against collateral danger to civilians. But the White House could not have supposed the military mission was worth much except as symbolism with this fatal delay in execution. One could have abandoned the Khartoum target altogether, in favor of decapitating al Qaeda's command and control.[2]

In October 2000, bin Laden struck again, using a skiff loaded with explosives to blow a hole in an American destroyer at harbor in Aden, nearly sinking the ship. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was again dispatched to investigate—perhaps because the United States doubted the authorship, perhaps because criminal investigation allows it to do something. But the Yemeni government quickly put the lid on what the agents could ask, and they were withdrawn. The United States passed through the millennium celebrations without incident, but an Algerian caught at the Canadian border confessed that the explosives in his car were designed for an attack at the Los Angeles airport.

The Attacks of September 11, 2001

On September 11, 2001, everything changed. A country of 250 million people, returning from its summer vacation, was turned upside down by the inconceiv-

[1] The rationale for the al Shifa target was further obscured when senior members of Clinton's cabinet boggled background facts in their public statements. The administration belatedly pointed to intercepted telephone links between the al Shifa owner and the director of the Iraqi chemical weapons program, but the press cycle had passed. Washington attempted to freeze the assets of the al Shifa plant owner but later abandoned the suit, and this was read by the press as an admission of mistaken targeting. It did not occur to any reporters that pretrial discovery in the civil suit might compromise ongoing surveillance activities. See Ruth Wedgwood, "Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden," *Yale Journal of International Law* 24 (Summer 1999): 599.

[2] Ibid.

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able destruction of two of the nation's tallest buildings. As many as 28,000 people are employed in the World Trade Center at the beginning of the workday, and the surprise is that more were not killed. Some law enforcement veterans remembered the warning issued by Ramsey Youssef when he was captured after the 1993 bombing: it had been their intention, he said, to topple the buildings entirely.

Like many other travelers, I was on a plane to Washington at the time. It was diverted to the Baltimore airport amid reports that one hijacked plane had hit the Pentagon and that another plane was still circling near Washington. (This was the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania.) The hijackers' plan to hit the White House or the Capitol as a fourth target has been corroborated by debriefings of personnel captured in Afghanistan.

The next several days were extraordinarily tense. Bin Laden had boasted to his circle of a Hiroshima-style event, and September 11 raised the fear that the metaphor might be literal. The evacuation of the President from Washington was not unreasonable under the circumstances. Bin Laden's keen interest in acquiring a nuclear device had been reported for years, and his escalation of violence lessened any confidence that he would step back from its use. The documents captured in Afghanistan have given no greater comfort about his ambition, although it appears that he still lacks a working bomb. On the supply side, there is limited cause for confidence. Roald Sagdeev, the famed Russian physicist, says it is unlikely that Moscow would have shared control of any so-called suitcase bombs with regional commands. Encrypted decoupling links could defeat any attempt to excavate the arming code with modern computing capability. But other observers, including former CIA Director James Woolsey and former UN weapons inspector Richard Butler, as well as Russian sources, have estimated that there are a dozen or more suitcase bombs unaccounted for. Russia also had hundreds of nuclear artillery shells prepared for a war in Europe. With the Russian economy in tatters, an unemployed scientist, technician, or guard might be tempted by the unspeakable. In addition, Saddam Hussein was thought to be six months away from atomic weapons capability at the time UN inspectors withdrew from Iraq in December 1998.

Al Qaeda's interest in developing chemical and biological weapons has also been corroborated in the aftermath of the American campaign in Afghanistan. Documents found on hard drives and schematics drawn on blackboards in al Qaeda's Afghan offices suggest that the network remains actively interested in developing weapons of mass destruction. During the 1990s, Iraq began to explore a policy of subcontracting abroad for the production of forbidden weapons to avoid the UN inspectors. A representative of Saddam Hussein's son Qusayy reportedly met with al Qaeda representatives in 1998 to explore a joint interest in chemical weapons.[3]

[3] "Sudanese Factory Was Working with Iraq on VX Nerve Agent, U.S. Intelligence Says; Assessment Based in Part on Intercepted Phone Calls," *Baltimore Sun*, 26 August 1998.

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Finally, little comfort can be taken from new discoveries about the structure of al Qaeda's compartmentalized network. Arrests and searches conducted by foreign authorities have revealed that al Qaeda cells are placed throughout Europe and Asia in cities such as Milan and Hamburg, Singapore and Manila with plans to attack American embassies and other targets in locations as farflung as Singapore and Sarajevo. The al Qaeda training manual found in a London apartment carefully instructs new recruits in the skills of terrorism. The manual, placed in the court record at the East African embassy bombings trial (as government exhibit 1677-T), decries Islam's "wasted generation that pursued everything that is western and produced rulers, ministers, leaders, physicians, engineers, businessmen, politicians, journalists, and information specialists." It celebrates "missions" such as "assassinating enemy personnel as well as foreign tourists," and "blasting and destroying the embassies and attacking vital economic centers" and "the bridges leading into and out of the cities." It notes the need in such special operations for "tranquility and calm personality that allows coping with psychological traumas such as those of the operation of bloodshed, mass murder."

At length, the manual instructs new members in countersurveillance, encryption, the preparation of safe houses, and the choice of escape routes after an assassination. The jihad's "undercover members" are to avoid any outward appearance of "Islamic orientation." The jihadist should not frequent mosques. He should avoid open devotions to the prophet, shave his beard, wear gold, and even listen to music in order to blend into the secular society of the West. The hijackers of September 11 who passed through security in the Boston airport looked like ordinary travelers.

September 11 is evident proof that attacks on civilians are within al Qaeda's theory of conflict. Bin Laden's 1998 fatwa declared that members of al Qaeda should target Americans and Jews, and his interviews since then have stated that even "taxpayers" are fair targets. What then should one do?

U.S. Military Response and Legislative Measures

The Bush administration's first strategy was to disrupt al Qaeda by military means, using air power and limited ground forces to attack the network's logistics and training centers in Afghanistan. Overthrowing the Taliban faction was also a signal lesson to complicit Muslim regimes that might be tempted to shelter al Qaeda. The response was approved by the United Nations Security Council[4] and NATO,[5] as a campaign of self-defense against armed attack. The flight of al Qaeda leadership over the mountains into neighboring territories in Pakistan and Iran has been a disappointment. But the military action has also provided a portfolio of documentary evidence to assist in the tracking of al Qaeda

[4] UN S.C. Res. 1368, 12 September 2001; S.C. Res. 1373, 28 September 2001.

[5] Statement by the North Atlantic Council, 12 September 2001, in Press Release 124.

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network members in other countries, and corroborates beyond doubt the terror group's troublesome interest in weapons of mass destruction.

The public debate in North America and Europe has concerned what measures should supplement this initial campaign of military force—whether terrorism should still be countered through the ordinary means of criminal law or through some significant shift in enforcement methods. It is interesting to note that the modern international guarantees of human rights openly anticipate the possibility of social threats that are hard to meet. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the American Convention speak openly of possible emergencies, perhaps because these legal instruments were designed for countries that are more familiar with such hazards than is the continentally protected American republic. Each document is quite frank in asserting that in a situation of emergency, a state may be bound to take measures that would be inappropriate in peacetime. In an acknowledged emergency, a government can derogate from listed rights, so long as the modification is proportionate and necessary, excepting only a few fundamental norms guaranteeing physical integrity of the body and protection against racial discrimination. This is much more open-ended than the American Constitution, where any necessary latitude for wartime travails is to be read into the rights themselves or (if you are Abraham Lincoln) handled through the radical measure of suspending habeas corpus.

In the response to September 11, the first contentious measure was approved by Congress in the so-called Patriot Act, which allows a crucial sharing of information between the intelligence and criminal justice agencies.[6] Over the last twenty-five years, in the aftermath of the Church and Pike congressional hearings, Washington created a wide firebreak between intelligence and law enforcement. This was to be a visible protection for the American ideal of privacy. Government scrutiny of ordinary citizens and resident aliens within the United States was limited to criminal acts established by demonstrable facts, where reasonable or probable cause was already in hand to indicate the law had been violated. This often meant the FBI was reactive, waiting for problems to present themselves, rather than going out searching. Any scrutiny based on acts of speech or political views was forbidden, even though incendiary advocacy of violence might sometimes give way to violent action. The FBI was largely unable to share grand jury information or criminal wiretap information with intelligence agencies as a matter of law and agency culture. Even foreign counterintelligence wiretaps conducted by the FBI often were not shared with the CIA. In turn, the intelligence agencies were reluctant to engage with the criminal justice agencies for fear that the linkage might appear to be a backdoor around the privacy rules of law enforcement.

This bureaucratic lobotomy had an obvious cost. Only the CIA can operate clandestinely offshore. FBI legates depend on the foreign host's say-so and per-

[6] The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), P.L. 107-05, 115 Stat. 2721, at section 203.

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mission. Only the FBI can operate stateside. Yet al Qaeda moves onshore and offshore in real time, with operatives flying between Europe, Asia, and North America. The necessary synthesis of circumstantial evidence was profoundly difficult in the circumstances. Despite the cautions from the past, it may take a network to catch a network. For a limited term, the Patriot Act permits the FBI to share grand jury information and Title III wiretap information with intelligence agencies investigating catastrophic terrorism; it must keep a record for later court review. In addition, the FBI has been instructed to share data from its foreign counterintelligence wiretaps. The intelligence agencies are now mandated to share their offshore investigative findings with the FBI.

The second major change in overcoming the "two-brain" government is a liberalized test for foreign counterintelligence wiretaps. Under the president's foreign affairs power, the constitutional right to monitor foreign adversaries (and even friends) has not depended on a showing of crime. Rather, the sleuthing of foreign intentions has only required the identification of a foreign government or agency relationship. Such surveillance within the United States is regulated by a judicial panel under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).[7] But in the past, the Justice Department was fearful of seeking a FISA tap when there was a realistic chance of criminal prosecution as well. The statutory test required that the singular purpose of the wiretap must be intelligence alone. This has now been changed by statute to permit a FISA tap where intelligence is a "significant" purpose.[8] Both criminal justice prosecutions and intelligence interception will be appropriate responses to a terrorist threat, and this statutory change avoids the unwonted pressure to pretend that one purpose is uppermost. It avoids the dilemma that would otherwise push agencies to forgo interdiction of a scheme because there was a felt interest in prosecution as well. To be sure, the limitations stemmed from the mishaps of the 1950s and 1960s—seeming to avoid any dilution of standards for government surveillance in a libertarian society. But if anything, the lesson was learned too well. We have been hobbled in gathering, pooling, and evaluating the necessary information on terrorist networks, cells, and their members—a task often requiring the examination of such minutiae as apartment leases, hotel registrations, check endorsements, wire transfers, travel itineraries, as well as intercepted electronic messages and conversations.

A third controverted measure was the Congress's authorization for the arrest of noncitizens "reasonably believed" to be involved with terrorism and the power to hold them for a period of seven days, before they were charged with a crime or immigration violation. This was perhaps the most illiberal of the government's measures. But it may count for something that Congress specifically delegated the authority in light of the emergency. As Justice Robert Jackson noted in the Steel Seizure Case in 1952,[9] the President's emergency power is at

[7] 50 U.S.C. 1801 et. seq.

[8] USA Patriot Act, section 218.

[9] *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Jackson, J., concurring.

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its height when he acts pursuant to Congress's instructions. Congress has the constitutional power to take far-reaching measures in wartime, including the suspension of habeas corpus (a measure widely indulged in during the Civil War when Lincoln was concerned that Confederate sympathizers in Maryland might cut off the nation's capital from the rest of the North). Another standard of comparison lies in the traditional prerogative of states in wartime to intern enemy aliens. This harsh power can reach even those enemy aliens who openly disdain their own foreign government. In Great Britain, shortly after September 11, Prime Minister Tony Blair successfully proposed to the Parliament that he should have the power to order the indefinite detention of aliens suspected of connection to the al Qaeda network.

Initially, approximately 1,100 aliens were taken into custody under the powers of Section 236A of the Patriot Act.[10] This was the only exercise of the emergency seven-day detention power, and was near in time to September 11. By late November 2001, 55 defendants were still held on criminal charges, and approximately 548 on immigration charges. Some material witnesses were also detained, but the number is not recorded because of grand jury secrecy.[11]

The administration's mustered defense turns on the urgency of throwing al Qaeda off balance. One did not know whether other attacks were in the works. There was little sense of luxury in resorting to patient grand jury investigations when greater mass catastrophe seemed a real threat. Oddly, accurate judgment could be hobbled by success. No violent attacks have been mounted within the United States since September 11, other than the disputed post office mailing of anthrax letters and the attempt to down an airplane with a powerfully packed shoe-bomb.[12] A critic may suppose that this proves the measures were unnecessary. But the absence of attacks may also indicate the opposite.

A fourth deeply controverted measure is the Bureau of Prisons order that permits the rare monitoring of attorney-client conversations within federal prisons.[13] Legal consultations between a lawyer and his client are sacrosanct under almost all circumstances. But statements that advance the commission of a crime are not protected under the Sixth Amendment or under the rules of

[10] USA Patriot Act, supra note 6, at section 236A.

[11] See *Attorney General Ashcroft Provides Total Number of Federal Criminal Charges and INS Detainees*, 27 November 2001, available at www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks11_27.htm.

[12] Nonetheless, al Qaeda's activity has continued with the truck-bombing of a synagogue in Tunisia, plans to bomb the Duomo in Milan and the marketplace in Strasbourg, France (venue of the European Court of Human Rights). The unhappy youth of the French suburbs have been named as the source of attacks against synagogues and other Jewish facilities, but foreign collaboration is not improbable. The violence in Israel may give pause in light of bin Laden's October 2001 reiteration that "We are in a decisive battle with the Jews and those who support them. . . . The killing of Jews and Americans is one of the greatest duties." See transcript of bin Laden's October 2001 interview with Al-Jazeera television, posted on www.CNN.com, 5 February 2002, available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapsf/south/02/05/binladen.transcript/index.html, 5 July 2002.

[13] *National Security: Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism*, 28 Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 500 and 501, 66 Federal Register 55061, 31 October 2001.

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legal ethics. An attorney is entitled to reveal a confidence where the disclosure is necessary to avoid the death of an innocent person. Attorneys are sometimes asked to carry messages for their clients, including convicted felons, who try to run their networks from jail. An attorney may not even realize the significance of what he is asked to transmit. This is a price we have been willing to pay for the sake of privacy and confidence in ordinary criminal schemes where only a handful of lives are at stake. Al Qaeda operations are aimed at massive casualties, and the moral and constitutional calculus becomes more perplexing. The view that all terrorism inquiries belong in the federal courts and the wish for full and free choice of defense lawyers ratchets up this dilemma.

The way that similar problems have been treated in the past is to have a strict segregation between an intelligence monitoring team and a trial team. This kind of firewall protection has been used before in cases where a defense attorney may have occasion to talk to officials of a foreign government office monitored under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. There is an attempt to "minimize" (not listen to or record) any privileged conversation. Any inadvertent knowledge of defense strategy is kept from the trial team. This has worked well and without scandal in past national security prosecutions, and it is perhaps the unfamiliarity of the arrangement that elicited such vehement initial comment by people who seemed unfamiliar with the judge's role. If any information is ever to be turned over, it can be done only with the permission of a federal judge.

But the greatest attention has been directed to the President's order on military commissions as mode of trial against the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Perhaps because the first implementing order was issued under the pressure of time and emergency,[14] critics initially treated it as an occasion to express accumulated fears that catastrophic terrorism might lessen the commitment to American liberties. One may wish to see the commission proposal as a response instead to the evident limits of federal court prosecutions.

U.S. strategy throughout the 1990s was to conduct criminal investigations through the grand jury and attempt to gather the necessary evidence for trial before a petit jury. Criminal charges in the 1993 Trade Center bombing and the embassies bombings were brought in the federal district court in lower Manhattan, and prosecutors in the Southern District of New York (under the leadership of U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White) had an impressive record of obtaining convictions. But the limits of criminal inquiries were evident when the World Trade Center toppled five blocks from the courthouse in the September 11 ca-

[14] Military Order Regarding Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html, 5 July 2002. But see *Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism*, Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, 21 March 2002, available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf, July 2002.

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tastrophe.[15] Every criminal case has in a sense represented an intelligence failure, for it means the United States failed to intercept an ongoing plan.

Remaining Concerns

There are several specific concerns with the capacities of federal courts. First is protecting intelligence information, especially in the middle of an ongoing conflict. Against an impenetrable network, a criminal conviction may well depend on the use of intelligence information obtained from exquisitely sensitive sources. The need for electronic intercepts and other delicate information will be especially acute in trials against the leadership and logicians, the organizers and entrepreneurs who dispatch the suicidal operatives to the bombing sites. A compartmentalized network schooled to avoid detection is not likely to generate many witnesses to its inner workings, hence requiring this broader availability of sources. Yet anything considered against the defendant must be put into the public trial record in a federal court, where it is available for review by al Qaeda as well as more benign court watchers. The Classified Information Procedures Act passed in 1980 permits some greater ability to gauge the extent of prejudice to ongoing intelligence work and compromise of classified information likely to occur in the course of a trial.[16] It may permit the substitution of a generic description for a specific particle of intelligence. But ultimately, the particulars to be used against the defendant must be made known to him and to the world at large. In the case of electronic surveillance, this can be extremely troublesome for keeping track of a terrorist network's ongoing plans. Bin Laden and al Qaeda are sophisticates in avoiding ongoing surveillance by changing telephone systems on regular occasions and switching to emails and couriers. To lose track of an open wire even for a few weeks could have serious consequences.

The second problem is the tightly woven exclusion of probative evidence in traditional federal trials, limiting what can be placed before a jury for evaluation. There is an historical distrust of juries in the Anglo-American tradition with sharp limits on what they are permitted to consider, excluding many forms of evidence used in everyday life. One wants to be rigorous in estimating what is sufficient proof of a criminal act for purposes of punishment and sanction—the *weight* of proof, commonly thought of as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But restrictions on the *admissibility* of evidence are another matter and are far less exclusionary in European trials, international courts, and civil courts. In an American criminal jury trial, only eyewitness testimony and first-hand speech by the defendant can be considered, with very few exceptions. Authentication

[15] See Ruth Wedgwood, "Cause for Alarm: Legal Action Can Bring Victories, But Preventing Terrorism Calls for Tougher Tactics," *Washington Post*, 3 June 2001.

[16] Classified Information Procedures Act, P.L. 96-456, 96th Cong., 94 Stat. 2025, 18 U.S.C. Appendix, as amended by P.L. 100-690, Title 7, sec. 7020(G), 18 November 1988, 102 Stat. 4396.

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requirements are rigorous for physical evidence, and search and seizure law is enforced by keeping avowedly reliable evidence away from the view of the jury.

Hearsay can lack desirable indicia of reliability, since the speaker is not available for cross-examination on his accuracy of perception, his possible motive to lie, and his memory. But one can also imagine examples where the indicia of reliability seem strong. Take, for example, Osama bin Laden's reported call to his mother before September 11, warning her that he could not call for awhile. If, hypothetically, bin Laden's mother told her best friend, the friend would not be permitted to testify to the conversation, even where she was the only available witness. First-hand evidence is clearly to be preferred, but there may be instances where hearsay is probative, especially where corroborated by other sources of evidence.

So, too, in a federal district court trial, if evidence was obtained through a legally defective search, it must be excluded from evidence. This has nothing to do with its probative quality, but rather with maintaining a peacetime incentive system for appropriate police behavior. Yet in the case of extraordinary threat, with a group such as al Qaeda, admitting evidence based on its probative quality may seem more attractive.

There are also rather technical authentication requirements that surround the introduction of evidence in federal trials. This often involves proving chain of custody, producing a custodian of records to testify how records were kept, and showing that the condition of an object has not changed. In the harried circumstances of a cave search, it will not be possible to maintain crime scene standards. Indeed, one of the most interesting discoveries concerning al Qaeda would face high hurdles for admission in federal court. A *Wall Street Journal* reporter assigned to cover the Afghan war broke his computer and needed a new laptop hard drive. He ventured into the marketplace in Kabul and discovered two hard drives for sale that had apparently been looted from al Qaeda offices, replete with al Qaeda memos, including reports on scouting targets.[17] One would hate to deprive a fact-finder of so rich a source of information.

In creating these limits on inquiry and probative power, we may have tied our hands beyond easy amendment except by constitutional change. Many restrictions on hearsay have been placed into the Sixth Amendment in its so-called confrontation clause. The open record of all portions of a criminal trial has been placed within the guarantee of an open and public trial in the Sixth Amendment. The exclusionary rule has been placed within the Fourth Amendment. The constitutionalizing of criminal procedure was designed to reform state criminal justice systems that could only be reached through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the upshot is that after September 11, there is little ability to change the modality of trial within the civilian court system except after serious conversation on the limits of constitutional change in wartime.

[17] See Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, "How al Qaeda Agent Scouted Attack Sites in Israel and Egypt," *Wall Street Journal*, 16 January 2002.

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The third felt concern has been trial security. In ordinary matters, the safety of the jury, judge, and witnesses is assumed. But in the trial of al Qaeda, there is cause for great caution. The federal judges who presided over al Qaeda cases are under round-the-clock protection by rotating teams of federal marshals after concerted threats to their safety. Jurors do not have similar teams of marshals for lifetime protection, and jury anonymity is a thin shield for a citizen summoned for mandatory service. The threats have not been all talk. German tourists killed at Luxor in 1997 were mistaken for Americans, and their bodies were found with a note railing at the trial judge in New York. The Pan Am 103 bombing trial was held at Camp Zeist, a mothballed American military base outside of The Hague. Even with Colonel Muammar el-Qadaffi's consent to the trial, the United Nations preferred to pick up the defendants in a UN transport plane that didn't need to linger in Tripoli for refueling. An al Qaeda embassy bombing defendant has used the occasion of his lawyer's visit to wield a filed-off pocket comb as a knife, stabbing and crippling a jailhouse guard in order to take over the floor of the detention facility.[18] The willingness of al Qaeda to target innocent civilians gives no comfort that they would respect the etiquette of courtroom safety.

Military Commissions and Tribunals

It was reasonable to consider other options for trying al Qaeda and Taliban fighters captured in Afghanistan. The President's decision to authorize military commissions follows the tradition of Nuremberg and the law of war itself.[19] The trial of the Nazi leadership in 1945 was conducted in a mixed military tribunal, with rules of evidence and cross-examination quite different from what is familiar in federal court. In the aftermath of World War II, 2,500 commission trials were convened in Europe and the Far East to try people accused of atrocities, including the Tokyo trials. Military courts are so much the venue of international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict that the 1949 Third Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War demands military trials in preference to civilian, unless the particular legal system also tries its own soldiers in civilian court.[20]

[18] See *United States v. Mamdouh Mahmud Salim*, 151 F. Supp. 2nd 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

[19] On the early history of American military commissions, see William Winthrop, *Military Law and Precedents* (Washington, DC: W.H. Morrison, 1886); and William Birkhimer, *Military Government and Martial Law* (3rd ed., Kansas City, MO: F. Hudson, 1914). On the history of commissions generally, see also A. Wigfall Green, "The Military Commission," *American Journal of International Law* 832 (1948); and *Madsen v. Kinsella*, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).

[20] See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Article 84, "A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war."

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What has distracted us, perhaps, is that in the 1990s, the Security Council created two civilian tribunals of limited jurisdiction to try the atrocities of the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. These tribunals have had some successes but have not been able to handle any volume of cases. In addition, the protection of sensitive intelligence information in an international institution is daunting, to say the least; and only one American judge, at most, would sit in such a venue. These two ad hoc arrangements have not been the typical method of trial for a body of law that is created, after all, through the state practice of responsible militaries as well as through the views of humanitarian organizations. So, too, the treaty-based International Criminal Court, which the United States has declined to join, will have jurisdiction only over future offenses committed after it comes into force in July 2002 and is equally problematic as a place to deposit sensitive operational intelligence in an ongoing conflict against catastrophic terrorism.[21]

The claim that the president has violated the principle of separation of powers is hard to square with Congress's repeated endorsement of a "common law" jurisdiction for military commissions in time of war and armed conflict. Judge Advocate General Enoch Crowder addressed the point in 1912 testimony concerning military courts-martial and new "articles of war" (equivalent to the Uniform Code of Military Justice). General Crowder noted that "There will be more instances in the future than in the past when the jurisdiction of courts-martial will overlap that of the war courts." He went on, "the question would arise whether Congress having vested jurisdiction by statute [in courts-martial] the common law of war jurisdiction was not ousted. I wish to make it perfectly plain . . . that in such cases the jurisdiction of the war court is concurrent."[22]

Congress's regulation of the court-martial system has been accompanied each time by acknowledgment that military commissions are still appropriate for prosecuting offenses against the law of war committed by adversaries. Article 15 of the 1920 Articles of War stated, for example, that "The provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions . . . of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute *or by the law of war* may be triable by such military commissions. . . ."[23] Similar language was included in the more famous Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, replacing the Articles of War.[24] In the 1996 War Crimes Act, newly permitting concurrent jurisdiction over certain

[21] See Ruth Wedgwood, "The International Criminal Court: An American View," *European Journal of International Law* 10 (1999): 93.

[22] Statement of Major General Enoch H. Crowder, judge advocate general, on Revision of the Articles of War, Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U.S. Senate, 62nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1912, 35.

[23] Article 15 of the Articles of War, in Chapter 227, P.L. No. 242, 66th Cong., 2nd sess., 1920.

[24] See 10 U.S.C. 361, cited in the preambular language of President George W. Bush's 13 November 2001 order.

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war crimes in the district courts, the legislative conference report again acknowledged the longstanding legitimacy of commissions.[25]

The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the role of military commissions in several cases arising in World War II: the prosecutions of German saboteurs who landed on Long Island and Florida,[26] Germans in China who had passed information to the Japanese even after Germany's surrender,[27] and Japanese General Yamashita, whose forces abused civilians and prisoners in the Philippines.[28] As Justice Robert H. Jackson recounted in *Johnson v. Eisentrager*, "[W]e have held . . . that the military commission is a lawful tribunal to adjudge enemy offenses against the laws of war."[29] The trials look more vulnerable now. For example, the defense counsel in the German saboteurs case had a conflict of interest that we would not now tolerate. But civil trials of that era also often appear deficient to our eyes, and the matter depends on the quality of the designed procedures.

The procedures announced by the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on 21 March 2002 include most guarantees familiar to lay observers.[30] Defendants would be presumed innocent, guaranteed the right against self-incrimination, protected against adverse comment for their exercise of that right, and guaranteed timely notice of charges. Defendants could choose among military defense counsel and could hire their own civilian counsel. The trial would be open to the press except in discrete moments when classified or sensitive intelligence was to be presented. The burden of proof would remain on the government and defendants would be free to call any witnesses in their defense. Convictions would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the death penalty could be imposed only by a unanimous verdict. Appeal could be taken to an independent appellate panel on which civilians could serve, with the power to reverse and remand a conviction. The concessions to circumstance are that the presiding panel could consider any evidence that would appear to be probative to a reasonable person. And for exquisitely sensitive intelligence particles, the defendant might have to rely on his military defense counsel for their rebuttal and challenge.

These are not the procedures of a railroad proceeding that some in the press and civil liberties community had feared. Upon publication of the procedures, the public conversation over the tribunals largely abated.[31] The proof of fairness

[25] War Crimes Act of 1996, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, H.Rep. 104-698, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 24 July 1996.

[26] *Ex parte Quirin*, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).

[27] *Johnson v. Eisentrager*, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).

[28] *In re Yamashita*, 327 U.S. 1 (1945).

[29] *Johnson v. Eisentrager*, 339 U.S. at 786.

[30] See *Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism*, Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, 21 March 2002, available at www.defenselink.mil/Mar2002/d2002032/ord.pdf, 5 July 2002.

[31] Several Washington veterans were asked individually by Secretary Rumsfeld to advise him on the desirable form of the procedures. The statement endorsing the fairness of the procedures appears in the Appendix to my chapter in Demetrios James Caraley, ed., *September 11, Terrorist Attacks, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 2002), 176–178.

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lies in the actual application, of course. The first prosecutions against alleged members of al Qaeda have proceeded in civilian courts. The so-called American Taliban, John Walker Lindh, was excluded from the reach of the President's order by virtue of his nationality. British citizen Richard Reid and French citizen Zaccarias Moussaoui were indicted before the military commission rules were available. The ambitious defense motions in those civilian cases may frame expectations of what a trial looks like; one lawyer has creatively argued there is a Second Amendment right to bear arms applicable in Afghanistan, a First Amendment right to associate with the Taliban, and a form of "combat immunity" for a "mere foot soldier" recruited to the Afghan front lines.[32]

In real life, there may be little information about the individual actions of combatants captured in Afghanistan. If the evidence does not rise to the quality of criminal proof, it would be a mistake to convene a criminal proceeding of any kind. This will leave the United States and its allies with the dilemma of potentially detaining captured combatants qua combatants. Such internment is a traditional prerogative of wartime: a nation state can capture and continue to detain enemy combatants until a war's active hostilities are over to prevent the soldiers from returning to the fight. But in the paradoxical world of al Qaeda's terrorism, there are fewer legal guideposts. Neither al Qaeda nor the Taliban chooses to wear a military uniform, and no one has ever defined an alternative standard of proof of combatant status. In terrorism sponsored by nonstate actors, there is no government able to demobilize young men embarked on a violent jihad, and the conflict has no evident end. One may be put to drawing analogies from elsewhere in the law, including the emergency powers recognized in international human rights law and the peacetime law of civil commitment with periodic review of the status of battlefield combatants and the necessity for their detention.

The basic norms of the law remain the same—to preserve liberty except where there is a grave danger to others posed by violent behavior, and to limit measures to what is necessary and proportionate. In a world where terrorist action flirts with catastrophic weapons, the competing paradigms of crime and war may provide no more than analogies. Fitting the law to this unwanted new world thus will require tact, judgment, and the weight of a heavy heart.

[32] See (E.D. Va. Crim. No. 02-37-A), Memorandum Opinion, 11 July 2002.

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Encircled Again: Russia's Military Assesses Threats in a Post-Soviet World

WILLIAM D. JACKSON

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new democratic, market-based Russian state whose leadership declared the states of the capitalist West to be partners and allies threw the military establishment in Moscow into ideological as well as organizational disarray. Gradually over the last decade, new forms of thinking focused on Russia's national security, and new perceptions of threats to the security of the new Russian state have emerged within Russia's military. The identification of threats intended to define the mission of Russia's armed forces and support the funding of military programs has been influenced by a complex of factors in post-Soviet Russia's internal and external political environment. These have included the conflict in Chechnya, the spread of fundamentalist insurgency in Central Asia, the eastward expansion of NATO, NATO's military actions in the Balkans, the growing influence of the United States and other states in many former Soviet republics, the U.S.–led military campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the potentially long-term increased U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Discussion of military threats has also been affected by the military's institutional interests in influencing the direction of reform and shaping defense policy and budgetary decisions. Finally, threat discourse in the military has been influenced both by the ideological heritage from the Soviet period in which the current military leadership was largely educated and socialized, as well as by new post-Soviet ideological and intellectual currents, especially those which have arisen in antiliberal nationalist circles to which elements of the military leadership appear to be attracted.

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This article will examine the nature and evolution of threat discourse in the Russian military in the last decade. Particular attention will be paid to disjunctures between the military and civilian leaderships' views on the threats confronting Russia and to the policies required to advance Russia's security interests. Overall, the policies of Russia's civilian leadership regarding foreign and security policy in the first decade of the post-Soviet era have appeared at odds with an emergent militant ideology within the military, which draws on geopolitical "science" as well as theories of "civilizational conflict" to describe a world in which Russia is encircled by mounting threats of a long-term and historically objective character. While a new post-Leninist militant world view postulating an inevitably aggressive West as well as a range of other historically determined dangers has not been uniformly embraced within the Russian military, it has appeared to exert growing appeal with elements of the military leadership.

The Military Confronts A Post-Cold War World

In the years 1989-1991, the Soviet military was confronted by a rapidly unfolding series of events that profoundly altered the Soviet strategic environment. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989, the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, the reunification of Germany in 1990, and the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe in 1991 created the need for a fundamental reassessment of the international situation and adjustments in military doctrine. Only in the last months of the Soviet Union's existence, however, did the accumulating weight of political change produce signs of shift in military thinking. Increasingly, military commentaries acknowledged the onset of a new epoch marked by the end of the cold war. New appeals appeared regarding the need to "adjust Marxist-Leninist science to an era of the growing cooperation of states."[1] In this period, military analysts generally acknowledged that the danger of a military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West had been significantly reduced.[2] At the same time, the military press expressed criticism of "naive" and unrealistic viewpoints in the civilian media that military dangers confronting the Soviet Union had been eliminated.[3]

To justify the continuation of a large military establishment in the post-cold war era, military officials cited: the West was maintaining NATO in the face of the elimination of the Warsaw Pact and on-going withdrawal of Soviet forces

[1] General S. A. Tushkevich, "Marksistko-leninskoye ucheniye o voine i armii: istoriya, razvitiya i sovremennie otsenki," *Voennaya mysl'* 6 (1991): 48–53.

[2] General N. P. Klokotov and Major-General M. M. Kasenkov, "K voprosu o voennoi opastnosti," *Voennaya mysl'* 8 (1991): 7–11; Tushkevich, "Marksistko-leninskoye ucheniye"; "Akromeyev on Military Balance," Joint Publication Research Service-University of Massachusetts (JPRS-UMA)-91-013, 20 May 1991, 27.

[3] General G. V. Kirilenko and Colonel D. V. Trenin, "Razmyshleniya nad proektom voennoi doktrini," *Voennaya mysl'* 10 (1991): 11–19.

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from Eastern Europe; the United States did not plan to dismantle the elaborate system of cold war military bases encircling the USSR; and the United States had not scaled back significantly its own military modernization programs.[4] Overall, analyses published in this period in *Voennaya mysl'*, the journal of the Ministry of Defense devoted to questions of military doctrine, acknowledged a lowered risk of confrontation with the West.[5] The dominant conclusion, however, was that NATO continued to represent a military danger that required the continuation of a vigorous military effort on the part of the Soviet state. Some Soviet military analysts expressed the view that the new capability of the United States to effectively engage an enemy at long distance with the highly precise conventional weaponry demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm augured a new era in which the United States would display greater willingness to use or threaten the use of military force.[6] Moreover, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact combined with the persistence of NATO, some analysts warned, left Russia in a new position of vulnerability in which a military threat from the West could rematerialize quickly as a result of changes in the political atmosphere.[7]

New State, Old Interests

Following the collapse of the Soviet state in December 1991, both the external strategic environment as well as the internal political environment confronting the military leadership in Moscow underwent profound change. The collapse of the USSR produced a new Russian state, contracted eastward and northward by nearly a third of its former territory and surrounded by other former Soviet republics, which had abruptly been transformed into fully independent states. The government of the new Russian state was now committed to a foreign policy, subsequently dubbed "Atlanticism," based on a reconstruction of the states of the West as partners and allies. The Russian military establishment was in a state of disarray. The collapse of Moscow's effort to preserve a commonwealth military in the spring of 1992 required the formation of a new military based on forces in the Russian federation and units being withdrawn from Eastern Europe. The development of a new military doctrine appropriate to the altered political and strategic circumstances was also required.

The Russian military establishment had a clear need to promote definitions of the security interests of the new state and assessments of potential threats to those interests that would minimize the ongoing decline in resource allocation to the military and an attendant loss of military capabilities and status. A serious decline in resources allocated to the military and in its capabilities had

[4] "Akhromeyev on Military Balance," 27.

[5] See, for example, Klokotov and Kasenkov, "K voprosu o vonnenoi opastnosti," 9; Tushkevich, "Marksistko-leninskoye ucheniye," 48; Kirilenko and Trenin, "Razmyshleniya," 11–12.

[6] Colonel E. V. Erokhin, "O razrabotke kontseptsii voennoi reformi," *Voennaya mysl'* 11–12 (1991): 36–45.

[7] Kirilenko and Trenin, "Razmyshleniya," 13.

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begun with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The decline threatened to accelerate given both the economic difficulties of the new Russian state and mounting political pressures for military reform intended to further reduce the burden of the military and defense complex. By 1993, the armed forces under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defense had fallen to an estimated 1.8 million, a reduction of nearly 50 percent from total Soviet military forces two years earlier. Growing conscription shortfalls threatened further contraction.[8] Even more seriously, a severe reduction in the military budget had led to a reduction in defense procurement orders for new weapons and spare parts by nearly 80 percent for 1992 and 1993. Funds for training and maintenance of naval, air, and ground forces were suffering similar severe declines.[9] In the words of a former member of the Russian Security Council, "the Russian army had begun to lose its sense of purpose in a 'no enemy, no Soviet Union world.'" The lack of an enemy was affecting both military morale and plans for military reform and the military share of the budget.[10] At the same time, political instability in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as well as actions on the part of the United States and its NATO allies had begun to raise new security concerns within the military and political establishments. The United States, NATO, and Chechen separatists quickly came to serve as convenient, albeit unintentional, allies in the Russian military's effort to defend and promote its institutional interests in the post-cold war, post-Soviet world.

New Assessments of the West and Its Policies

Military analyses of Western policies in the dawn of the post-Soviet era did not reflect the Yeltsin government's optimistic vision of a developing partner relationship with the West. Nor to military analysts did the West's policies appear to justify the substantial reduction in Russia's military effort, especially with regard to the need for a broad modernization of Russian forces, which the government was planning. Overall, military analysts sought to present an image of a vigorous United States military effort directed at preserving strategic dominance in the post-cold war era.[11] Typically, military analyses in this period stressed that though the cold war had ended, the United States was engaged in a costly effort to augment its capability to deploy forces rapidly to conduct

[8] John R. Leppingwell, "Is the Military Disintegrating From Within?" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report* 2 (1993): 12.

[9] Mikhail Berger, "A Plan to Tame the Economy's Biggest Beast," *Moscow Times*, 14 December 1994; Maj-Gen. I. N. Borob'ev, "Kakiye voini grozyat nam v budushchem veke?" *Voennaya mysl'* 2 (1997): 19–20.

[10] Vladimir Chernov, "Significance of the Russian Military Doctrine," *Comparative Strategy* 1 (1994): 161–166.

[11] P. P. Timokhin, "Voennaya strategiya s sh a-noviy etap," *Voennaya mysl'* 8–9 (1992): 64–69.

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large-scale offensive operations in any region.[12] Some analyses were more explicit in their conclusions that the military and political strategies of the United States and its NATO allies presented a serious threat to the vital interests of the new Russian state. The claim that the United States was deliberately pursuing a strategy aimed at weakening Russia and establishing a Western sphere of influence throughout Europe, the Black Sea region, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia appeared with increasing frequency after 1992.[13] An early example of this line of analysis appeared in the naval journal *Morskoi sbornik* in August 1992, a time when the government's Atlanticist foreign policy was at its height. The principal meaning of adjustments in the policies of U.S. and NATO states, according to the analysis, was to take "maximum advantage of [Russia's weaknesses] in order to strengthen and expand their influence in the world arena." The United States and its allies, the analysis warned, were attempting to establish a Russia dependent on Western aid and deferential to Western interests. At the same time, Western policy was aimed at encouraging the political and economic independence of the other members of the CIS.[14] Other commentaries in this period accused the United States of pursuing a strategy of "brazen interference" in the CIS, which aimed "to poison some parties against others in on-going conflicts" and "turn all of them against Moscow."[15]

By 1993, analyses began to appear in the journal of the Ministry of Defense invoking the science of geopolitics to support conclusions that the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union would serve to increase rather than diminish the threat of Western aggression. Typically, such analyses asserted that efforts by the United States and its NATO allies to aggressively expand their influence eastward were foreordained by objective geopolitical forces.[16] This aggressiveness could only be expected to increase in the face of Russia's internal weakness. Concerns were also apparent within the Russian military in this period that the "Atlanticist policy" not only reflected a failure to recognize the real nature of the continuing threat which the United States and NATO posed to Russia, but operated to undermine patriotic spirit and military morale, and hinder the task of rebuilding Russia's military. As one analyst expressed the problem: "The downplaying and particularly the denial of a military threat are contributing to a disorganization of the state and the people. It

[12] See, for example, Col. D. A. Afinogenov, "Voenniye voprosi bezopastnosti rossii," *Voennaya mysl'* 2 (1993): 10–14; Capt. N. Nikolaev, "Navies in New U.S. and NATO Strategies," *Morskoi sbornik* 8–9, trans. in JPRS-UMA-92-038, 21 October 1992, 58.

[13] See, for example, Z. A. Pozdnyakov "Sovremennye geopoliticheskiye izmeneniya i ikh vliianiye na bezopastnosti i stabil'nost' v mire," *Voennaya mysl'* 1 (1993) 11–17; M. A. Ponamarev, "V washingtone reshili otkrit' karti?" *Krasnaya zvezda*, 10 August 1993; M. A. Ponamarev, "Strelka compasa nato skloniaetsya k ugo-vostoku," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 27 August 1993.

[14] Nikolaev, "Navies."

[15] Ponomarev, "Strelka kompasa," 3.

[16] Pozdyakov, "Geopoliticheskiye izmeneniya," 11–19.

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creates a temptation to disarm unilaterally and diminishes attention to problems of defense and the Armed Forces. The Army ultimately begins to lose its combat effectiveness and controllability. . . . In the spiritual realm the downplaying of military threats and dangers has produced universal pacificism. . . . Some reasoning is reminiscent of that which prevailed on the eve of war in '41. We know what that caused."[17]

A Politically Correct Military Doctrine

These military concerns did not find clear expression in the Basic Tenets of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted in November 1993.[18] Deferential to the prevailing political atmosphere in which the Yeltsin government remained committed to its Atlanticist foreign policy—enshrined formally in a new Foreign Policy Doctrine adopted in 1993—the official statement on Russia's defense doctrine declared that "the Russian Federation does not regard any particular state as an adversary." While the formulation may have been politically correct, it did not accurately reflect the attitude of a military leadership that continued to view the United States and NATO in a decidedly adversarial light. Nor did the 1993 defense policy document serve to promote the military's general institutional interest in resisting substantial reductions in resource allocation, force levels, and weapons development and acquisition by attaching priority to developing forces capable of coping with the local conflicts deemed more likely than any major external aggression.

Military disdain for the document was evident in the fact that it was reportedly referred to privately by some representatives of the General Staff as "toilet paper."[19] Subsequently, the 1993 statement on defense doctrine was openly criticized in the Ministry of Defense's principal journal. Several critics suggested the document seriously harmed military planning and preparations by promulgating as doctrine the politicians' wrong-headed idea that Russia no longer confronted a serious external threat.[20] One critic charged that "a pacifist idea which rejects the possibility of a large scale war runs like a red thread through the document."[21] Another berated the 1993 document as a "bankrupt" formulation that ignored the fact that the United States and its allies continued to "encircle

[17] "Is the Threat Imaginary or Real?" *Sobesednik voina* 13 (1993), trans. in JPRS-UMA-93-042, 10 November 1993, 5.

[18] "Osnovnye polozheniya voennoi doktrini rossiiskoi federatsii," *Diplomaticheskii vestnik* 23–24 (1993): 6–10.

[19] Pavel Felgenhauer, "Russian Military Reform: Ten Years of Failure" in Elizabeth Skinner and Mikhail Tsypkin, eds., *Russian Defense Policy Toward the Year 2000* (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, 1997), 14.

[20] Borob'ev, "Kakiye voini grozyat nam?" 18; General V. M. Barin'kin, "Voennye ugrozi rossii i problemi razvitiya ee vooruzhennikh sil," *Voennaya mysl'* 1 (1999): 2.

[21] Borob'ev, "Kakiye voini grozyat nam?" 18.

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Russia and the other states of the CIS with a powerful ring of military bases."[22] As defense minister responsible for the adoption of the 1993 policy document, Pavel Grachev, who generally toed the government's reformist line on defense, portrayed the 1993 doctrine as sound.[23] Grachev's successor, General Igor Rodionov, who was more outspoken in expressing the General Staff's dissatisfaction with overall military policy, was quick to criticize the doctrine's emphasis on preparing Russia's military forces to wage limited and local wars to the exclusion of preparations to repel major aggression as "grossly mistaken."[24]

Concern about a potential Western threat to Russian security was by no means absent from the 1993 doctrine, however. It could be found in an itemization of "potential sources of external military danger to the Russian Federation."[25] Among the cited sources of existing or potential military dangers were the expansion of military blocs, the undermining of strategic stability as a result of the destruction of arms control agreements, and the introduction of foreign forces on the territory of contiguous states, not linked with decisions of the U.N. Security Council.[26]

After 1994, the increasing certainty of NATO's eastward expansion served to increase perceptions within the Russian military of a growing Western threat to Russia's security. The security concerns of the military, moreover, were not subsequently assuaged by either Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace or by political agreements such as the 1997 Founding Act on Russian-NATO cooperation.[27] Nor are the Russian military's concerns likely to be satisfied as a result of the enhanced consultative status given to Russia in May 2002 under the "NATO at 20" format.

The Russian military has had a clear institutional interest in portraying NATO's expansion as a highly menacing transformation of the international situation confronting Russia. The military's concerns over NATO's enlargement were by no means contrived, however. They reflected real perceptions of a serious deterioration in Russia's military and strategic situation. In their

[22] Lt. General V.G. Reznichenko, "O voennoi doktrine rossiskoi federatsii," *Voennaya mysl'* 2 (1996): 9–10.

[23] The formulation that Russia confronted no particular, external threat and that the most likely military conflicts Russia would face would be local and regional coincided with Grachev's own preference for a down-sized military centered on highly mobile forces capable of rapid deployment to confront threats arising from any point of the azimuth. Grachev's preference for restructuring Russia's military faced substantial opposition with the General Staff. See Felgenhauer, "Russian Military Reform."

[24] General Igor Rodionov, "What Sort of Defense Does Russia Need?" *Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye*, 28 November 1997, reproduced in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 50 (1997): 1–4.

[25] The term "danger" (*opastnost'*) is generally used by military analysts to denote a situation capable of creating a serious threat to Russia's national security.

[26] "Osnovnye polozheniya," 6.

[27] V. Konchernov, "Partnership for What?" *Rossiskaya gazeta*, 25 March 1994, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 2 (1994): 6.

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assessments of the impact of the anticipated first round of expansion on NATO's capabilities, military commentaries noted:

- The entry of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia would put at NATO's disposal nearly 300 forward positioned airfields, greatly increasing the potential depth and strength of NATO air strikes on Russian territory.
- Operating from new forward bases, NATO tactical aircraft could penetrate to the Smolensk-Bryansk-Kursk and Petrozavodsk-Yaroslav-Belgorod lines.[28]
- As a consequence of the extended penetration of NATO tactical aircraft and missiles, NATO's tactical weapons assumed strategic significance.[29]
- The entry of Poland alone would make available to NATO extensive port facilities on the Baltic, increase NATO's combat ships by 18 percent and Baltic patrol aircraft by 50 percent, and thus dramatically increase NATO's ability to dominate the Baltic.
- Land forces under NATO command would be augmented by eleven divisions and thirty-eight brigades.
- NATO would gain access to a vast infrastructure of transportation and storage facilities, which would allow rapid forward deployment of NATO forces to the east.[30]
- Russian warning time for NATO attacks would be reduced to even more critical and potentially dangerous levels.[31]

Assessments of the impact of the admission of the Baltics to NATO, which military commentary has regarded as a virtual certainty, have stressed not only the further erosion that would occur in the strategic situation, but also a greatly increased risk of actual military confrontation that would likely result. Russian concerns in this regard should not be dismissed as threatening bluster but as manifestations of legitimate concerns regarding the emergence of a military environment that would make Kaliningrad an outpost surrounded by NATO states and bring NATO's borders to within thirty miles of key military installations in the region of Pskov and within sixty miles of Saint Petersburg. Some military commentaries compared NATO's eastward expansion to Nazi Germany's *drang nach osten* and suggested that Russia was flirting with the same fatal error made by Stalin in downplaying the danger of impending military aggression against Russia.[32]

[28] Leonid Ivashov, "Rasshirenii nato na vostok," *Voennaya mysl'* 6 (1996): 13.

[29] Rodionov, "What Sort of Defense," 3; also see, "Raketniye voiska: vzglyadi v XXI vek," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 17 August 1999.

[30] Ivashov, "Rasshirenii nato," 14.

[31] Maj. General A. F. Klimenko, "Mezhdunarodnaya bezopastnost' i kharacter voennikh konflictov budushchevo," *Voennaya mysl'* 1 (1997).

[32] Col. S. Manukov, "Preklonya pered podvigom, dumaem o budushchem," *Orienteer* 5 (2000): 4–7. The article is an interview with General Andrei Nikolaev, chair of the Duma Committee on Defense. The views expressed are those of General Nikolaev.

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Military commentary has also regularly depicted the United States and NATO as embarked on a strategy of actively promoting conflicts in the CIS with a view to supplanting Russian influence in the region and destabilizing Russia itself.[33] In this regard, military commentary has differed little from the views expressed by communist and militant nationalist commentators.[34] Typical of this point of view, General V. Tikhomirov, the commander of the Urals Military District, asserted: "The success [of Russian military operations in the Caucasus] does not coincide with the interests of those who see Russia as a hindrance to the affirmation of their strategic interests in the region. Most of all these are the forces that are striving to affirm the result of their victory in the Cold War and finally destroy the position of Russia on the Eurasian continent. . . . One of the basic means of weakening Russia . . . has become the drawing of Russian forces into a multiplicity of local conflicts which have arisen on the perimeter of Russia's borders and those of the C.I.S."[35]

Parallel themes are prominent in militant nationalist and communist commentary; military officials have typically bolstered charges that the Western powers are currently supporting separatist rebels in the Caucasus in order to weaken Russia by reference to earlier Western policies in the region. As General Vladimir Shamanov has recently depicted the situation: "Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Turkey and Pakistan support and supply assistance to the war [in Chechnya]. But behind them, as always, as in the last century in the Russo-Turkish war, or the war against Shamil, are the states of the West. This should not surprise us. These countries as in the past in the 19th century have been interested in Russian departure from the Caucasus and the destruction of our never very powerful Imperium. . . . Chechnya is only a small springboard [*platsdarm*] of a larger war against Russia."[36]

Beyond the threat posed by the expansion of NATO and the allegedly malign Western influence in conflicts within the CIS, military assessments of the threat presented by the United States and NATO have focused on the Western powers' readiness to resort to military force to advance their strategic interests. American military actions against Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan and by NATO in Bosnia and Yugoslavia in the 1990s were generally presented in military analysis as a direct result of the collapse of the bipolar balance of power that had served previously to constrain the West. NATO's military campaign against Yugoslavia in spring 1999 was perceived within the Russian military—as it was largely perceived by the militant nationalist opposition in Russia—as the latest stage in an increasingly aggressive Western strategy to extend

[33] See, for example, M. Ponomarev, "V vashingtone reshili otkrit, karti?" *Krasnaya zvezda*, 10 August 1993; also see, Rodionov, "What Sort of Defense," 3.

[34] See, for example, General V. Tikhomirov, "Bor'ba za kavkaz," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 13 November 1999; Colonel Y. Elovets, "Nas ispitivaut na prochnost' na severnom kavkaze," *Armeiskii sbornik* 2 (2000): 72–78.

[35] Tikhomirov, "Bor'ba," 3.

[36] "General rossii : beseda c valdimirom shamanovim," *Zavtra* 46 (2000): 1.

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domination ever farther to the east. In particular, the war over Kosovo was generally described in military commentary as intended to destroy a de facto Russian ally and consolidate NATO's military and political influence in the Balkans. Military commentary also accused the United States of creating and arming the Kosovo Liberation Army with the intention of provoking the subsequent political crisis that served as the pretext for NATO's war against Yugoslavia.[37] Military commentaries also regularly charged that the United States pursued a policy of active collaboration with Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans.

On another key issue invoking Russian security concerns—ballistic missile defense (BMD)—Russian military commentary has characterized U.S. interest in the development of new missile defense capability as an effort intended to preserve and enhance the ability of the United States to conduct a positions of strength policy. At the same time, military analysts have argued that the U.S. deployment of BMD is intended to nullify Russia's policy of offsetting its new inferiority to NATO in conventional forces by lowering the nuclear threshold with the adoption of a flexible response doctrine. United States deployment of BMD is thus viewed as intended to preserve the strategic significance of what Russian military analysts acknowledge is an overwhelming U.S./NATO superiority in conventional forces. Moreover, military commentators have stressed the potential of a new U.S. missile defense to provoke a new arms race.[38]

Of further concern to the military is a perceived American drive to secure for itself a meaningful military superiority in space. Military analysts stress that an existing U.S. superiority in space-based information systems was a critical component of the effective conduct of highly accurate, long-distance "virtual war" campaigns against Iraq and Yugoslavia.[39] Recent analyses have warned that, aided by private sector capital and cooperative ventures with its allies, the United States may be able to realize its goal of achieving a commanding military superiority in space. Such a superiority would include an ability to destroy or incapacitate the space-based military assets of Russia and protect the assets of the United States and its allies against any countermeasures.[40]

Beyond NATO: Competing Threats

A broad spectrum of the Russian political establishment, along with the military, regards the North Caucasus and adjacent regions of Southern Russia as

[37] Yuri Pankov, "Aggression Continues," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 24 March 2000, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 12 (2000): 6.

[38] See, for example, Colonel S. V. Kredin, "Ogranichennaya pvo; likvidatsiya slabnosti ili ukrepleniye sily?" *Voennaya mysl'* 1 (2000): 14–19; General Yuri Maksimov, "Sberech' potentsial yadernovo sderzhivanaya," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 30 June 2000.

[39] Marshal Igor Sergeev, "Osnovi voenno-tekhnicheskoi politiki rossii v nachale xxi veka," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 9 December 2000.

[40] Major-General V. A. Men'shikov, "Voenno-kosmicheskaya politika rossii v xxi veka," *Voennaya mysl'* 5 (2000): 31–33.

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vulnerable to instability and conflict as a result of the spread of "separatism," "extremist Islamic movements," and "criminal anarchism," which have been manifest in Chechnya.[41] In military commentary, rebellion in the Caucasus has been depicted as a problem with which the Russian military has historically had to contend at great sacrifice and cost. The commentary frequently stresses that the region has been an historic arena of strategic competition between Russia and foreign powers. Post-Soviet conflicts in the region are depicted as the most recent episode in this historic pattern.[42] Set in this context, the conflict in Chechnya and the larger Russian effort to maintain order in the North Caucasus have an overarching strategic significance that justifies an all-out military effort to reestablish unequivocal Russian authority. Military commentaries have also stressed the theme that, as was the case in the nineteenth-century wars in the Caucasus, the Russian Army's recent campaigns to restore order in the region have had to be conducted in the face of domestic criticism from the Western-oriented intelligentsia at home and sympathy and support for the rebels from abroad.[43] Many in the current military leadership believe such pressures led the Yeltsin government to conclude the Khasavyurt Accords, which thwarted a Russian military victory in the first Chechen war (1994–1996).[44] Though public and political support for the second Chechen campaign, which began in the fall of 1999, was significantly stronger, concern on the part of the military leadership over a new failure of political will was again in evidence.[45] In line with the new importance attached to information warfare in Russian military thinking, military analysts have expressed concern that efforts by the Western-dominated global media to mobilize criticism of the Russian military campaign in Chechnya would again weaken political support for the war at home.[46]

Given the level of Russian military involvement in the Caucasus, it is noteworthy that more general surveys of threats to Russian security by military analysts have not given greater prominence to security problems in the region. While civilian security managers have tended to accord these threats a seriousness greater than that accorded the threat of potential Western aggression, this has generally not been the case in military analysis. One probable reason for this is the fact that Russia's armed forces, controlled by the Ministry of Defense, do not have primary responsibility for the maintenance of order within

[41] General V. L. Manilov, "Ugrozni natsional'noi bezopastnosti rossii," *Voennaya mysl'* 1 (1996): 7–17; Tikhomirov, "Bor'ba," 1; Colonel S. G. Kiselev, "Tsivilizatsionniye vyzovi rossii," *Voennaya mysl'* 2 (1999): 16.

[42] See, for example, Tikomirov, "Bor'ba," 1; General Yu. Baluevskii, "Kavazskaya Liniya: istoriia, politika, uroki," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 May 2000.

[43] Recent examples of this theme are reflected in Baluevskii, "Kavakazkaya liniya," 1 ; General V. Azarov and Colonel V. Marushchenko, "Kavkaz v sostave rossii," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 January 2001.

[44] Charles Bohlen, "Russian Military, Usually Silent, Urges Hard Line on Chechnya," *New York Times*, 7 November 1999.

[45] S. Saradzhyan, "Generals Tell Politicians: Hands Off," *Moscow Times*, 5 November 1999; Bohlen, "Russian Military."

[46] Elovets, "Nas ispitivaut," 72–77.

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the borders of the Russian state. That task is normally the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, which maintains its own force numbering approximately 250,000 well-armed troops. Though in the case of both rounds of the Chechen conflict, the regular military came to play a commanding role, the regular armed forces do not regard coping with such threats as their primary mission. Just as importantly perhaps, from the standpoint of the military's institutional interests, the threats posed by local, low-intensity conflicts have less value than the threat of major external aggression in promoting the funding, force levels, and weapons acquisition programs the military leadership seeks. This is certainly the case with regard to the institutional interests of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the navy, and the air force. The long-term institutional interests of the ground forces also appear better served by the construction of more substantial threats of external aggression.[47]

Beyond the conflicts in Chechnya and threat of the spread of extremism and separatism elsewhere in Southern Russia, military analysts have stressed a range of potential threats to Russian security arising from developments beyond Russia's new southern borders from the Black Sea in the West to the Primorye region in the Far East. In this case, too, the military, has tended to slight indigenous sources of tension in favor of an emphasis on the security problems posed by the activities of foreign powers. The military has not been alone in its concern about the security implications of the activity of outside states in the region, however. Concern has been evident generally within the Russian government and a broad spectrum of the political establishment over what is seen as the increasing efforts by outside powers to weaken Russian influence and challenge Russia's legitimate interests in the Black Sea, the Transcaucasus, the Caspian, and Central Asia. The military as well as the civilian press regularly describe the United States and Turkey as heavily involved in diplomatic and political efforts to weaken Russian influence across the region.[48] Saudi Arabia has generally been depicted as acting variously at its own initiative or at the behest of the West as financial backer for fundamentalist religious groups in the region.[49]

The spectre of a progressive wave of militant Islamic insurgency sweeping through Central Asia and drawing Russian forces into a military conflict in defense of weak regimes widely perceived as anti-Islam, haunts civilian and military officials in Moscow. Such a conflict has the potential to be a replay of the Soviet involvement in the civil war in Afghanistan. In assessing security threats

[47] See, for example, General A. F. Klimenko, "Osobennost' novoi voennoi doktrini," *Voennaya mysl'* 3 (2000): 25. In particular, Klimenko argues that it is a dangerous blunder not to accord internal threats the same priority in military planning as external threats.

[48] See for example V. Pasyakin, "NATO Ships Get Permanent Residence Permit in Black Sea," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 24 May 1995, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 22 (1999): 24 ; A. A. Afinogenov, "Voennye voprosi," 11.

[49] Valeriy Cheban, "Russian Geopolitics and Security," *Armeisky sbornik* (February 1995) in JPRS-UMA-95-019, 25 April 1995, 6–8; General A. Nikolaev, "Bol'shoi kavkaz-strategia rossii," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 4 January 2001.

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in the southern tier, Russian officials had focused increasingly on the role of Afghanistan's Taliban government. The Taliban regime was viewed as the principal supporter of militant extremism in the republics of Central Asia, as well as a key supporter of the insurgents in Chechnya. The Russian government's recognition of this fact was reflected in its support both diplomatically and militarily of the Northern Alliance's continuing opposition to Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Moscow's subsequent decision in the fall of 2001 to increase the flow of arms to the Northern Alliance in connection with its support of the United States-led military campaign to unseat the Taliban and destroy al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan did not in itself represent a fundamental policy shift. The outcome of the U.S.–led military operation, however, gave rise to new concerns within the military regarding Russian security interests without assuaging earlier concerns regarding the danger of the growth of radical Islamic militancy in the region.

Increased concerns regarding the threat of expanded insurgency by militant Islamic groups in the region after 1999 produced new efforts by Moscow to reach agreement on military cooperation under the aegis of the Collective Security Treaty. Though until 1999 all the states in the region except Turkmenistan participated in the Russian-sponsored Collective Security Agreement, little progress was made in working out contingency plans for collective military action.[50] In October 2000, Moscow did succeed in convincing the three remaining states in the region participating in the Collective Security Treaty (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) to agree in principle to the formation of a joint military force that would be available to "repel external military aggression or conduct counter-terrorist operations" in the region.[51] In 2000, the General Staff also announced plans for the eventual creation of two new special military strike forces with a total of 50,000 troops.[52] One is to be stationed permanently in the North Caucasus. The other is to be based just to the north of Kazakhstan in Western Siberia and would presumably be available for rapid redeployment to meet security needs in the Central Asia region. Given the confusion surrounding military reform, however, whether this plan will be realized is itself uncertain. Ambivalence on the part of the key governments in the region with regard to relations with Moscow and their own security policy options continue to contribute to a climate of diplomatic uncertainty with which the military and political leadership in Moscow must contend. The increased security cooperation between states in Central Asia and the United States, which developed as a result of the military campaign in Afghanistan, will likely further weaken the inclination of the Central Asia states to rely on Moscow for security assistance.[53]

[50] A change in Uzbekistan's foreign policy strategy led to its withdrawal from the Treaty in 1999.

[51] Oleg Odnokolenko, "Russia and Its Allies Agree to Create Collective Security Forces," *Sevodnya*, 12 October 2000, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 41 (2000): 9.

[52] Mikhail Kozyrev, "Defense Ministry Preparing to Strike," *Kommersant*, 14 July 2000, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 28 (2000): 16.

[53] P. N. Andreev, "Voenno-politicheskoe sotrudnichestvo gosudarstv sng," *Voennaya mysl'* 4 (2000): 25–34; "Kontrterroristicheskaya operatsiya na severnom kavkaz: krugly stol," *Voennaya mysl'* 4 (2000): 5–25.

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Other Potential Threats

Though China has been regarded as a strategic partner in the leadership's multi-polar diplomatic strategy, the possibility of serious conflict with China has been raised, albeit infrequently, by military officials. One analysis warned, for example, that in contemporary international relations "many states were prepared to carry out policies of 'ethnic dumping' on neighbors to avoid demographic catastrophe" and illustrated the danger by citing the fact that each year Primorye's borders were crossed by around 200,000 Chinese.[54] In a similar view, another analysis of threats confronting Russia offered the thinly veiled warning that "the vast spaces and natural resources of Russia represent an enormous temptation for states with overpopulated territories, controlling powerful armed forces, with high mobilizational potential, and military potential near our borders."[55] A more substantial depiction of the potential of Russian-Chinese conflict was offered in a survey of potential threats to Russian security by General Valery Manilov, first deputy chief of the General Staff. Manilov warned:

> [A]ccording to the estimates of experts in 10-15 years China can find itself on the brink of a serious demographic and energy crisis. As a result China's interest in the energy reserves of . . . Siberia and the Russian Far East is growing. Even now illegal immigration is growing (*narastaet*) from China into the strategically important regions of Transbaikal, Khabarovsk Krai, and Primorye. In some border districts of Primorye, Chinese outnumber Russians by one and one-half to two times. As the migration stream intensifies and broad areas of compact Chinese settlement form in the Russian Far East, the territorial problem between the two states can assume particular sharpness and become highly explosive (*vzrivopasnii*).[56]

Manilov and other military analysts have also warned of a range of existing and potential territorial disputes involving Russia that could lead to serious conflicts. The existing disputes most often referred to include that with Japan over the Kuriles, a dispute with Norway over maritime boundaries in the Barents Sea, and ongoing disagreements with the other littoral states of the Caspian regarding the delimitation of jurisdiction over Caspian Sea resources. Military analysts have cited the possibility that Germany might be influenced by "revanchist circles" who seek to recover "East Prussia" (that is, Kaliningrad). The spectre that revanchist pressures might lead Finland to demand from Russia the return of Karelian territories lost in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940 has also been raised. Military commentaries have referred also to other re-

[54] Cheban, "Russian Geopolitics," 7.

[55] General S. P. Lugugta and Colonel V. A. Rodin, "Strukturny analiz voennoi doktrini rossiiskoi federatsii," *Voennaya mysl'* 1 (1997): 12.

[56] Manilov, "Ugrozy," 9; Civilian defense analysts have also given expression to similar warnings regarding a Chinese threat to Russia's security. See, for example, Alexander Sharavin, "Tret'ya ugroza," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 28 September 2001; and Vitaly Tsygichko, "S amerikoi" *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 9 June 2001.

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vanchist threats that might arise from Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania with regard to territory in Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova.[57] Generally, military commentators have treated both existing territorial claims and the likelihood of further claims as flowing from Russia's current condition of political and military weakness.

The Deployment of New Theoretical Frameworks

In the immediate post-Soviet period, the discreditation of Leninist ideology left the military without the benefit of a putative "scientific" theory to legitimize an image of long-term threats arising from objective historical forces. The filling in of this theory gap has been one of the more important developments in the evolution of post-cold war Russian strategic thinking. The first post-Leninist theoretical frameworks appearing in military analysis were based on theories of geopolitics and drew for their scientific authority on the writings of Western theorists, particularly H. Mackinder, N. J. Spykman, and S. B. Cohen. The deployment of geopolitical theory by military analysts has paralleled and appeared to be influenced by ideological and intellectual trends in communist and militant nationalist circles. These theories of geopolitical conflict and related Eurasianist theory have served to provide a post-Leninist legitimization for depictions of the West and Western institutions as being in fundamental conflict with Russia's interests and its communitarian values.[58] As a framework to analyze the post-Soviet strategic environment, geopolitics has several virtues from the standpoint of the military's institutional interests. Analyses under the guise of geopolitical theory invariably depict Russia as located in a global geopolitical bulls eye region—Mackinder's "heartland." The region is presented as the object of control by outside powers seeking world rule. Typically, such analyses conclude that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have tempted the United States and other states to step up aggressive efforts to extend their influence over the heartland. A militarily strong Russia firmly in control of the critical heartland is presented as the key to overall international stability. Moreover, in denying control of this region to forces seeking world rule, Russia is depicted as fulfilling an historic world mission. By positing the primacy of "objective" geopolitical determinants of foreign policy, the end of the cold war and the emergence of a democratic Russia are construed as having little effect on the real aggressive aims of U.S. policy toward Russia. The putative permanent and objective nature of conflict between Russia and the West

[57] Manilov, "Ugrozy," 9; V. M. Barin'kin, "Voennye ugrozi rossii i problemi razvitiya vooruzhennikh sil," *Voennaya mysl'* 1 (1999): 3.

[58] Eurasianist and geopolitical interpretations of contemporary world politics have been especially salient in the militant nationalist publication *Zavtra.* Gennadi Zyuganov, the head of the Communist Party, has publicized the party's commitment to these world views in his political writing and speeches. This line of ideology has also been elaborated in the writings of the militant Eurasianist and adviser to the Russian Duma Speaker, Alexander Dugin, and of Alexander Prokhanov, the editor of *Zavtra.*

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also implies a sharp criticism of the Atlanticist policy of the Yeltsin government. As one analysis in this vein pointedly stressed: "the greatest mistake . . . state leaders can make consists in the naive belief that in the world of power politics good relations between states can develop based upon friendly feelings which leaders and peoples hold toward one another."[59]

While recent military analyses of world politics framed in terms of geopolitical theory share a number of conclusions, they also reflect some important differences regarding Russia's strategic environment and threats to its security. Some analyses posit the existence of a bipolar conflict formed by the opposition of maritime/rimland states—the most important of which at this stage of history is the United States—and continental states—with Russia occupying the most important geostrategic position among the latter. The political divisions suggested by such models resemble with some variations the alignment patterns of the cold war.[60] In line with Mackinder, the conflict between the maritime and continental states is seen as fundamental and historically recurrent. The cold war is reconstructed from this viewpoint to represent a failed effort by the maritime states to contain Soviet power to the heartland. Typically, analyses in this vein conclude that a correct geopolitical strategy requires Russia to strengthen relations with its natural geostrategic allies in the continental world and at the same time to court the support of the poor states of the South. Regarding the importance of allying with the South, one such analysis warned: ". . . careless reliance on unconditionally improving relations with the West can create new threats, without removing the old. . . . Uniting with the West, Russia will lose the trust of the poor South which disquieted might respond by the retargeting of its rockets [on Russia]."[61]

Other analyses invoking the authority of a geopolitical theory posit an essentially multipolar world in which Russia is viewed as a lucrative geopolitical prize by many states, including its continental neighbors. Unlike Realist theory, which presents a multipolar world creating opportunities for the construction of balancing alliances, geopolitical military analysts viewing the multipolar setting tend to stress only the multiple threats that confront Russia. Typically, analyses of this sort describe the international environment in terms of an array of geopolitical threats encircling Russia from the West, the South, and the Asiatic-Pacific region.[62] Often, a vague version of the multiple geopolitical threats

[59] For early examples of this type of analysis, see Col. A. S. Sinaiskii," Geopolitika i nationalnaia bezopastnosti rossii," *Voennaya mysl'* 10 (1992): 2–10; E. A. Pozdnyakov, "Geopoliticheskiye izmeneniya," 11–17; General N. N. Efimov and Colonel V. S. Frolov, "V chem opasnost' geostrategii bzhezinskovo dlia rossii," *Voennaya mysl'* 5 (1999); Major-General M. I. Yasukov, "Geopoliticheskoye faktor v systeme natsional'noi bezopastnosti strani," *Voennaya mysl'* 6 (1999).

[60] Pozdnyakov, "Geopoliticheskie izmeneniya," 11–17; Sinaiskii, "Geopolitika," 2–4. According to Sinaiskii, the leading powers in the maritime world were the United States, the states of Western Europe, and Japan. The opposing set of continental "civilizations" is described as including such "contemporary continental giants" as China, India, Iran, Russia, and Kazakhstan.

[61] Sinaiskii, "Geopolitika," 9.

[62] Cheban, "Russian Geopolitics," 7.

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to Russia is deployed in military commentary. Thus, for example, as Defense Minister Rodionov warned: "Who is threatening us? Russia's gigantic territorial expanses and its colossal natural resources . . . have long attracted the gaze of those who dream of lording it over our land. There are still many countries that dream of expanding their living space at Russia's expense. Russia should be prepared for this."[63]

Theories of civilizational conflict have also been deployed increasingly by military analysts to support evaluations of the strategic environment confronting post-Soviet Russia. Analysis of this type often cites Samuel Huntington's thesis that conflict among civilizations has acquired particular salience in the post-cold war era. The invocation of Huntington is used with a double significance, both to add the legitimacy of foreign social science to claims of objective forces producing conflict between Russia and the West and to suggest that Western policy is itself premised on the conduct of a civilization struggle. While analysts who invoke theories of civilizational conflict draw upon the recent writings of Huntington and other Western writers, most importantly Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler, civilizational theory is given a Russian pedigree with the invocation of Nikolai Danilevskii, the nineteenth-century Russian biologist and philosopher, or the more recent theories of contemporary Eurasianists such as Alexander Dugin.[64] Much as with geopolitical theory, civilizational theory functions to support conclusions that, notwithstanding the end of the cold war, present a set of objective forces implying grave and long-term threats to Russia in world politics.

Military analyses invoking civilization theory have presented Russia as facing multiple threats emanating from dynamic and aggressive civilizations in the West, East, and South. At the same time, Russian civilization is depicted as particularly weak and vulnerable to expansionist pressures of states imbedded in other civilizations. One recent analysis in this vein noted that while aggressive expansionist tendencies in recent history were strongest in Western civilization, all civilizations had a tendency to attempt to expand and to subordinate the territory and resources of adjoining areas to their control. According to the author, the principles of civilizational theory dictated that "if a civilization feels that a neighboring civilization is weaker it does not fail to utilize the circumstances." Russian civilization, plagued by economic, demographic, political, and military weakness, was depicted as not only vulnerable to an aggressive West but also to expansionist pressures from both Islamic and Confucian civilization—both of which, according to the author, were undergoing a period of dynamic economic, demographic, and military development—as well as from Japanese civilization which was continuing to display high rates of economic and military development. The expansionist tendencies threatening Russian

[63] Rodionov, "What Sort of Defense," 4.

[64] N.Ya Danilevsky, *Rossiya i evropa*, (Saint Petersburg: N. Strakhov, 1888); Alexander Dugin, *Osnovy geopolitiki* (Moscow: Arktogiia, 1997); A. Dugin, "Evraziya prevyshe vcevo: manifest evraziyskovo dvizhenie," *Zavtra* 5 (2001).

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(*Rossiiskaia*) civilization were evident, according to the analyst, in NATO's eastward expansion and the enlargement of the sphere of American "vital interests," tendencies on the part of Turkey and Iran to regain influence over territory once part of the Ottoman and Persian Empires, China's interest in recovering lost territories, and Japan's territorial pretensions to the Southern Kuriles.[65]

An alternative line of analysis drawing on civilizational theory as formulated by the Eurasianist school depicts the civilizations of Eurasia as joined by similar values and hence natural allies. According to Eurasianists, Russia is fitted by history and culture to function as the leader and defender of a larger Eurasian civilization. Increasingly reflecting a view of the more militant anti-Western "Eurasianists" like Alexander Dugin, some military officials have warned that the import of contemporary liberal ideology into Russia constitutes a threat to Russian national security and reflects an effort to both destabilize Russia and frustrate Russian alignment with its natural Eurasian allies.[66] Military commentary has also accused the United States of a strategy aimed at deliberately seeking to fan the flames of conflict between Orthodox and Islamic civilization in order to frustrate the potential unity of Eurasian civilization under Russian leadership. According to this line of analysis, the goal of Western strategy is to weaken and ultimately dismember Russia as well as to prevent the realization of an alliance between Orthodox and Islamic civilization. Reflecting this viewpoint General Tikhomirov wrote recently: "As is well known, the American conception of a new world order or the 'globalization' project, supposes a universal consolidation of the primacy of private property, the cult of money, and the priority of individualism. The principal enemies of this ideology are Islam and Orthodoxy which rely on collectivism as the only principle for the formation of social relations and state construction. Their uniting on the basis of such principles is destructive to the plans of influential interests across the ocean. Therefore, their principal goal is to set these forces fighting against each other in a merciless struggle. . . ."[67]

Escalation of the Western Threat

The Kosovo Crisis in 1999 served as an opportunity for the military leadership to intensify a focus on a growing military threat from NATO. Moreover, discussions within the government on the formulation of a revised national security policy document, a revised defense doctrine, and a naval policy that were un-

[65] Kisilev, "Tsivilizatsionnye vyzovi rossii," 19.

[66] The theme that the importation of liberal ideology itself represents a serious threat to Russian national security has been articulated recently in the militant national press by General L. Ivashov, who serves as the head of the Main Administration for International Military Cooperation. Ivashov has been lionized in the militant nationalist press for his staunch, anti-Western sentiments. See, L. Ivashov, "Rossiia, mir, voina," *Zavtra* 337 (2000): 3.

[67] Tikhomirov, "Bor'ba," 1.

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derway provided an internal policy environment in which threat assessment assumed increased relevance to issues of basic policy regarding military reform, force structuring, and weapons acquisition. Dissatisfied with the tone and substance of both the 1993 defense policy document and the 1997 national security concept, both of which heavily downplayed a Western threat, the Russian military utilized the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia in their own campaign to gain revision in the official assessment of the threat from the West and associated changes in Russian security policy. The military's campaign was significantly facilitated by the fact that NATO's action in the Balkans was widely perceived across Russia's political spectrum as an act of aggression.

While discussions were going on in Russia's Security Council over drafts of the revised defense and security policy documents, signs were evident that the Western threat had achieved a new policy salience. In 1999, the Defense Ministry conducted a series of military exercises based on scenarios involving Western aggression. The largest of these, "Zapad-99," which began on 22 June—the anniversary of the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union—was a week-long exercise aimed at rebuffing an attack by NATO against Kaliningrad. In a demonstrative message meant perhaps as much for the Russian government as for the West, Russian forces in the exercise were forced to resort to the use of nuclear weapons when they were unable to cope with the onslaught of NATO's superior conventional forces. Exercises premised on aggression by NATO forces also were conducted during 1999 by the Russian navy in the Barents Sea and the Black Sea.[68] As part of stepped up NATO-oriented military activity, strategic bombers resumed cold war exercises in the North Atlantic and Arctic.[69] War games premised on NATO aggression were held jointly with Belarus in August 2001. A further military exercise for conflict with NATO involving simulated launches of cruise missiles by a flight of backfire bombers scheduled for mid-September was abruptly cancelled in the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.[70]

Reenforcing the message implied by these war games, an intensified emphasis on the Western threat also appeared in military discourse in the immediate aftermath of NATO's military campaign against Yugoslavia. At a military conference held in November 1999 attended by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and other ranking government officials, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, in remarks that were widely televised, declared that "diktat and tyranny" were the basis of NATO policy and the alliance was prepared to use military force in any region to achieve its objectives. These objectives, according to Sergeyev, included "the weakening of the international position of Russia and the ousting [of Russia] from strategically important regions, including the Caspian region, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia." Sergeyev also declared that a spreading

[68] S. Saradzhyan, "Russia Practices for NATO Invasion," *The Times* (London), 22 June 1999; "Kremlin Rattles Nuclear Sword," *Moscow Times*, 13 November 1999.

[69] See, "United States Intercepts Russian Jets," *New York Times*, 19 September 1999.

[70] Pavel Felgenhauer, "The Ghost of Christmas," *Moscow Times*, 28 December 2001.

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wave of terrorism in Russia was "directed from abroad" and suggested that the United States had an interest in the continuation of such turmoil as part of its policy of undermining Russia's position in the North Caucasus.[71] Sergeyev also promoted the view that NATO's war against Yugoslavia marked a fundamentally new era in international relations, characterized by a sharp escalation in the danger of U.S. military aggression against Russia itself.[72] This shift toward greater aggressiveness in U.S. policy, Sergeyev contended, was the result of a combination of geopolitical pressures and a revolution in military affairs. The defense minister endorsed a version of geopolitics that attributed increasing U.S. aggressiveness to growing needs for control over world markets and resources. According to Sergeyev: "The appearance of [the new] era is not an accidental zig-zag of history, but one of the fundamental laws [*zakonomernost'*] of the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. . . . In correspondence to its growing demand on world markets and on world supplies of natural resources for its well being, the military force component of U.S. policy will systematically increase, including in relation to Russia due to the specifics of its geopolitical situation."[73]

As to the importance of the revolution in military affairs in inaugurating a new era in world history, Sergeyev asserted that NATO's war against Yugoslavia "was a full-scale prototype of a new war without contact," which signified a new stage in the revolution of military affairs. Reflecting a view sounded with some frequency in military analyses, Sergeyev declared that the superior ability of the United States to conduct such war enabled it to employ force with a far lower risk of losses to its own forces and hence increased U.S. readiness to resort to force in international relations. With a further expected increase in the gap between the U.S. capability to wage such war and that of other developed states, Sergeyev warned, the U.S. propensity to resort to a policy of military coercion could be expected to further increase.[74] Early military analyses of the Yugoslav conflict presented NATO's air campaign as highly effective in destroying a majority of predetermined targets while keeping its own losses to a minimum. Analysts concluded that NATO aircraft and rockets were virtually "invulnerable" to Yugoslav air defenses. Overall, a central theme in analysis of the Yugoslav conflict was that the war revealed a growing gap in military technology between NATO and Russia, which presented a serious threat to Russian security.[75]

That the military leadership chose to place special emphasis on the growing aggressiveness of the United States at the end of 1999 was itself significant,

[71] "Sbor rukovodyashchevo sostava vooruzhennikh sil," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 11 November 1999, 1.

[72] I. D. Sergeev," Osnovi voenno-tekhnicheskoi politiki rossii v nachale xxi veka," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 9 December 1999, 1, 2.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] General M. A. Gareev, "Nekotorye problemy podgotovki vooruzhennikh sil k lokal'nym voynam," *Voennaya mysl'* 1 (2000): 19.

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given the military's heavy involvement in the second Chechen war. That war commanded the attention of both the public and the government and could serve to provide substantial justification for greater attention to the needs of the Russian military. While the military did exploit the Chechen war to some degree for this purpose, the threat posed by such local conflicts does not serve the full spectrum of the military's institutional interests. Some important interests require a major external threat. This circumstance has not gone unnoticed by domestic critics of the military. As Pavel Felgenhauer, the defense analyst for the centrist paper *Sevodnya*, has contended: "For the Russian military a confrontation with the Chechen or Afghan rebels is not enough. Such enemies cannot promote serious procurement—especially nuclear submarines and bombers. For the Russian military-industrial complex a confrontation with the West is the only chance to keep alive a big Soviet style military and defense industry."[76]

New Defense and Security Policy

Formally, at least, new assessments of security threats confronting Russia were contained in the National Security Concept and the Defense Doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted in 2000.[77] Neither the revised National Security Concept approved in January 2000 nor the revised Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted in April of the same year reflected fully the military's concerns regarding the appropriate characterization of the threats to Russian national security. The new defense and security policy documents did reflect, however, a shift in the evaluation of the West. The assertion that Russia considers no state an adversary was removed and more direct language appeared in both documents identifying aspects of U.S. and NATO policy as threats to Russian security. Among the potential external threats to Russian security, these documents identify the pursuit of hegemonic policies by the United States, a new U.S. determination to pursue its goals by forceful means, the eastward expansion of NATO, and the danger that local conflicts on Russia's periphery might escalate to regional or even global war. The security policy document identifies as factors producing threats in the international sphere: "the strengthening of military political-blocs and alliances and above all NATO's eastward expansion," and "attempts to oppose the strengthening of Russia as one influential center in a multipolar world . . . and to weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region." Further, the security policy document warns that NATO's shift to a practice of "using military force outside its zone of responsibility could de-

[76] Pavel Felgenhauer, "Appeasement No Answer to Xenophobia," *Saint Petersburg Times*, 19 December 2000.

[77] "Kontseptsiya national'noi bezopastnosti rossiiskoi federatsii," *Diplomaticheskii vestnik* 2 (February 2000): 3–13; "Voennaya doktrina rossiisskoi federatsii," *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 25 April 2000.

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stabilize the entire global situation."[78] As was widely noted in the Russian media at the time, the two documents appeared to indicate that the Putin government had adopted a new official image of the United States and NATO as a strategic adversary.[79]

The formulations in these official policy statements largely represented compromises hammered out by military and civilian officials in the context of the Security Council and did not fully reflect the military leadership's assessments of the threats facing Russia. While threats posed by the United States and NATO were given greater salience in the defense and security policy documents adopted in 2000, the basic policy line on the type of wars likely to threaten Russia in the future did not change significantly from previous policy documents. Thus the new policy documents affirm that there has been a decline in the threat of the unleashing of a large-scale war, including a nuclear war against Russia. This decline is attributed to "positive changes in the international situation . . . the peace-loving policy [of the Russian Federation] and the maintenance of Russia's military potential—primarily its nuclear potential."[80] Local and regional conflicts rather than large scale external aggression remain the most likely threats to Russian security. In accordance with this assessment, current plans for military restructuring remain centered on the development of a highly mobile, compact military force totalling approximately 1.2 million. The deterrent value of this force is to be supplemented by a flexible response policy, which lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.[81] Of overarching significance in the new Russian security policy, however, is the emphasis on Russia's domestic economic and political problems.[82] Total revenue for the Russian government according to the 2001 budget was a mere 15 percent of U.S. military spending. Within this blunt fiscal reality, the Russian government allocated 17 percent of budgetary revenue to the military sector.

Putin and the Military: A Growing Divergence?

In his first months in office, Putin's approach to defense and security policy issues appeared to win the the military's approval. His determination to prosecute the renewed war in Chechnya until the rebels were defeated, declared support for enhancing the status and living conditions of the military, commitment to reestablishing Russia as a Great Power, and endorsement of a vigorous

[78] "Kontsepsiia natsional'noi bezopastnosti,'" 6.

[79] This was also the evaluation of the mainstream Russian press. See, for example, V. Ermolin, "U generalov prorezalsia komandnii golos," *Izvestia*, 13 November 1999; O. Odnokolenko, "Amerika-pervii vrag kremlia," *Sevodnia*, 15 October 1999.

[80] "Military Doctrine," 30.

[81] General A. Skvortsov, "Ot opyta proshlovo-k armii budushchevo," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 January 2001.

[82] Igor Semenenko, "Duma Passes Budget in Second Reading," *Moscow Times*, 21 October 2000.

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multipolar diplomacy aimed at countering a unipolar world order dominated by the United States accorded with the policy preferences of the military.[83]

As Putin's first term unfolded, however, there were signs of an increasing divergence between the military and the new president. In his own assessment of the most serious security problems confronting Russia, Putin placed increasing stress on domestic problems including the depressed state of the economy, rampant criminality, a weakened governmental structure, and separatism. This same emphasis was apparent in the security policy document completed under Putin's supervision. The logic implicit in Putin's assessment of the most pressing problems confronting Russia suggested that he would not be inclined to promote the effort underway by Defense Minister Sergeyev and other ranking commanders to construct an increasingly menacing portrait of a Western threat. Disputes with the United States over peacekeeping in the Balkans, the ABM treaty, NATO expansion, and the war in Chechnya notwithstanding, Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry displayed increasing interest in working to improve Russian relations with Europe and the United States and in playing down conflicts. Putin supported early resumption of active engagement with NATO in the aftermath of the war over Kosovo notwithstanding opposition from within the Ministry of Defense.[84] Evidence of a warming in relations with the United States was apparent at the time of the meeting between Presidents George W. Bush and Putin in Slovenia in June 2001 and the completion of arrangements for a Putin visit to the United States in the fall.[85] Months before the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov were according growing stress to the threat of international terrorism and religious extremism and generally avoiding harsh attacks on U.S. policy.[86]

Russia's Response to September 11

The trend toward closer relations with the United States was given significant impetus by Putin's response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York

[83] Initially Putin echoed the language characteristic of threat discourse of both the hard-line nationalists and the Russian military in warning that Russia was confronted by a fundamental challenge to its sovereignty and territorial integrity "by forces that are striving for the geopolitical restructuring of the world." "President Soothes, Warns His Generals," *Moscow Times*, 9 July 1999; A. Korbut, "Putin i kreml' opredilis," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 13 November 1999.

[84] Gennady Sysoyev, "Putin Doesn't Object to Russia's Joining NATO," *Kommersant*, 7 March 2000, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 10 (2000): 5–6; General Leonid Ivashov: "I See No Place for Us in the Present Alliance," *Trud*, 7 March 2000, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 10 (2000): 6.

[85] Vitaly Dymarsky, "29 Hours in the Balkans," *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 19 June 2001, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 25 (2001): 1.

[86] The gap between Putin and his generals on threat assessment was apparent in Putin's remarks in June 2001 on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The greatest threats to international peace were "international terrorism and religious and national extremism," which represented, "though under new banners," the same old Nazi ideas. Notably, Putin made no references to NATO expansion or the strivings of the United States to create a unipolar world. See "Za Otechestvo stoyat' nasmert," *Krasnaya zvesda*, 23 June 2001.

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and Washington. In the immediate aftermath, Putin was among the first world leaders to express sympathy and solidarity with the United States.[87] He also endorsed a U.S. right to respond forcefully against those responsible for the attacks.[88] Subsequently, Putin announced that Russia would share relevant intelligence with the United States, permit the use of its airspace for humanitarian flights, and, most significantly, increase its military assistance to the Northern Alliance opposition forces in Afghanistan. Further, contradicting an earlier statement by the Russian defense minister, Putin announced that Russia would not be opposed to the use by the United States and other coalition forces of bases on the territory of its "Central Asia allies."[89] With this latter declaration, however, Putin appeared to acknowledge developments between the United States and states in the region that were already underway.

In offering support to Washington's initial campaign in a war on terrorism, Putin clearly hoped among other goals to gain a greater degree of U.S. and European support for Russia's war in Chechnya. Beyond this objective, the Russian government likely sought to advance Russia's own interests in countering a threat to Russia and Central Asia from militant Islamic forces in Afghanistan as well as to improve Russia's diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis the West on a broad range of issues. By aligning Russia with the United States, Putin also appeared to further distance his government from the multipolar strategy championed by former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, which had been consonant with the policy preferences of those in the military leadership who defined a U.S. drive for hegemony as the principal threat to Russia.

The warming of relations with the United States and NATO led to expressions of concern by military leaders that the government was sacrificing other priorities that required vigorous opposition to U.S. attempts to sustain a unipolar world order.[90] In particular, military representatives were reported to have expressed serious concern that the general warming of relations with NATO and the United States would undermine efforts to block further NATO expansion, preserve treaty restrictions on BMD, and oppose Western attempts to undermine the CIS.[91] Military representatives also were reportedly dissatisfied

[87] "Statement by Vladimir Putin on Terrorist Acts in the United States," *Kommersant*, 12 September 2001, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 37 (2001): 4.

[88] Yevgeny Vasilyev, "After Shanghai, Texas," *Vremya MN*, 23 October 2001, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 43 (2001): 1.

[89] "Putin Outlines Steps to Help United States in Antiterrorist War," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 39 (2001): 1–5; "Zayavlenye presidenta rossisskoi federatsii v.v. putina," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 September 2001; for the earlier statement by Defense Minister Ivanov, see, "There Will Be No Military Operation on CIS Territory," *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 15 September 2001, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 37 (2001): 5.

[90] Igor Korotchenko, "Armeiskaya verkhuska pod nadzorom fsb," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 28 November 2001; Vladimir Georgiev, "Generali uchilis'ponimat'presidenta," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 October 2001.

[91] Georgiev, "Generali uchilis'ponimat' presidenta"; Pavel Felgehauer, "Going Unilaterally Ballistic," *Moscow Times*, 14 December 2001; Yuri Fyodorov, "Quiet Opposition of the Generals," *Moscow News* 42 (2001): 5.

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with the flexibility the Putin government demonstrated in last minute negotiations with the United States on the ABM Treaty.[92] The subdued reaction by the Russian government to the decision by the Bush administration in December 2001 to abrogate the ABM Treaty was itself less a source of irritation to the Russian military than was the fact that the U.S. decision appeared not to affect the overall trend toward improved relations.[93]

Military concerns about the strategic purpose and policies of NATO appeared not to be modified as a result of the enhanced consultative role offered to Russia under the "NATO at 20" format. NATO's decision at its December 2001 ministerial meeting to establish a new NATO-Russia Council to facilitate "consultation . . . joint decision and coordinated joint action" in areas of common interest was intended as an acknowledgment of the importance of the cooperative posture that Russia adopted with regard to the U.S.–led military campaign in Afghanistan as well as a response to Russia's dissatisfaction with the existing consultative arrangement.[94] While the civilian leadership accepted the enhancement of Russia's relationship with NATO as a diplomatic gain, the military leadership appeared to regard the "NATO at 20" formula as cosmetic and implying no real change in the nature or purposes of the alliance. Military commentary tended to treat U.S. interest in cooperating with Russia in a war on terrorism as entailing only a temporary and tactical shift on the part of the United States. The military view that the United States collaborated with Albanian terrorists in the Balkans and was supporting terrorism in Chechnya colored early military analysis of the U.S. war on terrorism. While General Gennadi Troshev, the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, claimed to have evidence that following the September attacks the United States moved to curtail Saudi funding for Chechen rebels, military commentaries openly reflected a view that the United States would continue to make use of terrorist groups in the Balkans and elsewhere when it served U.S. policy.[95] Elements of the military leadership known for their hard line views on U.S. strategic goals were quick to depict the U.S. war on terrorism as a continuation of an underlying strategy in the post-Soviet era. General Leonid Ivashov, the former head of the Department for International Military Cooperation in the Ministry of Defense, likely expressed the view of other hard-line elements in the military leadership when he declared that the September 11 attacks were a "consequence of American policy," which sought "world domination" and that the United States was exploiting the attacks to assert a new and broader basis for

[92] Vadim Solovyov, "Generals Joining Opposition to the Kremlin," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 13 November 2001, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 46 (2001): 8–9; Michael Wines, "Putin Sees Continued Alliance Despite the End of the ABM Pact," *New York Times*, 18 December 2001.

[93] Pavel Felgenhauer, "The Ghost of Christmas Past," *Moscow Times*, 28 December 2001.

[94] *Final Communique: Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, 6 December 2001.

[95] Alexander Prokhanov, "Dobit i zamiritsya: beseda Alekhsandr Prokhanova s komaduyushchevo severo-kavkazkym voennym okrugom general-polkovnika Gennadiya Trosheva," *Zavtra*, 13 November 2001; Ury Pankov, "Pervaya voina xxi veka," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 September 2001.

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military intervention and as an occasion for the demonstration of its military superiority.[96]

Notwithstanding Russia's interest in eliminating Afghanistan as a source of support for radical Islamic groups in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the success of the U.S.–led effort to drive the Taliban from power and destroy al Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan has been viewed by the military as a distinctly mixed blessing. While radical Islamic groups in Central Asia and the North Caucasus have lost a base of support, the threat of militant Islamic insurgency has by no means been eliminated. Further, the increased military and political presence of the United States in Central Asia is seen as a development that further undermines Russian influence in the region and poses an increased threat to Russia's security.[97] In his assessment of the results of the U.S.–led campaign in Afghanistan, General Ivashov gave expression to views shared to some extent by other Russian military officials who see the United States engaged in a hegemonic power drive in the post-Soviet era. Ivashov observed that while Russia's cooperation in the military campaign in the form of its support for the Northern Alliance served Russian interests, Russia had been outmaneuvered with the result that: "now the Americans and their allies, in essence, are arranging their own military-political control over this important region. . . . [W]ith Afghanistan as a platform they will increase their influence over all the states of Central Asia. Russia's influence on processes here will constantly weaken and the end result it seems will be that our country will be driven out of Central Asia."[98]

Though the Russian government expressed the view that any long-term U.S. military presence in the Central Asian region was unwarranted, its ability to exercise control over the development of security cooperation between the United States and states in the region appears uncertain. The current military leadership is unlikely to see any security gains for Russia and only increased evidence of a U.S. threat as a result of any long-term U.S. military presence in Central Asia.

Conclusions

Motivated by both institutional interests and its beliefs regarding the military dangers confronting Russia, the Russian military leadership can be expected to take advantage of every opportunity to market images of serious existing and emerging military threats. Within the military there has been growing commitment to new militant and confrontational models that depict Russia as encircled by hostile forces inclined toward increasingly aggressive policies. This view of an array of mounting external threats grounded in "objective" geopolitical and

[96] Leonid Ivashov, "Global'naya provokatsiya," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 10 October 2001.

[97] See, for example, the interview with General Leonid Ivashov in Andrei Artemov, "Zapad demonstriruet rossii novy format sotrudnichestva," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 20 December 2001.

[98] Andrei Artemov, "Zapad demonstriruet rossii novy format sotrudnichestva," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 20 December 2001.

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civilizational dynamics serves important military institutional interests. These models themselves have yet to gain the status of official doctrine, and analyses questioning their validity continue to appear in military journals.[99] In all likelihood, however, the military, along with the militant nationalist and communist opposition, will continue to embrace and market models of growing external threats based on theories of civilizational and geopolitical confrontation. The military will likely view further NATO enlargement as highly menacing and present other international developments in a manner that advances their own institutional agenda.[100]

Whether the Russian government will be able to sustain a foreign policy course involving growing cooperation with the United States and NATO will depend on a number of factors. These include, most importantly, President Putin's ability to manage and restructure the Russian military and the diplomatic and security gains for Russia that are realized as the result of a policy of closer cooperation with the United States and NATO.

To some degree President Putin has moved to strengthen his control over the Defense Ministry, though overall progress in restructuring Russia's military has been slow. Frustrated by the slow pace of military reform, Putin in March 2001 replaced the Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev with Sergei Ivanov, a close ally and security service careerist who had previously served as secretary of the Security Council under Putin. A career intelligence officer with close ties to Ivanov and Putin, Nikolai Pankov was appointed to head the Defense Ministry's chief personnel administration, and a civilian official was named as the deputy minister of defense responsible for overseeing military expenditure. In the same time period, General Ivashov, whose hardline views on NATO had made him a popular figure in the nationalist press, was removed as head of the Department of International Military Cooperation responsible for liaison with NATO and replaced by an officer with a distinctly less truculent orientation.[101] Reform of the Russian military is a formidable task, however, and the extent of progress that can be realized under Putin's leadership still remains unclear.

The Russian government's ability to sustain a policy aimed at improving relations with Europe and the United States will also depend on Western policy. The absence of perceived gains as a result of Russia's campaign to improve relations will leave Putin vulnerable to domestic critics, including the coalition of forces favoring a Eurasian strategy centered on balancing a threat of U.S. world domination. Unfortunately, the plausibility of renewed images of the West as a threat to Russia has been increased as a result of some Western poli-

[99] See, for example, Major-General A. F. Klimenko, "Mezhdunarodnia bezopastnost' i kharakter voennikh konfliktov budushchevo," *Voennaya mysl'* 1 (1997): 2–10.

[100] The naval command's determination to attribute the August 2000 sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk during war games in the Barents Sea to a collision with a foreign, most likely U.S. submarine reflects the combination of renewed suspicion and institutional interest underlying the Russian military's predisposition to promote confrontational models of the West.

[101] "Sergei Ivanov Shifts Around Some Generals," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 29 (2001): 14.

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cies. Most significant in this regard have been NATO decisions regarding enlargement and out-of-area alliance security interests. The adoption by NATO of a revised strategic doctrine at the Washington Summit in April 1999, which envisioned the use of NATO forces in a broad but ill-defined zone "in and around the Euro-Atlantic region," has been seen by Russian military officials as evidence of a growing Western threat. Other U.S. policies in particular have fed the spread of suspicions and paranoia in Moscow. The persistence of cold-war-era military maneuvers, increased U.S. and other NATO military activity in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea, forward Western diplomacy in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, and a tendency to resort to force with considerable frequency and little concern with Moscow's *amour propre* in the post-cold war era have all played into the hands of the more hawkish and anti-Western interests in Moscow. To enhance domestic support for Putin's new policy aimed at downplaying conflicts with the West and accelerating Russia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community and to gain full advantage of Russian cooperation in the war on terrorism, in which the United States is likely to be engaged for some time, it is in the West's interests to make a new NATO-Russia partnership meaningful and to ensure that Putin's new policy yields real gains for Russia. Confronting a new and quite likely prolonged campaign against global terrorism, the United States and its allies have an even larger interest in behaving in a way that disconfirms the militant images of the West embraced by elements of the Russian military.

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Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China

AN CHEN

The structural theory of democracy postulates that capitalism is an important, if not indispensable, catalyst to democratization. For some scholars, capitalism produces a bourgeoisie that is vital to democracy largely because this class, unlike the aristocracy, does not have to depend on coercive state power to survive and thrive.[1] For many others who concentrate on contemporary democratic transitions, capitalism expands the middle class that at a certain evolutionary stage would turn to crucial social pressure for democratization.[2] Most structural theorists agree that capitalist development, by its logic, would transform the state-society relations and shape a pattern of class alliances in favor of the growth of a civil society whose main function is to provide a counterweight to state power and prevent its tyrannical abuse.[3]

China's seemingly steady march toward capitalism has prompted many China specialists to take a structural approach. They argue that the lack or weakness of "civil society" in China accounted for the failure of the 1989 pro-democracy movement and impeded democratic transition. Yet capitalist development

[1] See Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Eric Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1969).

[2] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 51; Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), chap. 5; Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 81.

[3] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), vol. 2, 114–18, 123–28; David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), chaps. 3, 5; Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); M. Steven Fish, "Democratization's Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14 (July-September 1998): 212–47.

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in China would set in train economic and political changes that undermine the excessive party-state domination and lead to a more autonomous society.[4] Given the recognized causal relationship between capitalism and civil society, China's rapid expansion of the private sector in recent years has made civil society such a crucial concept in the discussion of democratization that some analysts have endeavored to search for it in China. When they fail to find a civil society in the Western sense, they try to modify this term to fit the Chinese reality.[5] Some scholars doubt the applicability of the civil–society notion to China either because of the alleged peculiarities of Chinese culture, history, politics, and traditional state-society relations[6] or the lack of "a direct and simple causal link between economic reform and democratization from below."[7]

The structural approach is a useful analytic tool, as it explains the dynamics of democratic transition by examining the social structure of an authoritarian regime. But this approach may not apply adequately to the Chinese case because of its flaws in treating capitalist development as an unexceptionally spontaneous process and in seeing structural consequences of capitalism as largely predetermined, irreversible, and universal. Although the Chinese polity has been economically and politically transformed to resemble a typical authoritarian-capitalist state, it is highly problematic whether China will follow a conventional civil-society path or a classic European model toward democracy. Will China's capitalism generate the same social dynamics, class realignment, and pattern of state-society interactions conducive to the formation of civil society as one finds in traditional capitalist societies? Why are we still unable to find clear signs heralding a Western-type civil society after the two decades of market reform?

This article grapples with these issues and, meanwhile, reexamines some key structural concepts regarding class, society, and the state. My approach differs from that of some China scholars. I attempt to solve the civil-society puzzle

[4] Gordon White, *Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Harry Harding, "The Contemporary Study of Chinese Politics: An Introduction," *China Quarterly* 139 (September 1994): 699–703; Richard Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Craig Calhoun, *Neither Gods Nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Thomas Gold, "Bases for Civil Society in Reform China" in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and David Strand, eds., *Reconstructing Twentieth-Century China: State Control, Civil Society, and National Identity* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1998), 163–88.

[5] B. Michael Frolic, "State-led Civil Society" in Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic, eds., *Civil Society in China* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 47–67; Baogang He, *The Democratic Implications of Civil Society in China* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1997), 7–8; Gold, "Bases for Civil Society."

[6] Kenneth Dean, "Ritual and Space: Civil Society or Popular Religion" in Brook and Frolic, eds., *Civil Society in China*, 172–92; Joseph Fewsmith, "The Dengist Reforms in Historical Perspective" in Brantly Womack, ed., *Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23–52; Frederic Wakeman, "The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate," *Modern China* 19 (April 1993): 108–38.

[7] See Margaret M. Pearson, *China's New Business Elite: The Political Consequences of Economic Reform* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), chap. 1.

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through scrutiny of the particular pattern of China's capitalist development and its influence over the formation of China's entrepreneurial class. My analysis adopts a structural methodology, but it challenges some of its theoretical formulations as applied to China. Structural theorists see the rise of an entrepreneurial class and other middle classes as central to the expansion of societal autonomy from state domination, and therefore to democratization. I would argue that this scenario might not be a necessity in China, at least during the present phase of development. The Chinese experiments with a market economy in the reform era have been entangled in a political dilemma, which makes the future of capitalism uncertain in China. More significantly, it has submitted the entrepreneurial class and other middle classes to a status of political and economic dependence. In addition, these classes' self-perceived position in the societal hierarchy does not lead them to associate their class interests positively with democratization.[8]

A Note on the Method

In addition to the relevant Western and Chinese scholarship, this study draws heavily on the fieldwork I conducted for this project four times in China during June-July 1998, November-December 1998, 1999, and 2000. I gathered a large number of data and materials on this topic from China's official statistics and publications, but an analytic reading of them must be combined with an extensive empirical study. My investigations were aimed to collect firsthand information as the basis of my analysis of the potential roles of China's entrepreneurial class and other middle classes in the political transformation. But my original plan for collecting data through questionnaires was thwarted. Such a method proved far more difficult to adopt among entrepreneurs than among workers and peasants. Entrepreneurs could not be easily reached. They were usually too cautious to respond to the questionnaires not allocated through official channels. After some fruitless efforts, I decided to rely mainly on personal interviews, which allowed me to proceed with open-ended and follow-up queries and also to explain some key terms and concepts.

My interviews targeted the six categories of people: private entrepreneurs (including businessmen), other high-income professionals, researchers and scholars (mostly social scientists), local officials/cadres, middle- and low-income

[8] I am not the first to explain the lack of civil society in China through an examination of market reform and the new merchant force. This approach is adopted in Pearson, *China's New Business Elite.* But the emphasis of her analysis is placed on China's foreign-sector managers, whereas this study focuses mainly on private entrepreneurs and business people. Basically because of this difference, we come to a similar conclusion but have quite different explanations for it, particularly on the issues concerning the autonomy and political behaviors of China's business class. Part of my major argument echoes a point taken by Dorothy J. Solinger years ago that indicated "no true autonomy of economic power for a 'private' sector" during the 1980s. See her *China's Transition from Socialism: Statist Legacies and Market Reforms, 1980-1990* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), chap. 11.

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employees, and the unemployed. The total number of interviewees exceeds 130, of whom over one-sixth and approximately half belong to what I define as the "bourgeoisie" and "middle class," respectively. In my interviews with these people, particularly the private entrepreneurs, I was most interested in their personal experiences with economic successes and their interactions with the local officials. I also made detailed inquiries into their thinking on the issues related to political reform. Actually, the entrepreneurs I talked with were by no means the sole source of my knowledge about them. My understanding of this social stratum—especially those entrepreneurs with "special" family backgrounds—was boosted by my interviews with the other categories of the people as well.

But I must acknowledge the limitations of my method. First, since a mass survey on this topic was not feasible, no firsthand data of statistical significance are available for a quantitative analysis. Second, questions about democracy—defined specifically as a multiparty system, political opposition and contestation, free elections, and majority rule—did not often yield meaningful results. Chinese citizens do not seem to reflect or discuss politics in these terms, although they frequently lashed out at the party-state. For the lack of democratic experience, they showed much uncertainty when asked to comment on democracy's merits and effects. Contradictory statements were therefore unsurprising. Diversified personal outlooks and experiences also undermine a class-based analysis. Third, my fieldwork was mostly done in Beijing, Shanghai (and their adjacent counties), Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong provinces, where capitalism was more advanced or even dominated the local economy. I would caution the reader to be aware of the regional bias of my empirical study. This study is, of course, not limited to the above regions. I have quoted available materials and statistics in an effort to present an overall picture of today's China.

The Unique Pattern of Capitalist Development

The private economy has grown in China at an explosive pace since Deng Xiaoping's 1992 tour to southern provinces. By 1999, state-owned companies that used to monopolize business made up only 47 percent of the national economy. The private sector—not counting the operations of foreign investors—accounted for as much as 40 percent and dominated the regional economy in some coastal provinces.[9] Since the 1997 Party Congress legitimized the private economy and promised to give it legal protection, post-Deng leaders seem to have gone even farther toward capitalism than Deng's own design.[10] Behind

[9] Dexter Roberts et al., "China's New Capitalism," (http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_39/b3648087.htm?scriptFramed, *Businessweek Online*, 27 September 1999), accessed on 15 November 1999.

[10] Jiang Zemin, "Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory," *Beijing Review* 40 (6–12 October 1997): 10–33.

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the apparent booming private economy, however, hides an unsolved puzzle. If China's market reform, as many economists contend, represents a transition of the economic system, what is its destination? This question is critical to an assessment of the future of the private economy in China and its political consequences.

Capitalist development in post-Mao China is a rare phenomenon in terms of its origins, path, and depth. China is presumably the first country in world history where capitalism is largely an "artifact" invented by the state. After more than two decades of absence—following the completion of the Socialist Transformation in 1956 that nearly eliminated China's private industry and commerce[11]—China's capitalist enterprises and private entrepreneurs actually started from scratch in the era of Deng's reform. In this respect, China stands in sharp contrast with Europe, where commercial capitalism preceded and even helped the emergence of the centralized kingships.[12] It, too, differs from many contemporary Third World countries in which the economic legacy of the colonial period was inherited and the struggle for independence/political unification and consolidation of state power restructured or redirected but did not discontinue capitalist development. These differences suggest that China's commercial classes will have to take a longer time to achieve political influence. China has yet to reinstate its capitalist traditions, ethics, and values.[13] Among these values are separation of economic and political powers, individual choice, and peaceful competition in the marketplace, which favor democratic development.

China's capitalist development in the reform era is not really a spontaneous process. It was sponsored and guided by a party that is, by definition, anticapitalist. While it is controversial whether the decollectivization in the Chinese countryside was a peasant or government initiative,[14] the rise of the urban private economy as part of the reform package has been mostly a product of the party-state policy and placed under tight government control. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) set out on the capitalist road not out of a belief or ideology, but out of considerations based on an understanding that capitalism is "superior" at least in one respect, namely that it is economically more effi-

[11] After taking over the ownership of their firms, the communist state paid capitalists a fixed interest on their private capital until 1966. In theory, therefore, the Chinese bourgeoisie still existed between 1956 and 1966. See Carl Riskin, *China's Political Economy: The Quest for Development since 1949* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 97.

[12] R. H. Tawney, *The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1967).

[13] Capitalist sprouts in China could perhaps be traced back to the Ming Dynasty. By 1750, there were high parallels between China and northwest Europe in consumption and product and factor markets. See Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[14] Two contrasting views are found in Daniel Kelliher, *Peasant Power in China: The Era of Rural Reform, 1979–1989* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); and Jonathan Unger, "The Decollectivization of the Chinese Countryside: A Survey of Twenty-eight Villages," *Pacific Affairs* 58 (Winter 1985–86): 585–607.

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cient than socialism. This political pragmatism translated into a pro-capitalist strategy with an enormous dilemma. The survival of the regime is increasingly dependent on its economic performance, whose success requires a transformation of the economic system in a capitalist direction. But the CCP finds it hard to totally forsake Marxist ideology, which remains instrumental in maintaining its organizational cohesion and ideological legitimacy.

The contradiction between theory and practice could not be exposed more clearly than in the September 1999 party decision, which raised economic privatization to new heights on the reform agenda. Yet the central decision makers took great pains to wrap the adopted radical market measures in a socialist package, emphasizing that public ownership would remain "the economic foundation of [China's] socialist system."[15] The refusal to alter the public discourse was not simply a theoretical or propaganda matter; it was politically consequential. As Arnold Buchholz suggests in reference to the Soviet experience, if ideology undergoes little substantive change in reform, then "there is no fundamental change in the basis of the system."[16] To be sure, compared with the 1980s and early 1990s, when conservative leaders such as Chen Yun wielded a strong influence over central policy making, the post-Deng regime is more and more only rhetorically tied to Marxist ideology. But still, the regime has not shown an intention of abandoning socialism as one of its legitimizing symbols. As such, it is in doubt whether a free market economy will be set as the goal of the ongoing economic transition.

The fundamental political dilemma of Chinese capitalism to a large extent preordains its distinctive features. First, it is a mostly artificial, structurally limited, and probably halfway capitalism whose prospects are more or less politically contingent. The obstacles in the way of establishing conventional capitalist norms and regulations do not just come from the short history of the communist-led capitalism, but more importantly, from the regime's need for political manipulation of the economy. The socialist market economy as an innovation to fuse market and central planning economies seems to have achieved some short-term successes, but it is hardly sustainable in the long run. During the 1990s, the inherent contradictions in market reform accounted for considerable economic irregularities and market disorder. Along with a fragile legal system, they placed the nascent entrepreneurial class in a situation in which political protection and favor proved, if not crucial, important for its economic successes. It is true that the private sector has acquired a recognized status in the national economy as well as a friendly environment in which to grow. But compared with a traditional capitalist society, the private economy and the entrepreneurial class suffer from the state's discriminatory policy that is most mani-

[15] "Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Guoyou Qiye Gaige he Fazhan Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding" [The CCP Central Committee's Decision on Some Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of State-owned Enterprises], *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*), 27 September 1999.

[16] Arnold Buchholz, "Perestroika and Ideology," *Studies in Soviet Thought* 36 (October 1988): 149–68.

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fest in bank loans and taxation. Moreover, the hybrid of market and planning mechanisms has led to unfair and unequal market competition in which entrepreneurs well connected to political power enjoy numerous privileges.

Second and relatedly, China's capitalism took off and evolved under a nearly almighty party-state. Since the market reform is politically motivated, the central leadership has been keen to control its momentum and prevent economic pluralism from spilling over into the political domain. Unlike a typical authoritarian state that usually does not seek an ideological justification of its dictatorship and hardly lasts long, China's communist regime not only remains institutionally entrenched, it sticks to those creeds in Marxist discourse that serve to legitimize the one-party system and political repression. Under such an exceedingly powerful state, it should not be taken for granted that sociopolitical pluralism and autonomous social organizations—as a presumable outgrowth of capitalism—would emerge out of the increasing diversification of societal interests.[17] One needs to use great caution in drawing a parallel between China and other relevant countries. In Europe, liberal democracy grew out of capitalism partly because political pluralism had been an historical accompaniment of capitalism and played a decisive role in taming monarchic power. In contemporary capitalist countries, such as those in southern Europe and Latin America, organized political opposition and civil society were long historical phenomena and posed constant challenges to authoritarianism. Even in Taiwan and South Korea, with a weaker democratic tradition and a more dominant state, uninterrupted capitalism eroded political control and contributed to an "authoritarian-pluralist" regime that "accepts or even encourages economic and social pluralism."[18]

Although bureaucratic power has been streamlined in China to accommodate market reform, it has not diminished the party-state capacity to a substantial degree.[19] To maintain an organizational check on the democratic potential of capitalism, the communist leadership has not sought alternative sociopolitical forces, but relied upon party cadres to implement market reform and has allowed them to retain considerable power to control the reform process. As David Wank's empirical study shows, this cadre power has resulted in the strengthening of commercialized patron-client ties between the local government and private businesses.[20] The party-state dominance in the marketplace

[17] A very powerful and almost entirely autonomous state in relation to social classes and groups, as David Potter argues, has provided "a most uncongenial setting for democratization." See his "Explaining Democratization" in David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh, and Paul Lewis, eds., *Democratization* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997), 1–40.

[18] Robert A. Scalapino, *The Politics of Development: Perspectives on Twentieth-Century Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 71–131.

[19] An Chen, *Restructuring Political Power in China: Alliances and Opposition, 1978–1998* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

[20] David L. Wank, *Commodifying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

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integrates with its still heavy political penetration into Chinese society to constitute the major source of the economic vulnerability and political submission of China's entrepreneurial class and other middle classes.[21]

A Political Analysis of China's Entrepreneurial Class

Social class in the West is largely about inequality and hierarchy, and it is usually categorized on the basis of occupation, income, and wealth. But class definitions should be carefully applied in the Chinese context. China's market reform, for instance, has bred a special wealthy group whose members are government officials or party cadres by occupation.[22] With low nominal salaries, they have amassed enormous fortunes through rent seeking and predation. A study indicates that in 1999 the majority of the "new, rich classes" (*xinfu jieji*) were bureaucrats and government-appointed managers of state-owned enterprises (SOE).[23] But the wealth they have acquired through illegal channels is usually deeply hidden and its actual amount hardly known. And their disposal of wealth does not entirely fit the definition of the bourgeoisie, either. As such, these corrupt "public servants" are not included in the category of the Chinese bourgeoisie discussed in this article.

Defining China's Bourgeoisie and Middle Classes

China's entrepreneurial class as a whole shares some basic politics-related features. But distorted market rules and the magnitude of bureaucratic meddling inherent in a somewhat spurious capitalist context have caused conflicts of economic interests that justify a political differentiation within the entrepreneurial class—more specifically between the bourgeoisie and the (entrepreneurial) middle class. Many Marxist and classic works on the historical political economy of Europe do not distinguish clearly between the bourgeoisie and the middle class. This conceptual confusion, inherited by Chinese researchers, seems to have well served the propaganda purposes of the CCP leadership, which never acknowledges the emergence of a bourgeoisie out of the market reform.[24] In

[21] It is true that the private sector, as Pearson argues, has acquired autonomy greater than state-owned enterprises. See her *China's New Business Elite*, 95–99. But in China's macroeconomic environment, this autonomy far from constitutes a base for alienation from the regime. Here one has to distinguish between the employees and owners of private enterprises who enjoy quite different degrees and natures of autonomy.

[22] Solinger classifies them into "entrepreneurs" and likens them to the "bureaucratic capitalists" in late dynastic times. See her *China's Transition*, 259.

[23] Cai Yongmei, "Hongse Zhongguo de Qieguo Dadao" [The Arch Usurper of State Power in Red China], *Kaifang* (*Open*, Hong Kong) 153 (September 1999): 39–42.

[24] Whether there is a bourgeoisie in China is a controversial issue among Western scholars as well. David S. G. Goodman defines China's "large- and medium-scale capitalists" as one of the "new middle classes." His refusal to categorize them as the bourgeoisie seems to be based on two questionable criteria: these capitalists are too few in number, and they are not, like the bourgeoisie of the European context, "independent of the party-state." See his "The New Middle Class" in Merle Goldman and Rod-

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many party-state documents and officially censored social science publications, the richest social stratum is generally referred to either as private entrepreneurs (*siying qiyezhu*) or individual business households (*geti gongshanghu* or *getihu*) or middle classes (*zhongchan jieji*). These blurred references and deliberate mixing of the two social categories add much perplexity to our reading of the relevant statistics, from which one hardly gets an accurate picture of China's bourgeoisie. While in decreasing usage in contemporary Western scholarship, the term bourgeoisie basically denotes the owners of capital with a profit orientation and some distinctive values.[25] By this loose definition, perhaps most of China's entrepreneurial class could be labeled as the "bourgeoisie." But for my purpose of political analysis, as well as because of the enormous internal gap in wealth, I divide China's entrepreneurial class into two categories. While placing small entrepreneurs or the petit bourgeoisie within the middle-class category, I define China's bourgeoisie as comprising the owners of relatively large capital, namely the wealthiest Chinese private entrepreneurs.

Since most available data are fragmentary and treat private entrepreneurs in an undifferentiated way, the dividing line between big and small entrepreneurs has to be rough and somewhat arbitrary. By the end of 1999, the total number of private enterprises in China was 1.51 million. Their average registered capital was 682,000 *yuan* (US$82,398), with 200,000 exceeding one million *yuan*.[26] Some surveys disclose widespread underreporting or assets-hiding behavior. In Henan, for example, only forty-two private enterprises registered with the government with over one million *yuan*, whereas the actual number was 200.[27] On the other hand, the number of "individual business households" (*getihu*) reached 32 million by the end of 1999. But there is no indication of what criteria separate them from private enterprises.[28] Although most of them operate small stores or workshops and employ only a few workers, some *getihu*s own capital no less than do some private-enterprise owners.[29] Without income taxation data as the basis of calculation, it is hard to determine precisely the

erick MacFarquhar, eds., *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 241–61.

[25] The notion of "bourgeoisie" is sometimes quite vague and misleading in political discourse. For an examination of changing and differing usages of the word, see Raymond Williams, *Keywords* (London: Fontana, 1983).

[26] Guowuyuan Fazhan Yanjiu Zhongxin [Development Research Center of the State Council], *Zhongguo Jingji Nianjian 2000* [Almanac of China's Economy 2000] (Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Nianjianshe, 2000), 723–24. The exchange rate between Chinese *yuan* and U.S. dollar was 8.2769:1 on 25 June 2001.

[27] Zhu Fangming et al., *Siyou Jingji zai Zhongguo* [The Private Economy in China] (Beijing: Zhongguo Chengshi Chubanshe, 1998), 76.

[28] Guowuyuan Fazhan Yanjiu Zhongxin, *Zhongguo Jingji Nianjian 2000*, 724–25. In some authoritative official statistics, "private enterprises" and "individual business households" are mixed and placed in the category of "individual-owned enterprises." See State Statistical Bureau, *China Statistical Yearbook 2000* (Beijing: China Statistic Press, 2000), 407.

[29] During my 1998 fieldwork, I met some "large" *getihu*s who, for various reasons, preferred to register as "individual business household" rather than "private enterprise."

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real size of the Chinese bourgeoisie. If the bourgeoisie denotes the owners of the above-mentioned private enterprises, then its members should be over 1.5 million. If the millionaire (*baiwan fuweng*) is the bourgeois as some researchers suggest, its number is put at three million in 1998.[30] Three million make up less than 0.25 percent (or approximately 1 percent if their family members are included) of the Chinese population.

In social science, the middle class is usually more broadly or ambiguously defined. It is not limited to small entrepreneurs and business people, but also covers many other professions that typically require good education, receive high pay, and have some particular consumption habits. In the West, the term refers more to a social status than a strictly circumscribed class and is therefore quite subjective. The majority of the population in many industrial democracies prefers to assign themselves to the middle-class category. By contrast, for historical and practical reasons, most Chinese urban citizens tend to identify themselves as the working class. As an alien concept, the "middle class" in China circulates mainly in intellectual discourses and used to be associated with living "comfortably" (*xiaokang*). As *xiaokang* becomes an increasingly common way of life, the standard of the middle class has been accordingly revised to denote a social stratum lying above ordinary working people but still not the richest.

For the same reasons as for the bourgeoisie, a precise assessment of the proportion of China's middle class is almost impossible. An official statistic indicates that in 1993 there were 5.3 million families whose annual income exceeded 50,000 *yuan* (roughly US$6,041), which was implied as the threshold for the middle class.[31] As nominal income rose to keep pace with inflation throughout the 1990s, that benchmark is obviously no longer applicable. Based on my investigation in 1999 and 2000 of wage schemes and sources of income for several trades and professions in some affluent provinces, I would assign a family with an annual income between 100,000 and 700,000 *yuan* to the middle class. My own approximate estimate is that such families cannot exceed 12 million in China. Including all the family members, middle-class people should number between 35-45 million. They constitute 9-11 percent of the urban population, but may not exceed 4 percent nationwide.[32] This social stratum includes small

[30] Despite their consensus on that figure, these researchers have not disclosed where and how they got it. See Chang Xinghua, *Jingji Biange Zhongde "Heixiang"* [The "Black Box" in the Economic Transformation] (Zhuhai, Guangdong: Zhuhai Chubanshe, 1998), 215; Wen Ming, *Zhongguo Youchanzhe Baogao* [A Report on China's Propertied Class] (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe, 1999), 7; Tang Zhongxin, *Pinfu Fenhua de Shehuixue Yanjiu* (A Sociological Study on Economic Polarization] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1998), 2.

[31] Qin Yan, *Zhongguo Zhongchan Jieji* [China's Middle Class] (Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe, 1999), 27.

[32] China's total population was 1.26 billion by the end of 1999, of which 30.9 percent (389 million) was defined as urban. See State Statistical Bureau, *China Statistical Yearbook 2000*, 95. The estimate of China's middle-class size is based on both my investigation and some official data. A statistic indicates that in China's urban areas (including townships) there were two million families with an annual income of over 100,000 *yuan* in 1996 and more than six million families between 30,000 and 100,000 *yuan*. The income gap between them and low-pay groups was being widened annually by 11.3 percent.

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entrepreneurs and business people (mostly individual business households), many contract-based SOE managers, senior scientists, stockbrokers, estate agents, senior employees in some financial institutions, managers and white-collar employees in foreign and large private companies, and some special professionals such as lawyers, accountants, singers, fashion models, designers, and athletes.

Why Don't Chinese Bourgeois Like Democracy?

The bourgeoisie as a group of big private entrepreneurs should be singled out from China's entrepreneurial class for a separate analysis not just because its number is increasing. More importantly, this group wields social, economic, and political influence disproportionate to its size, particularly at local levels. Many bourgeois come from formidable political families and hold tremendous power resources. Many have established cozy collaboration with the local top officials. Many have infiltrated deeply into the party-government apparatus by buying agents to influence the governmental process. Others, as local celebrities, have landed a position for themselves in people's congresses and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) branches.[33] Chinese bourgeois are not a politically undifferentiated aggregate and should be divided into two types: parasitic and self-made. The first comprises the children, spouses, and relatives of incumbent senior officials/cadres as well as the former bureaucrats whose private companies thrive upon their official networks.[34] The second denotes the bourgeois who have risen from the bottom of Chinese society through self-help. An investigative report suggests that the first type may outnumber the second.[35]

How special is China's bourgeoisie as compared with its counterpart in traditional capitalist societies? The Chinese bourgeoisie is definitely not the one in Barrington Moore's sense which, as David Goldblatt understands it, is "the sociological vectors of liberal and democratic ideologies," and has emerged out of the capitalist economic relations recognizing "no enduring differences be-

See Tang Zhongxin, *Pinfu Fenhua*, 32–33. According to another report, 10 percent of urban (including township) citizens belong to a vaguely defined high-income (*gao shouru*) stratum. Liu Yingjie et al., *Zhongguo Shehui Xianxiang Fenxi* [An Analysis of China's Social Phenomena] (Beijing: Chengshi Chubanshe, 1998), 72.

[33] From 1990 to 1994, the number of private entrepreneurs in people's congresses and the CPPCC at and above the county level increased by 42 percent and 62 percent, respectively. See Zhu Guanglei et al., *Dangdai Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieceng Fenxi* [An Analysis of Various Strata in Contemporary Chinese Society] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1998), 383.

[34] For an empirical analysis of the societal capital these people are endowed with, see Wank, *Commodifying Communism*, 124–32.

[35] According to this report, 92 percent of the children and spouses of top-level officials at the municipal level and 71 percent of provincial- and central ministerial-level officials run private companies. See Yue Shan, "Guanding Dalu Bage Shijie Diyi" [Eight Officially Designated World Champions in Mainland China], *Cheng Ming* (*Contend*, Hong Kong) 273 (July 2000): 17–19.

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tween human beings on the basis of rank, status or family."[36] Of course, China is not alone in that respect. Capitalism plagued by cronyism, as one finds it in some developing countries, is not a hotbed for such a "liberal" bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie would be pro-liberal when and where it could benefit from free competition and minimal state intervention. But politically, as both classic European cases and Guillermo O'Donnell's bureaucratic authoritarian model suggest, the bourgeoisie always wants itself to be included in state power and "rarely fought for further extensions [of political participation] once its own place was secured."[37] It might even see the political exclusion of the mass of the population as a requisite for overcoming economic stagnation.[38] Simply put, the ideal model for the bourgeoisie in most capitalist states is, at best, a liberal oligarchy rather than a liberal democracy.

Although Chinese bourgeois unquestionably reject a return to central planning, they are hardly proponents of true economic liberalism, let alone democracy. Their monopoly of economic resources through manipulating or buying state power contradicts efforts for transforming the oligarchic, exclusive regime into a liberal, inclusive one. A large proportion, if not a majority, of the bourgeois have prospered from the commercial privileges deriving from political lineage. They are essentially a parasitic appendage of corrupt and unrestricted political power and have a taken-for-granted personal stake in preventing regime change.

By contrast, self-made bourgeois do have a possibility of evolving into a pro-liberal force. Despite their own market edges that often make life difficult for smaller entrepreneurs, they face unfair competition from more privileged rivals and are compelled to pay a high price for access to politically monopolized economic resources. To stave off legally unjustifiable extortion and blackmail or to avoid falling victims to likely policy change, they have to place themselves under the umbrella of powerful political figures.[39] In the early stage of development, many of them made fortunes by exploiting market chaos and loopholes in the immature legal regulations. Once they have achieved success in businesses and established themselves as powerful competitors in the marketplace, they look forward to "rule of law," which will hopefully institutionalize free market order. In my interviews with these people, close to half of them equated democracy with rule of law and thereby denied that they are opponents of democratization.

[36] David Goldblatt, "Democracy in the 'Long Nineteenth Century,' 1760–1919" in Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh, and Lewis, eds., *Democratization*, 46–70.

[37] Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, *Capitalist Development*, 46.

[38] Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973). Such examples could also be found in Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

[39] As the fate of the Beijing Dannong Corporation manifests, big private companies would be unsustainable or go bankrupt once they lose such protection. Xiao Bai, "Dalu Zhongchan Jieji zhi Zhenxiang" [True Stories of the Middle Class in Mainland China], *Kaifang* 149 (May 1999): 86–88.

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But the implications of the support of self-made bourgeois for rule of law should not be misunderstood. This support would hardly translate into an endorsement of the political empowerment of the masses. Self-made bourgeois believe that rule of law will subject party (cadre) power to some transparent legalized rules; and it, too, could add some legal force to the political protection of their private property. One finding of my fieldwork is the ambivalence of self-made bourgeois toward the communist regime and corruption. To compete against SOEs and privileged bourgeois "freely" and "fairly," they want to use "rule of law" to deter officials/cadres from flagrantly offering state-monopolized resources and commercial opportunities to their children and relatives. This desire, however, does not mean that they hate cronyism and bureaucratic rent seeking or demand a transparent, democratic supervisory system. Self-made bourgeois hold incomparable competitive advantages over the entrepreneurial middle class, not simply because they possess more abundant funds and wider social networks. They also can afford to pay a higher price to buy off more senior bureaucrats on a more stable basis.[40] Their cooperation contrasts with the pattern of interactions between smaller entrepreneurs and officials, whose exchange of money and power usually takes place on a case-by-case basis, just like buyers and sellers in an open market. Self-made bourgeois usually have forged long-term clientelist ties with the local party-state chiefs and enjoy their special care in the allocation of government favors. Some bourgeois have loyal patrons in the provincial government or even in the central leadership. To get returns from the cumulative investment and maintain their market superiority over weaker competitors, most of self-made bourgeois prefer no substantial change in the existing power arrangement and no regular reshuffling of the government.[41]

If self-made bourgeois wish to rely on rule of law for legal protection, then this protection is aimed more against perceived threats from the lower classes than against the impingement of local officials or possible political reversals. It is the intensified confrontation between rich and poor in Chinese society that provides all Chinese bourgeois with a common cause in resisting democratization and averting the collapse of the regime. As economic upstarts in the reform, Chinese bourgeois are constantly haunted by a nightmare, namely that they might fall prey to seething popular anger because of "unjustifiable" eco-

[40] A big private company owner in Jiangsu disclosed that he spent a large amount of money every year on gifts to the top township officials. These gifts were used for investing in "personal affection" or "friendship" (*ganqing touzi*) rather than for a particular business. Shang Qing, "Siqi Laoban Yinian Songli Wuwan" [Private-company Boss Gives Gifts of 50,000 Yuan Each Year], *Qian Shao* (*Frontline*, Hong Kong) 105 (October 1999): 130.

[41] Among my interviewees, only a couple of self-made bourgeois expressed an interest in the possibility of taking advantage of their wealth to seize political power through free elections. This result went against my expectation based on Taiwan's democratic experience. This is a phenomenon Eva Bellin explains in her "Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries," *World Politics* 52 (January 2000): 175–205.

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nomic inequalities. The Russian experience with democratization—transmitted through media reports, TV pictures, and party propaganda—has prompted Chinese bourgeois to associate democracy with political chaos, economic breakdown, the mafia, and other social evils. With deep apprehensions for political disorder, the Chinese search for a double guarantee of their private property. In case the communist power is paralyzed by people's uprisings such as those in Beijing during the short 1989 Tiananmen period, the rule of law may provide a legal framework on which to maintain social order and to keep the state machine functioning normally. Over three quarters of the entrepreneurs I interviewed were particularly suspicious about the notion of free elections and considered them to be inapplicable to China. In their imagination, free elections mean endless street demonstrations and mass rallies, and would bring about a government that desperately wants to please the poor majority.

Last but not least, private entrepreneurs often require a labor-repressive state power to maximize business profits. Mostly resulting from the way the owners treat their employees, capital-labor tension runs high in a growing number of private companies, particularly in coastal provinces. Observers, including congressional deputies, were shocked by the exploitation and worsening working conditions in enterprises where the employees, many of them children, were underpaid and forced to work overtime. With the local authorities standing behind them and sharing the profits, these private bosses unscrupulously ignored the demands of the employees for labor protection and improved welfare.[42]

The Middle Classes as a Vacillating Sociopolitical Force

Historical studies show that the middle class, just like the bourgeoisie, is keen to push for its own political inclusion. Its attitude toward democratization is often ambiguous and contingent, depending on "the need and possibilities for an alliance with the working class."[43] The experiences of South Korea and Taiwan suggest that the evolution of the middle class from an anti- into a prodemocratic social force closely correlates with its enlargement. As its percentage exceeds half of the entire population, socioeconomic equality is improved, the likelihood of extremist politics lessened, and the threats from the lower classes mitigated. Only with such a social structure can the middle class acquire a sense of economic security and hence care about state accountability.[44] Edward Muller's study comes to the same conclusion: economic development

[42] Detailed reports are found in Liang Xiaosheng, *Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieceng Fenxi* [An Analysis of Social Strata in China] (Beijing: Jingji Ribao Chubanshe, 1997), 24–165; Chang Xinghua, *Jingji Biange*, 218–23.

[43] Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, *Capitalist Development*, 8.

[44] David I. Steinberg, "The Republic of Korea: Pluralizing Politics" in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 369–415; Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," *World Politics* 41 (July 1989): 471–99.

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would favor democratization if it could alter the "pyramid-shaped social stratification system" to a "diamond shape, in which the majority of the population is middle class and relatively well-off."[45]

Compared with South Korea, Taiwan, or other developing countries, China's middle classes have some particular features with a mixed blessing for democratic prospects. They have grown up in an uncertain economic-political setting. Having benefited from the market reform, China's middle classes have vested interests in its continuation. Unlike the bourgeoisie, most successes of the middle classes have been built on pro-market government policy or their true market power rather than on patron-client relations with the bureaucracy. As such, the middle classes constitute a real liberal force and a key social basis of China's transition toward a full-fledged capitalism.

Most small entrepreneurs and business people, who represent China's largest middle class, have not freed themselves fully from suspicions about the communist leadership's commitment to capitalism.[46] Furthermore, though not innocent of bribing, the entrepreneurial middle class perceives itself more as the victim than beneficiary of political corruption for two reasons. It is not unusual for major business activities—ranging from the registration of a company to the sale of commodities—to require governmental approval. In an institutionalized capitalist society, however, this approval or disapproval is based on explicit laws, rules, and regulations. In China, the massive rent seeking of local officials tends to make every governmental approval a "special favor," which must be paid for by business people and hence adds substantially to the turnover costs of their businesses. Second, the entrepreneurial middle class lacks sufficient economic strength to compete with the bourgeoisie for government grace and to level the playing field.

Small entrepreneurs and businessmen share the resentment of the lower classes against corruption—of course for different reasons. More strongly than self-made bourgeois, they demand legal-institutional constraints upon the party-state capacity to manipulate the market.[47] The lack of powerful political patrons deepens their feeling of vulnerability. These variables have shaped a middle-class agenda whose top priority is striving for institutionalization of and ideological (or constitutional) justification for capitalism in order to make their

[45] Edward N. Muller, "Economic Determinants of Democracy" in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Inequality, Democracy, and Economic Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 133–55.

[46] This suspicion prompts some private entrepreneurs to register their companies as "collective (public) enterprises," which is referred to as the "private enterprise with a red cap." See Kristen Parris, "The Rise of Private Business Interests" in Goldman and MacFarquhar, eds., *The Paradox*, 262–82.

[47] This capacity, of course, mainly denotes the control of local officials over the market. Although market reform has stripped these officials of many power resources, it has also created some new ones for them such as the authority for tax collection and financial lending. See Susan Shirk, *The Political Logic of Economic Reform* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Jean C. Oi, "Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China," *World Politics* 45 (October 1992): 99–126.

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businesses and capitalist way of life politically safe.[48] This agenda has an obvious pro-democratic element as it exerts pressure on the communist regime for some fundamental economic-political changes. Assuming that democracy reinforces capitalism among other things, China's middle classes are likely to develop, though perhaps unconsciously, into a democratic force.[49]

But one needs caution in thinking of the middle classes as staunch, conscious democrats. Here again, how to understand democracy makes a difference. Middle-class citizens are not mere economic animals apathetic to politics. They place political reform high in the government agenda. But what do they really want from political reform? They expect a system of checks and balances that could effectively constrain party power over the market and hold a tight rein over corruption. But sharing the bourgeoisie's concerns, the middle classes hardly accept the complete breakdown of the CCP government or majority rule. The type of polity that the majority of them seem to desire is a liberal, oligarchic, relatively small state that—as found in the predemocratized Europe—guarantees some institutional checks and balances of political power, but excludes the majority of the population from participating.[50]

An examination of the political mentality of the middle classes may offer some clues to why one cannot expect them to be active agents of democracy soon or why they have taken great caution to eschew political challenge to the regime. Quite a few middle-class members showed a strong interest in such ideas as political pluralism and multiparty systems. This interest could be logically interpreted as a preference for civil society. But these people hardly displayed enthusiasm for promoting such a civil society with their own efforts. Nor did they desire to make themselves the building blocks of civil society by resisting the regime's attempt to maintain control.[51] The middle classes may not resort to state power for getting rich, but they could not afford to offend the regime, which maintains formidable sanctions against them.

The middle-class disposition against lower class empowerment has two psychological roots and is unlikely to change quickly. The first is a sense of economic insecurity. China's exceptionally huge population, most of which is poorly educated and lives in rural areas, makes it remote, if ever possible, for the middle classes to expand to the same proportion in China as in South Korea

[48] Zhu Fangming et al., *Siyou Jingji*, 86–87; Zhu Guanglei et al., *Dangdai Zhongguo*, 382.

[49] This likelihood could be discerned from private entrepreneurs offering funds for the pro-democracy activities during the 1980s. See Michael Bonnin and Yves Chevrier, "The Intellectual and the State: Social Dynamics of Intellectual Autonomy during the Post-Mao Era," *China Quarterly* 127 (September 1991): 569–93.

[50] Author's interviews. It is interesting to note that over half of my middle-class interviewees, when questioned, were quick to deny their opposition to "majority rule" as a democratic value. But they firmly believe that this "majority rule" must be "led" (*jia yi ling dao*), at least in the Chinese context, where peasants constitute a majority of the population. Some others "honestly" rejected "majority rule" as either impossible or unacceptable.

[51] Author's interviews. This impression tallies with Pearson's observation of the political behaviors of China's foreign-sector managers. See her *China's New Business Elite*, chaps. 3, 4.

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and Taiwan. In other words, the rich (the bourgeoisie plus middle classes) in China will remain a small minority over a long developmental phase. Meanwhile, the government will face heavy pressure from the propertyless for egalitarian policies. As socioeconomic polarization continues to deteriorate, this pressure has already risen to an explosive point.[52] Widespread street protests and grievances, particularly among overcharged peasants and unemployed workers, cause much panic among the middle classes who are fearful that extremist politics would loom large once "necessary" political control is abandoned.[53] As the diversification of social interests aggravates class antagonism, the middle classes and the bourgeoisie as "affluent" strata find common ground for an alignment. They share the need for repressive state power that if free from the influence or control of the populace would protect their wealth and "noble" status in the societal hierarchy. It is not surprising that for all their discontent with the regime, nearly all my interviewees with a roughly middle-class identity unhesitatingly endorsed the party-state agenda that was characterized by a well-known slogan: "social stability is above all" (*shehui wending yadao yiqie*).

This economic analysis only accounts for the conflict of material interests that has a strong potential to evolve into political confrontation between middle and lower classes. But economic conflict is not the sole source of the alienation of the two social strata. Albeit humbled by the bourgeoisie in wealth, middle-class people—especially those well educated—condescend to the "masses," assigning themselves to China's "upper class" (*shangliu shehui*). After all, the real "upper class," the bourgeoisie, is too small in size. The middle classes see themselves as superior to the lower classes in nearly all relevant aspects, including the level of knowledge, intelligence, vision, legal-political consciousness, governing capability, and life style. Such an elitist complex poses a psychological obstacle to their acceptance of political equality based on the one-citizen-one-vote principle.

Middle-class people typically distrust the ability of the majority to govern. In their views, the party-state hegemony should not be checked and balanced by the masses, but by social elites such as themselves. They tend to choose to pursue political influence or power by joining the establishment rather than through opposition politics and mass mobilization; they are averse to running

[52] World Bank studies indicate that from 1981 to 1998, the Gini coefficient in China jumped from 28.8 to 40.3. See The World Bank, *Sharing Rising Incomes: Disparities in China* (Washington, DC, 1997), 7–13; The World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2000* (Washington, DC), 66. The urban unemployed plus the surplus rural labor seeking urban employment pushed China's rate of unemployment to a staggering 27.76 percent in 2000. Long Hua, "Zhongguo Zhengzhi Fazhan Keneng Yinqi de Shehui Wenti" [The Social Problems that China's Political Development Might Bring About], *Xin Bao* (*Hong Kong Economic Journal*), 13 September 2000.

[53] During the late 1990s, demonstrations and protests took place in over 230 cities across the country. "Li Peng Cheng Meitian Duyou Xiagang Gongren Qingyuan" [Li Peng Admits that Laid-off Workers Petition Every Day], *Qian Shao* 87 (April 1999): 100.

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any risk of making the society more "autonomous" or adopting other potentially confrontational tactics.[54] According to a survey conducted in Guangdong, 28 percent of private entrepreneurs aspired to join the party or to be appointed as local government leaders; 77 percent desired to join the Association of Industry and Commerce, a party-controlled organization influential over the making of local economic policy; 55.3 percent preferred to be elected congressional deputies or CPPCC members.[55] The party's decision, which was announced by Jiang Zemin on 1 July 2001, to throw its doors open officially to private and individual entrepreneurs has led to a significant increase in the number of applications for CCP membership. Some of these entrepreneurs are expected to attend the 16th Party Congress or even join the Central Committee.[56]

A Pragmatic Partnership

As the private economy has become a powerful engine of growth, the communist state takes a more accommodating approach and thereby makes it easier to coopt China's entrepreneurial class and neutralize it as a potential opposition force. For my analytic purposes, it makes sense to differentiate the central from local policy. Despite some twists, the central policy toward the private economy in the post-Mao reform has gone through three phases: tolerance, permission, and encouragement.[57] Since the pronouncement of the 1997 Party Congress that the private sector "is an important component part of China's socialist market economy,"[58] which was incorporated into the 1999 amendment to the state constitution, the regime has been speaking more in favor of the private sector. But even so, the private sector is still denied certain advantages conferred upon legally or nominally "public" firms.[59] How to rescue SOEs has remained a priority in the state's macroeconomic policy making. By contrast, at local levels, though with considerable regional variations, the private economy and entrepreneurial class enjoy more amiable treatment by the government.

While remaining keen not to deviate too far from the central government's basic guidelines, local officials are not bothered by ideology or regime legiti-

[54] Author's interviews. In 1989, the Central Committee issued a document that prohibited private entrepreneurs from joining the party. To qualify for party membership, an entrepreneur donated his company to the government. Shou Beibei, "Zhongguo Siying Qiye Ershi Nian" [The Two Decades of China's Private Enterprises], *Qian Shao* 99 (April 1999): 31–33.

[55] Wen Ming, *Zhongguo*, 353–54.

[56] "Zibenjia Kewang Ruxuan Zhongyang Weiyuan" [Capitalists Are Expected to Be Central Committee Members], (http://www.secretchina.com/news/sc.asp?id=7345, 28 November 2001), accessed on 7 December 2001.

[57] This pro-capitalist process was interrupted twice, in 1983 and 1989–1991, when conservative party leaders attempted to reassert the orthodoxy of Marxism and block the development of the private sector.

[58] Jiang Zemin, "Hold High the Great Banner."

[59] Wank, *Commodifying Communism*, 33.

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macy at all. Instead, they are more practical and oriented toward their concrete personal stakes. As some scholars found, these officials do not necessarily obstruct local economic privatization, although it might diminish their sphere of authority. They embrace privatization with great enthusiasm whenever chances for profitability are available.[60] A large number of local officials in positions of authority have their own private companies registered under the names of their family members. These officials tend to reciprocate favors by granting privileges and benefits to one another's enterprises under their jurisdiction. For other officials, the relationship with the private entrepreneurs has evolved into a symbiosis. Some entrepreneurs set up a special coffer to feed the officials, who use part of the "donated" money to bribe their superiors for job security or promotion. In turn, they let the entrepreneurs enjoy tax reduction or exemption and grant them government contracts and loans. Local officials usually have strong incentives to boost the private economy, whose profits they share as part of hidden personal income. A provincial party secretary reportedly reprimanded a growing number of officials in his region for "living upon wealthy entrepreneurs" (*bang da kuan*). They are "buddies and as thick as thieves." To protect the private enterprises, some officials even move their offices to these enterprises as a shield to avoid regular government inspections.[61]

Given that the government lacks a workable strategy for rescuing money-losing SOEs, private businesses have become increasingly indispensable to local economies, particularly in terms of employment and government revenue. Nonstate sectors share more and more of the job market. By 1997, the number of employees in the private economy nationwide rose to over 50 million.[62] An economist predicted that by 2004, more than 60 percent of the economy would be in private hands and employ some 75 percent of China's workforce.[63] An important criterion in appraising the performance of local officials is the ability to reemploy laid-off state workers. In Wuxi, private enterprises offered nearly 20,000 jobs to these workers in 1999. To help the local government perform well, some entrepreneurs reserve a quota of employment especially for former SOE workers.[64]

The financial magnitude of private businesses as taxpayers is impressive as well. According to an official statistic, the private economy paid 46 percent of the total tax revenues nationwide in 1998, and its tax payment increased by 21

[60] Yan Sun, "Reform, State, and Corruption: Is Corruption Less Destructive in China than in Russia," *Comparative Politics* 32 (October 1999): 1–20.

[61] Shu Huiguo, "Ganbu Bang Dakuan Xianxiang" [The Phenomenon of Officials Living upon the Wealthy Entrepreneurs], *Qian Shao* 98 (March 1999): 11.

[62] Qin Yan, *Zhongguo*, 141.

[63] Roberts et al., "China's New Capitalism."

[64] Wuxishi Siying Qiye Xiehui [The Wuxi Association of Private Entrepreneurs], "Wuxishi Gesi Xiehui 1999 Niandu Gongzuo Zongjie" [A Work Summary of the Wuxi Association of Private Entrepreneurs in 1999], document no. 21 (1999).

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percent annually over the past two decades.[65] The private sector has become the main source of government revenue and the largest donor for local public welfare in many areas.[66] The private sector in Zhejiang, for example, made up over 75 percent of the gross value of the provincial industrial output in 1999. And their tax payment was of a similar percentage in government revenue.[67] In a private high-tech company I visited, the owner paid 17 percent of the company's profits (called enterprise tax) to the state, and 33-43 percent income tax. In other words, the local government took more than half of his business profits. In addition, he frequently received "requests" to donate to local welfare projects.[68]

Economic "contribution" is, of course, rewarded. The local party-state apparatus appoints entrepreneurs to people's congresses and CPPCC branches, confers upon them various honorary titles, and even recruits them into the party. In capital-labor confrontations, local governments more often than not are aligned with capital.[69] Ironically, this phenomenon has invited vociferous protests from Marxist fundamentalists. They allege that the political, ideological, and economic agents of the "bourgeoisie" have formed a powerful lobby group within the party-state apparatus and have "attempted to topple the socialist system from within."[70] Some reformers have even complained that corruption has downgraded government officials to the status of spokespersons for economic upstarts.[71]

Conclusion

China's market reform has not brought a real civil society into being nor are there signs of its emergence, mainly because China's entrepreneurial class and other middle classes have tremendous difficulty developing their own autonomy. This difficulty is not merely caused by a repressive one-party system that

[65] "Feigong Jingji Nashui zhan Zhongguo Banbi Jiangshan" [Tax Payment by the Nonpublic Sector Makes up Half of China's Total Tax Revenues"), *Qian Shao* 104 (September 1999): 135.

[66] Zhu Guanglei et al., *Dangdai Zhongguo*, 396; Zhu Fangming et al., *Siyou Jingji*, 89–90; Qin Yan, *Zhongguo*, 142.

[67] Deng Yun, "Zhejiang Minying Jingji de Xianzhuang yu Weilai" [The Status Quo and Future of the Private Economy in Zhejiang], *Jingji Daobao* (*Economic Reporter Weekly*, Hong Kong) (19 June 2000): 36–37; Shou Beibei, "Zhongguo."

[68] Author's interview with Ying Zhineng, chairman of Wuxi Modern Applied Technology Research Institute Co, Ltd, 22 December 1999.

[69] When a writer attempted to bring the misery of the employees and exploitation in a private company to the attention of the local officials, these officials categorically rejected his plea, claiming that were it not for their "benign" boss, these employees would simply be jobless. Liang Xiaosheng, *Zhongguo Shehui*, 24–166.

[70] Ma Licheng and Ling Zhijun, *Jiao Feng: Dangdai Zhongguo Sanci Sixiang Jiefang Shilu* [Confrontation: A Record of the Third Spiritual Emancipation in Contemporary China] (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1998), 276–80.

[71] Yu Zuyao, "Baofahu dui Gaige de Weihai" [The Upstarts Do Damage to Reform], *Qian Shao* 95 (December 1998): 55.

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stifles sociopolitical initiatives; more crucially, it is related to some special features of the Chinese capitalism. During the 1980s and early 1990s, because of the opposition of some powerful conservative leaders, capitalism was hard to legitimize or institutionalize. In the post-Deng period, when the ideological obstruction has faded, the development of a true capitalism has been stymied by corruption, cronyism, and inadequate efforts for rule of law. Throughout the reform process, therefore, China's private businesses must rely heavily upon arbitrary political power to survive and prosper. The perceived threats from the lower classes further strengthen their dependence on the state's protection to reduce their social vulnerability and precariousness. In that regard, Chinese private entrepreneurs, particularly those big ones, bear a strong resemblance to their counterparts in some Latin American countries during the 1970s.[72] These variables are part of the explanation of why capitalism and social autonomy have not evolved in tandem in China, as one would see in a traditional capitalist society.

But China's entrepreneurial class and other middle classes are not entirely passive or left without political options. Their disposition toward democratization hinges on how, in their own imagination, their socioeconomic interests may be affected. In developing countries plagued by socioeconomic polarization, class warfare often turns affluent social strata into the staunch supporters of the authoritarian regime. Class confrontation in China tends to be more explosive and constitutes a long-term destabilizing factor. Economic inequality is harder to justify culturally or ideologically in the Chinese context. Within China's huge population, a high percentage of which is illiterate and poorly educated, the income gap between rich and poor can hardly narrow unless the communist state is able to enforce an egalitarian policy. But the state probably will not do so, for such a policy would dampen the dynamics of economic growth, to which the base of regime legitimacy is shifting. The resentment of the relatively poor majority against the polarization in the redistributive process and its feelings of relative deprivation, push self-made bourgeois and middle-class people into a dilemma that shapes their love-hate relationship with the regime. To acquire an equal footing in the marketplace against the politically privileged, party-state power must be circumscribed and at least partially withdrawn from the market. But out of anxiety about the potential threats from the lower classes and fear of social chaos, the affluent classes expect the party-state to remain commanding, even ironhanded if necessary. This dilemma translates into ambivalence toward political reform. Most members of China's entrepreneurial class are enthusiastic proponents of rule of law, with the hope that a sound legal system will provide legal-institutional protection for their private property and prevent the abuse or misuse of party power. But they are hostile

[72] See Alfred Stepan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America" in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bring the State Back In* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 317–43.

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to the basic ideas modern democracy stands for, namely free elections and democratic majority rule.

It is, of course, risky to predict a social class's future attitudes toward democracy from its present stances, because the balance of gains and losses keeps changing. Some studies on East European democratic experiences suggest that private entrepreneurs within a socialist context—if well organized and adopting the right strategies—could contribute considerably to democratization. Civil society might emerge in an unconventional way and take on different features, but it still could play its classic role in eroding authoritarian power.[73] Although this scenario cannot be completely ruled out in China, it is perhaps likely only under some hypothetical conditions. If capitalist development is impeded for political reasons, some private entrepreneurs may turn their agitation for capitalism into a political struggle against the regime. If significant progress could be made toward rule of law, it might reduce the dependence of the entrepreneurial class upon political power or ease its worry about the possibility of extremist politics. On China's uncertain future path, however, there will be many intervening variables, and firm predictions are therefore not warranted.*

[73] Andrew Arato, "Civil Society Against the State: Poland 1980–1981," *Telos* 47 (Spring 1981): 23–47; Daniel V. Friedheim, "Bring Society Back into Democratic Transition Theory after 1989: Pact Making and Regime Collapse," *East European Politics and Societies* 7 (Fall 1993): 482–512.

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Kosovo and the Metaphor War

ROLAND PARIS

"This war is rapidly becoming a debacle that rivals Vietnam itself."
—Representative Dennis Kucinich[1]

"Kosovo . . . is not analogous to Vietnam."
—Senator Joseph Biden[2]

"The refusal to watch the repeat of Hitler's death pageant is our duty."
—Representative Major Owens[3]

"My mindset is Munich."
—Secretary of State Madeleine Albright[4]

"People . . . say this has something to do with Hitler and Nazi Germany. That is nonsense. It has nothing to do with that at all."
—Representative William Goodling[5]

"We act to prevent a wider war; to defuse a powderkeg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century."
—President Bill Clinton[6]

"There is no need to fear a return of World War I."
—Senator John Kerry[7]

In the spring of 1999, American political leaders debated how to respond to the ongoing military and humanitarian crisis in the Kosovo region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where armed Serbs under the control of then-Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic appeared to be conducting an ethnic cleansing campaign against the province's predominantly Albanian population. Six months earlier in the fall of 1998, the Yugoslav army had forced members

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of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an armed separatist group comprised of ethnic Albanians, into the remote mountains of Kosovo, along with thousands of civilians. With winter approaching and the civilians in danger of freezing, the United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) threatened attacks against Serb forces unless civilians were allowed to return to their homes unmolested. Serbian leaders relented and drew back their forces, but in March 1999 they launched yet another military campaign in defiance of international warnings. Once again, Albanian Kosovars fled the assault, this time in even greater numbers; thousands of refugees crossed into neighboring countries, recounting stories of summary executions and forced expulsions by Serbian forces. NATO responded on 24 March 1999, after the failure of negotiations in Rambouillet, France, by bombing Serbian targets for eleven consecutive weeks until Yugoslav forces finally withdrew from the province in early June. NATO ground troops then entered Kosovo and began escorting the refugees back to their homes.

In the United States, members of Congress and the Clinton administration engaged in a sometimes-heated debate over American policy toward the Kosovo crisis. At first glance, the terms of this debate were relatively straightforward: Should the United States respond to the situation in Kosovo? If so, how should it respond? On closer examination, the empirical facts of the Kosovo crisis and the significance of these facts were as much in dispute as the question of how to respond to the crisis itself. One way in which participants in the debate sought to define the situation in Kosovo was by relating this situation to other well-known events from the past—that is, by using historical comparisons to characterize the crisis. Some of these comparisons were obvious and direct, such as Representative Dennis Kucinich's (D-OH) bald assertion that Kosovo was "rapidly becoming a debacle that rivals Vietnam itself."[8] In other cases, widely-recognized trigger words and phrases were used to invoke particular historical memories – such as "quagmire" for Vietnam or "never again" for the Holocaust. Four historical analogies or metaphors appeared most frequently in the speeches and statements of Clinton administration officials and members of Congress: Vietnam (referring to America's experience in the Vietnam War); the Holocaust (the Nazi attempted extermination or genocide of European Jews); Munich (the 1938 Munich conference, where the Western democracies failed to stand up to Hitler); and the Balkan Powderkeg (recalling the region's

[1] 145 *Congressional Record* H 3226, 18 May 1999.

[2] 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4552, 3 May 1999.

[3] 145 *Cong. Rec.* E 621, 13 April 1999.

[4] Cited in Michael Dobbs, *Madeleine Albright: A Twentieth Century Odyssey* (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), 34.

[5] 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 1899, 13 April 1999.

[6] "Statement by the President to the Nation," Federal News Service, 24 March 1999.

[7] 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 3116, 23 March 1999.

[8] 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 3226, 18 May 1999.

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endemic instability and, specifically, the role that Balkan conflicts played in igniting World War I).

The debate over American policy in Kosovo, in other words, was to some extent an argument about the relevance of various historical comparisons to the situation in Kosovo—or what I label a "metaphor war." By promoting certain metaphors and discrediting others, participants in the debate presumably hoped to establish what scholars in the field of political communication call "interpretive dominance"—that is, the widespread acceptance of one's own characterization of a particular issue.[9] Stakes in the struggle for interpretive dominance can be quite high, as M. J. Peterson explains: "Different representation can lead to the retrieval of very different analogies and thus very different conclusions about the target domain."[10] Competing interpretations of an issue, in turn, open up certain policy responses and foreclose others. If, for instance, the Kosovo crisis were successfully portrayed through direct or indirect allusions as another Holocaust, the imperative of stopping a genocide would lend support to some kind of American intervention in Kosovo. If the crisis were viewed as another Vietnam or as a civil war in which the United States had no clear national interest, unpleasant memories of the Vietnam conflict would likely produce countervailing pressures against intervention. The study of historical metaphors and analogies used in the Kosovo debate, therefore, is not merely an examination of language but rather an investigation into the conduct of politics through language.

This much was noted by media commentators at the time of the debate.[11] But the use of historical comparisons was considerably more complex than many pundits suggested, not least because the metaphor war was waged on two distinct levels simultaneously. Participants in the debate not only argued about the relevance of particular historical metaphors to the situation in Kosovo (which I call the "first level" of the metaphor war); they also fought over the meaning of the metaphors themselves (the "second level"). This second level of disagreement reflected the fact that certain historical references have clearer connotations than others—their meanings are more settled and less contested. Munich is an example of a relatively settled metaphor, because it almost always signifies the folly of attempting to appease an aggressive dictator;[12] the meaning of references to Vietnam are less obvious, probably because Americans con-

[9] Mary E. Stuckley and Frederick J. Antczak, "The Battle of Issues and Images: Establishing Interpretive Dominance" in Kathleen E. Kendall, ed., *Presidential Campaign Discourse: Strategic Communication Problems* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 117–134. For a related argument, see William H. Riker, *The Art of Political Manipulation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

[10] M. J. Peterson, "The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law," *International Organization* 51 (Spring 1997): 249.

[11] For example, Daniel Schorr, "The Dread 'Appeasement,'" *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 June 1999.

[12] David Chuter, "Munich, or the Blood of Others" in Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser, eds., *Haunted By History: Myths in International Relations* (Providence: Berghahn, 1998), 66–67.

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tinue to disagree about why the Vietnam War turned out so badly for the United States. Some participants in the Kosovo debate used the Vietnam metaphor to imply that the United States had not devoted sufficient political and military resources to defeat Serbian forces in Kosovo (drawing on the view that the United States failed in Vietnam because American forces fought with one hand tied behind their back). Others invoked Vietnam to suggest that the Kosovo campaign was being waged too vigorously (by drawing parallels between Serbian civilian deaths from NATO bombing and the killing of civilians during the Vietnam War). Both versions of the Vietnam metaphor were used to argue against American intervention in Kosovo, but they were based on very different interpretations of what "went wrong" in Vietnam. The Kosovo debate, then, was simultaneously a battle to define or fix the meaning of both the present and the past.

More generally, there are compelling incentives for political actors to fight over the usage of historical metaphors. In addition to shaping interpretations of particular events, both past and present, metaphors can also influence the manner in which political communities define their collective goals. Although this article conceives of the Kosovo metaphor war in relatively narrow terms—as a political battle to define the significance of specific historical events—it should be noted that the larger world of politics is, among other things, a never-ending metaphor war over the meaning and purpose of social life.[13] In the words of Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt: "Political language and arguments—in sum, political rhetoric—create political consciousness, define political settings, create national identity, stimulate people to act, and give sense and purpose to these actions."[14] The debate over Kosovo was one element (albeit, a very small element) of this larger interpretive struggle.

The article is divided into five parts. In the first part, I review the scholarship on historical metaphors as instruments of political communication. In the second part, I describe the methodology that was used in gathering data for this study. In the third part, I examine the usage of historical metaphors by President Clinton and senior U.S. officials in public speeches and statements on Kosovo, focusing primarily on the roughly four-month period from the start of the Serbian offensive on 20 March 1999 until the termination of NATO's bombing campaign on 10 June 1999. In the fourth part, I analyze the congressional debate on Kosovo during the same period. Finally, I explore a number of implications of the Kosovo metaphor war for our understanding of foreign policy debates within the United States.

[13] William E. Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse*, 3rd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), chap. 1.

[14] Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., *The Cold War As Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945–1950* (New York: Praeger, 1991), 7.

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Historical Metaphors and U.S. Foreign Policy Debates

Within the scholarly field of political communication, there is a voluminous literature on the use of metaphors in political speech.[15] One branch of this literature concentrates on the rhetoric of U.S. foreign policy and focuses especially on the language used by presidents during moments of "crisis," such as wars.[16] Whether these works explore the language of foreign policy or of some other arena of politics, most contributors to this literature start from the proposition that metaphors are not merely rhetorical flourishes or ornamentation; rather, metaphors can shape the way in which people apprehend and respond to a particular issue or event. In adopting this perspective, students of political communication build upon the insights of ancient political commentators—including Aristotle, who noted more than two millennia ago that the skillful use of metaphors by political actors can induce listeners to "see things" that they might not otherwise perceive[17]—as well as the findings of modern cognitive psychologists who have long recognized that the way in which people interpret and respond to new information will depend in part on how this new information is presented or "framed."[18] Because metaphors, by definition, draw attention to similarities across different domains,[19] they invite listeners to conceive of one issue or phenomenon in the light of another issue or phenomenon. Thus they offer, in the words of David Allbritton, "a framework for understanding a new domain or for restructuring the understanding of a familiar domain."[20] Another

[15] For overviews, see Mary E. Stuckey, ed., *The Theory and Practice of Political Communication Research* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); David L. Swanson and Dan Nimmo, eds., *New Directions in Political Communication: A Resource Book* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990); and David L. Paletz, ed., *Political Communication Research: Approaches, Studies, Assessments* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1987).

[16] Foundational works include Robert L. Ivie, "Presidential Motives for War," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 60 (October 1974): 337–345; and Philip Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70 (November 1984): 339–361. For an overview of more recent work, see Denise M. Bostdorff, *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994).

[17] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, trans. by W. Rhys Roberts (New York: Modern Library, 1954), book 3:11 and 1:1–2. See also William J. Jordan, "Aristotle's Concept of Metaphor in Rhetoric" in Keith V. Erickson, ed., *Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1974), 244–246.

[18] Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," *Science* 211 (30 January 1981): 453–458; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Choices, Values, and Frames," *American Psychologist* 9 (April 1984): 341–350; and Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974). See also Zeev Maoz, "Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," *World Politics* 43 (October 1990): 88; Francis A. Beer, Alice F. Healy, Grant P. Sinclair, and Lyle E. Bourne, Jr., "War Cues and Foreign Policy Acts," *American Political Science Review* 81 (September 1987): 701–715; and Lance Bennett, "Constructing Publics and Their Opinions," *Political Communication* 10 (April–June 1993): 101–120.

[19] The word "metaphor" derives from the Greek *metapherein*, which means "to transfer" or "to carry" from one thing to another.

[20] David W. Allbritton, "When Metaphors Function as Schemas: Some Cognitive Effects of Conceptual Metaphors," *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity* 10 (1995): 36.

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scholar of political communication, George Lakoff, puts it this way: metaphors "limit what we notice, highlight what we do see, and provide part of the inferential structure that we reason with."[21]

There are two further characteristics of metaphors that make them potent instruments of political persuasion. First, they not only suggest similarities across different domains, but they can also "activate conscious and subconscious, rational and emotional responses" in their listeners.[22] To suggest that a foreign leader is behaving "like Hitler," for example, is apt to produce a more emotional response among listeners than the suggestion that the foreign leader is behaving "like the head of an oppressive, authoritarian regime," because strong emotions are associated with the evocation of Hitler's name. As Murray Edelman argues, it is this aspect of metaphors—namely, their ability to evoke rational as well as irrational or emotional associations—that permits political actors to use metaphors in order to "threaten or reassure people so as to encourage them to be supportive or quiescent."[23] Second, metaphors are powerful rhetorical tools because they can often be summoned subtly with trigger phrases or oblique references that evoke the metaphor without necessarily making it explicit. Indirectness can serve several purposes: in cases where it might be impolitic to make a particular claim or comparison, metaphorical allusions allow speakers to suggest these connections and to deny having done so. Peter Fysh and Jim Wolfreys, for example, point out that the leaders of France's Front National regularly employ euphemisms for immigrants and blacks that convey the party's racist, anti-immigrant agenda, while preserving a veneer of respectability.[24] More generally, by selecting their metaphors carefully, political actors can calibrate messages to the sensitivities, prejudices, and emotional associations of particular audiences.

Historical metaphors are implicit or explicit comparisons between the present and the past. Scholars such as Ernest May and Yuen Foong Khong have demonstrated that American policy makers tend to apprehend and respond to foreign events through the filter of historical analogies and their own personal experiences.[25] It is also true, however, that policy makers use historical meta-

[21] George Lakoff, "Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf" in Martin Pütz, ed., *Thirty Years of Linguistic Evolution* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1992), 481.

[22] Francis A. Beer and Christ'l de Landtsheer, "Metaphorical Meaning and Political Power" in Francis A. Beer and Christ'l de Landtsheer, eds., *Metaphorical World Politics* (forthcoming).

[23] Murray J. Edelman, *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 103–4.

[24] Peter Fysh and Jim Wolfreys, *The Politics of Racism in France* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

[25] Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1973); Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking In Time: The Use of History for Decisionmakers* (New York: Free Press, 1986); Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies At War: Korea, Munich, Dein Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. See also Alex Roberto Hybel, *How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America* (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); and Christopher Jon Lamb, *Belief Systems and Decision Making in the* Mayaguez *Crisis* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1989).

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phors as tools of political persuasion in their public rhetoric by drawing parallels between contemporary phenomena and past events, and thereby encouraging listeners to conceive of the present in the light of the past. Because historical references frequently evoke the perceived lessons of the past experience, political actors can use historical metaphors to legitimize certain policy options and to delegitimize others. More generally, as Phillip Wander points out, historical and other metaphors allow political leaders "to inspire their partisans, attract other groups with whom coalitions might be formed, and recruit from that vast, unorganized aggregate known as the 'mass audience.'"[26] However, not all historical metaphors will resonate equally with audiences. All other things being equal, listeners are more likely to embrace comparisons that offer a credible description of events,[27] refer to past experiences that the listeners themselves recollect,[28] and evoke what Robert Ivie calls the society's "vocabularies of motive" or the justifications that members of the society are generally willing to accept for governmental policy or action.[29] By examining the use of historical metaphors in political debates, therefore, we can gain insight into the choice of metaphors that the participants in the debates themselves believed would resonate with their listeners. And by distilling the implied lessons of these metaphors for contemporary policy, we can gain a better understanding of what the participants were actually communicating when their rhetoric drifted into the realm of historical allusion.

As Riikka Kuusisto points out, when political leaders describe foreign crises or events, they often engage in "story telling" that evokes widely-remembered experiences from the past in order to make sense of the present.[30] Foreign policy "stories," writes Kuusisto, transform "originally ambiguous circumstances into something relevant to us; in the discourses treating far-away events and actors, necessary duties . . . as well as obstacles to action are formed out of formerly insignificant elements."[31] Students of political communication have studied the foreign policy "stories" conveyed by American political leaders during many different moments of recent history: for example, the outset of the

[26] Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," 341.

[27] Thomas A. Hollihan, "The Public Controversy Over the Panama Canal Treaties: An Analysis of American Foreign Policy Rhetoric," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 50 (1986): 379.

[28] At a society-wide level, the most recognizable historical references are those that tap into the "public memory" or the stories that societies tell themselves about their collective past. On the notion of public memory, see Stephen Browne, "Reading, Rhetoric, and the Texture of Public Memory," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 81 (May 1995): 237–265; Erna Paris, *Long Shadows: Truth, Lies, and History* (New York: Bloomsbury, USA, 2001); Maurice Halbwachs, *La Mémoire Collective* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950); and David Lowenthal, *The Past Is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[29] Ivie, "Presidential Motives for War."

[30] Riikka Kuusisto, "Framing the Wars in the Gulf and in Bosnia: The Rhetorical Definitions of the Western Power Leaders in Action," *Journal of Peace Research* 35 (September 1998): 603–620.

[31] Ibid., 607.

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cold war,[32] the 1962 Cuban missile crisis,[33] the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident,[34] the 1983 U.S. intervention in Grenada,[35] the 1991 Persian Gulf war,[36] and the Bosnian war of 1992–1995.[37] As well, other scholars have examined the foreign policy rhetoric of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy,[38] Reagan,[39] Clinton,[40] and, more generally, leaders in the post-cold war era.[41] Many of their works are superb at identifying the metaphors that punctuated the political speech of American political leaders—especially presidents—in the area of foreign policy. But this literature has paid less attention to the relationship between historical metaphors and domestic disagreements or debates about foreign policy. As a result, one learns a great deal from this literature about the metaphorical content of official American foreign policy rhetoric, but relatively little about the politics surrounding the use of competing historical metaphors in domestic foreign policy debates. Furthermore, many of these works (along with those in the May-Khong school cited above) portray historical metaphors as having relatively settled connotations, rather than considering that these metaphors might be the focus of ongoing battles over the interpretation and meaning of past events.

The domestic debate over U.S. policy toward Kosovo suggests that the use of historical metaphors is considerably more complex and controversial—in short, more politically fraught—than the literature on political communication and U.S. foreign policy has suggested. While political leaders were arguing over the American response to Kosovo, they were also engaged in what I call a meta-

[32] Robert L. Ivie, "Fire, Flood, and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman Doctrine Speech," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29 (September 1999): 570–591; Hinds and Windt, *The Cold War As Rhetoric.*

[33] Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, "Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of 'The Cuban Problem,' 1960-1994," *Millennium* 25 (Summer 1996): 361–395; Bostdorff, *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis*, chap. 2.

[34] Richard Cherwitz, "Lyndon Johnson and the 'Crisis' of Tonkin Gulf: A President's Justification of War," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 42 (Spring 1978): 93–105; Bostdorff, *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis*, chap. 3.

[35] David E. Procter, "The Rescue Mission: Assigning Guilt to a Chaotic Scene," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 51 (Summer 1987): 245–255.

[36] Francis A. Beer and Barry J. Balleck, "Body, Mind, and Soul in the Gulf War Debate" in Stuckey, ed., *The Theory and Practice of Political Communication Research*, 159–176; Mary E. Stuckey, "Remembering the Future: Rhetorical Echoes of World War II and Vietnam in George Bush's Public Speech on the Gulf War," *Communication Studies* 43 (Winter 1992): 246–256; Lakoff, "Metaphor and War."

[37] David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Kuusisto, "Framing the Wars in the Gulf and in Bosnia."

[38] Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy."

[39] Bonnie Dow, "The Function of Epideictic and Deliberative Strategies in Presidential Crisis Rhetoric," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 53 (Summer 1989): 294–310.

[40] Siobhan McEvoy, *American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001).

[41] Mary E. Stuckey, "Competing Foreign Policy Visions: Rhetorical Hybrids After the Cold War," *Western Journal of Communication* 59 (Summer 1995): 214–227.

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phor war, which took place on two distinct but interconnected levels. The first level of the metaphor war was a series of disagreements over the relevance of particular historical metaphors to the situation in Kosovo, or a struggle to define the present in the light of the past. The second level of the metaphor war centered around the connotations of the historical metaphors themselves, including the lessons to be drawn from particular past events. Both levels of the metaphor war became intertwined in complex and interesting ways as speakers engaged in simultaneous battles for interpretive dominance over both the present and the past. This article seeks not only to determine which historical metaphors appeared in the Kosovo debate and to explain what they signified, but also to examine the politics surrounding the use of the historical metaphors themselves.

Methodology and Synopsis

Figure 1 presents the four historical metaphors that appeared most often in the debate[42] and also identifies the principal "trigger phrases" that speakers commonly used to evoke these metaphors. These findings are based on an examination of the public speeches and statements of two groups of U.S. political leaders: first, the Clinton administration, which consisted of President Bill Clinton and his senior foreign policy officials, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and National Security Adviser Samuel Berger; and, second, the U.S. Congress, or elected members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives. The source for statements by the President and his officials was the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database, news-transcripts section,[43] which contains a complete record of official declarations and on-the-record comments to the press by administration officials. The principal source for statements by elected members of Congress was the *Congressional Record,* as reproduced in the Lexis-Nexis Congressional Universe database.[44] Both databases were searched for all references to Kosovo during the period from the start of the Serbian offensive on 20 March 1999 until the termination of NATO's bombing campaign on 10 June 1999. Each mention of Kosovo was examined for explicit comparisons between an historical event and the Kosovo crisis. The most commonly cited comparisons were the four historical events in the figure. Each comparison between Kosovo and these four events was then examined for adjectival words and phrases or synonyms that speakers associated with the historical events. The most frequently recurring words and phrases are those labeled "trigger phrases" in Figure 1. Finally, the databases were searched once again, this time for all occurrences of the trigger

[42] Bosnia was also mentioned frequently, but given that events in Bosnia were still unfolding at the time of the Kosovo debate, I did not consider it to be an historical reference.

[43] http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/form/academic/s_transcript.html, accessed on 1 March 2000.

[44] http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/form/cong/s_congress.html, accessed on 1 March 2000.

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FIGURE 1
Historical Metaphors in the Kosovo Debate and Associated Trigger Phrases

U.S. War in Vietnam "Vietnam," "quagmire"	**Attempted Genocide of the Jews by the Nazis** "Holocaust," "genocide," "never again," "concentration camps," "loading innocent people onto trains," "Hitler"*
Lead-Up to WWII/ Munich Conference "appeasement," "Munich," "stand up to Nazi aggression," "Hitler"*	**Balkans' Role in the Outbreak of WWI** "Balkan powderkeg," "Balkan tinderbox"

** References to "Hitler" were associated with both the Munich metaphor and the Holocaust metaphor.*

phrases.[45] The citations found in this search were added to the list of explicit historical comparisons (eliminating duplicates) that had already been gathered. The result was a complete compilation of allusions to the four historical events in Figure 1.

[45] The time period for this search extended from one year before the beginning of the March 1998 Serbian offensive until the end of NATO bombing in June 1999. In addition, because the *Congressional Record* does not include public statements made by elected members of Congress outside the Congress, the Lexis-Nexis database of "major U.S. newspapers" (http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/form/academic/s_gennews.html) was also searched for instances in which members used trigger phrases in connection with the Kosovo crisis.

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Before proceeding with the analysis, one further note of clarification is in order: we cannot know whether members of Congress or the Clinton administration invoked historical metaphors for purely instrumental purposes (that is, to shape others' interpretations of the Kosovo crisis) or whether they genuinely believed that the crisis resembled these historical precedents. We simply lack the necessary evidence, such as the private and unguarded communications of these political leaders, to answer this question at present. However, we can assume that officials who promoted particular interpretations of the Kosovo crisis were, among other things, seeking to convince others of the value of these interpretations. Why else would these officials have bothered to speak publicly on this matter, if not to express a position that would be taken seriously by others? In this article, therefore, I examine the use of historical metaphors in the Kosovo debate as a form of political persuasion, and I leave to others the knottier question of whether participants in the debate who used these metaphors were truly speaking from the heart. I do not claim that metaphors serve solely as instruments of persuasion in political or social life, but rather, that this is one of the functions that metaphors perform in policy debates.

The Clinton Administration

During late spring 1998, the United States and other members of the Contact Group—France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Britain—announced that they would impose sanctions on Yugoslavia unless President Slobodan Milosevic withdrew his security police from Kosovo and opened talks with representatives of Kosovo's Albanian community on the future of the province. The Contact Group had called for peaceful dialogue on the status of Kosovo for several years,[46] but Milosevic had shown little interest in political negotiation with the Kosovars. Even after the Contact Group issued threats of sanctions against Yugoslavia, Milosevic remained defiant. On 10 June 1998, the United States froze all Yugoslav-owned assets in the United States and prohibited Americans from making investments in Yugoslavia.[47] The executive order authorizing sanctions against Yugoslavia articulated a theme that Clinton would later develop in his speeches and statements: namely, the danger that violence in Kosovo could spread to nearby states. According to the text of the order, the situation in Kosovo constituted "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States," because the Yugoslav policies, by promoting ethnic conflict and human suffering in Kosovo, threatened "to destabilize countries in the region," including Bosnia.[48]

[46] For example, "Statement on Kosovo of the Contact Group of Foreign Ministers," New York, 24 November 1997, reproduced on the internet website of the Office of the High Representative, http://www.ohr.int/docu/d970924a.htm, accessed on 6 March 2000.

[47] Executive Order 13088, 10 June 1998.

[48] Ibid.

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By October 1998, Serb forces had driven the KLA and thousands of Albanian civilians into the mountains of Kosovo, prompting Clinton to make extended public comments on the Kosovo situation.[49] His main concern, as before, was that instability in the province threatened peace and security in the entire Balkans region. In making this argument, the President introduced a new metaphor: He described Kosovo as the "powderkeg" of the Balkans—a term that along with "tinderbox" would be used repeatedly over the subsequent months in the debate over American policy towards Kosovo. Clinton stated: "We all agree that Kosovo is a powderkeg in the Balkans. If the violence continues, it could spill over and threaten the peace and stability of Bosnia, of Albania, of Macedonia and other countries in the region. What is already a humanitarian disaster could turn into a catastrophe."[50]

At this early stage in the Kosovo crisis, Clinton's language was still somewhat coded and suggestive; in the months to come, he would spell out the implications of his historical allusions with much greater clarity. Nevertheless, the phrase "powderkeg in the Balkans" would have carried historical significance for listeners who possessed even a casual knowledge of European history. Since the early part of the twentieth century, when instability in the Balkans drew in the great powers and provided the spark that ignited World War I, the region has been widely known as a powderkeg. In 1947, for instance, members of the International Court of Justice noted that the Balkans had been "*so often described* as the 'powder-keg' of Europe."[51] Today, the term continues to be attached to the region's politics, conjuring up memories of the origins of World War I.[52]

The meaning of the powderkeg metaphor is straightforward: the Balkans can explode at any time, and the resulting conflagration can spread to the rest of Europe; preventing such an explosion is vital to the continent's, and perhaps even to American, security. When Clinton described Kosovo as a powderkeg, he warned that the Kosovo conflict might spill over not only to surrounding

[49] Before October 1998, Clinton made only sporadic and passing references to the "alarming tensions" and "turmoil" in Kosovo in his public statements. See, for example, "Remarks by President Clinton at Reception for Lee Fisher," Federal News Service, 3 June 1998; "Remarks by President Clinton to the 141 1998 Presidential High School Scholars," Federal News Service, 15 June 1998; "Remarks by President Clinton: Announcement of Cabinet-Level Appointments," Federal News Service, 18 June 1998; "Remarks by President Clinton to the American Federation of Teachers 75th Convention," Federal News Service, 20 July 1998; and "Remarks by President Clinton to Members-Elect of the Northern Ireland Assembly," Federal News Service, 3 September 1998.

[50] "Remarks by the President to Opening Ceremony of the 1998 International Monetary Fund/World Bank Annual Meeting," Federal News Service, 6 October 1998.

[51] "Separate Opinion by Judges Basdevant, Alvarez, Winiarski, Zoricic, de Visscher, Badawi Pasha and Krylov," *American Journal of International Law* 42 (July 1948): 707. (Emphasis added.) See also John D. Treadway, "Of Shatter Belts and Powder Kegs: A Brief Survey of Yugoslav History" in Constantine Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas, eds., *Crisis in the Balkans: Views From the Participants* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).

[52] For example, Treadway, "Of Shatter Belts and Powder Kegs, 19–45.

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Balkan states, but to Europe as a whole; and he insinuated that the United States could be compelled to fight in such a pan-European conflict, just as it did in World Wars I and II. "As we approach the next century," he stated on 12 October, during a discussion of the Kosovo situation, "we must never forget one of the most indelible lessons of this one we're about to leave—that America has a direct stake in keeping the peace in Europe before isolated acts of violence turn into large-scale wars."[53] Translation: if you want to make sure American boys will not have to fight another world war, then support me in my efforts to extinguish the smoldering fire in the Balkan powderkeg, before it is too late.

Internationally sponsored peace talks on Kosovo opened in Rambouillet, France, in early February 1999. Shortly thereafter, another historical metaphor entered the Clinton administration's public statements on Yugoslavia—the "lessons of Munich," or the imperative to deal firmly with dictators who are bent on aggression.[54] Although the President and his aides continued to use the powderkeg/tinderbox metaphor, Secretary of State Albright, for instance, told a congressional committee that Kosovo "is a tinderbox."[55] American officials now also began to evoke memories of the failure to stop Hitler before World War II. Albright likened the Kosovo crisis to "what happened before the Second World War in Munich."[56] The President argued that history had proved that the failure to "deter aggression" would lead "to even greater violence we will have to oppose later at greater cost."[57]

The Clinton administration's most extensive use of historical metaphors to describe the situation in Kosovo, however, came during the period of the crisis itself, after Serbian forces began the March 1999 offensive that elicited the NATO bombing campaign. On 23 March, three days into the Serbian offensive and one day before NATO started dropping bombs, the President delivered a speech on the Kosovo situation in which he evoked both the powderkeg and Munich metaphors: "What if someone had listened to Winston Churchill and *stood up to Adolf Hitler* earlier? How many peoples' lives might have been saved, and how many American lives might have been saved? What if someone had been working on the *powderkeg* that exploded World War I, which claimed more lives than World War II for most European countries, what would have happened?"

[53] "Statement by the President at the New York Hilton and Towers," Federal News Service, 12 October 1998. See also Clinton's warning of "a wider war in Europe" in "Remarks by the President at HMO Announcement," Federal News Service, 8 October 1998.

[54] On the enduring quality of the Munich metaphor, see Kenneth M. Jensen and David Wurmser, eds., *The Meaning of Munich Fifty Years Later* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1990); and Chuter, "Munich, or the Blood of Others."

[55] "Hearing of the House International Relations Committee," Federal News Service, 25 February 1999; see also "Foreign Policy Address by President Clinton," Federal News Service, 26 February 1999.

[56] "Hearing of the House International Relations Committee," Federal News Service, 25 February 1999.

[57] "Radio Address by the President to the Nation," Federal News Service, 13 February 1999.

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He further reinforced this message by making the historical lessons more explicit than in his earlier speeches, and by using trigger phrases such as "concentration camps" and "genocide" that introduced yet another metaphor into his description of the Kosovo situation—that of the Holocaust. "Let me remind you," he told his audience, "this is not the first time we've faced this kind of choice [over whether to take military action]. When President Milosevic started the war in Bosnia seven years ago, the world did not act quickly enough to stop him. Let's not forget what happened. Innocent people were herded into *concentration camps*. . . . A quarter of a million people in a country with only six million population were killed, and a couple of million refugees were created. Not because of anything they had done, but because of who they were, and because of the thirst of Mr. Milosevic and his allies to dominate, indeed, to crush people who were of different ethnic and religious affiliation. Now, this was *genocide* in the heart of Europe. It did not happen in 1945. It was going on in 1995."[58] Clinton was in effect offering Americans a conceptual model for interpreting the complex circumstances of the Kosovo crisis. It invited his listeners to draw upon widely shared understandings of key historical events and to view the Kosovo conflict in the light of these historical events.

On the following evening, 24 March, the president reiterated these themes in a televised address announcing NATO air strikes on Serbian forces. "We act to prevent a wider war," he explained, "to defuse a *powderkeg* at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results." Without asserting that a genocide was actually taking place in Kosovo, he evoked memories of the Holocaust twice in his speech, along with several other historical metaphors: "Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is *where World War I began. World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region.* In both wars, Europe was slow to recognize the dangers, and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. Just imagine if leaders back then had acted wisely and *early enough*, how many lives could have been saved, how many Americans would not have had to die. We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just a few years ago. The world did not act *early enough* to stop that war either. And let's not forget what happened . . . *genocide* in the heart of Europe. . . . Not in some grainy newsreel from our parents' and grandparents' time, but in our own time, testing our humanity and resolve." The President then returned to the powderkeg/tinderbox metaphor: "Let a fire burn here in this area and the *flames will spread.* Eventually, key U.S. allies could be drawn into a *wider conflict*, a war we would be forced to confront later—only at far greater risk and greater cost. . . . [Let us act now] so that future generations of Americans do not have to cross the Atlantic to fight *another terrible war.*[59]

[58] "Remarks by President Bill Clinton to AFSCME (American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees) Conference," Federal News Service, 23 March 1999. (Emphasis added.)

[59] "Statement by the President to the Nation," Federal News Service, 24 March 1999. (Emphasis added.)

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In this speech, which was apparently meant to rally public support behind the NATO bombing campaign, Clinton assembled all of the historical metaphors that he had used to describe Kosovo over the previous months and combined them into a single, concentrated barrage of emotionally charged images from the distant and recent past. The President's earlier metaphorical allusions had been almost oblique in comparison to the blunt manner in which he now invoked the powderkeg, Munich, and Holocaust metaphors to explain events in Kosovo.

Although neither Clinton nor any of his cabinet officers explicitly called Milosevic a new Hitler, or stated that the Serb treatment of Albanian civilians in Kosovo actually represented a new Holocaust, American officials continued to stir up memories of World War II, Hitler, and the Holocaust in the weeks that followed the president's televised address. Madeleine Albright's speech at a Brookings Institution panel on the future of NATO was a case in point. In the first minute of her presentation, she portrayed NATO as a response to the lessons of Munich and the Holocaust, which helped to situate her subsequent discussion of Kosovo against the backdrop of this history: "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was forged in the aftermath of the *Holocaust* and war by the survivors of war to prevent war. It reflected our predecessors' determination to defend hard-won freedoms and their understanding that while *weakness invites aggression*, strength is a parent to peace." She then went on to fit the Kosovo crisis into this institutional history of NATO: "[B]y acting on behalf of justice and peace in Kosovo, we are reaffirming NATO's core purpose as a defender of democracy, stability and basic human decency on European soil. . . . Kosovo is part of an area, the southeast corner of Europe, *where World War I began*, [and] major battles of *World War II* were fought. The worst fighting in Europe since *Hitler's* surrender, occurred in this decade. . . . It is because of [Milosevic's] cruelty that NATO actions became the only option as he prepared to unleash *yet another rampage of terror*. . . . We are resolute because it is in our interest and it is right to stop the ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other indicators of *genocide* that we see."[60] Without explicitly comparing Milosevic to Hitler, or explicitly asserting that the Kosovo crisis was analogous to Munich or the Holocaust, Albright seemed to be inviting her listeners to make these connections for themselves.

The president and his advisers also linked Kosovo to the Holocaust by repeating certain trigger phrases in their public remarks, such as "never again" (an expression that is associated with the pledge never to allow another Holocaust to occur) or references to innocent people being loaded into train cars for deportation (which recalls the transportation of Jews to Nazi concentration camps during World War II). For instance, during a public forum at the White House with Holocaust-survivor Elie Wiesel in April 1999—a forum entitled

[60] "Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at Brookings Institution Forum," Federal News Service, 6 April 1999. (Emphasis added.)

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"The Perils of Indifference: Lessons Learned From a Violent Century"—the president's wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton, stated: "I never could have imagined that when the time finally came for him [Wiesel] to stand in this spot and to reflect on the past century and the future to come, that we would be seeing children in Kosovo *crowded into trains*, separated from families, separated from their homes, robbed of their childhoods, their memories, their humanity. It is something that causes all of us to pause and to reflect . . . how could all this be happening *once again* at the end of this century?"[61]

When Wiesel pointed out that he did not believe the Kosovo crisis was a new Holocaust, President Clinton, who was also present at the forum, immediately agreed but was apparently reluctant to abandon the historical parallel: "When we see people forced from their homes at gunpoint, *loaded onto train cars*, their identity papers confiscated, their very presence blotted from the historical record, it is only natural that we would think of the events which Elie has chronicled tonight in his own life." In other words, the Kosovo situation may not be a new Holocaust, but it bore an uncanny resemblance to the Holocaust, which the President highlighted again and again in his public comments and choice of imagery.

In the weeks following that evening, the President and his aides continued to include indirect references to the Holocaust in their statements on Kosovo. "This is Holocaust Remembrance Day," Clinton declared on 13 April 1999, drawing a connection between the Holocaust and Kosovo, "*On this day*, let us resolve not to let this ethnic cleansing and killing by Mr. Milosevic go unanswered."[62] Secretary of State Albright similarly described "images of families uprooted and *put on trains.*"[63] President Clinton, speaking to Kosovar refugees on 26 May, recalled their ordeal: "People rounded up in the middle of the night, *forced to board trains for unknown destinations*, separated from your families. . . . On the eve of a new century, we refuse to be intimidated by a *dictator* who is trying to *revive the worst memories of the century we are leaving.*"[64] While Clinton's condemnation of Serbian atrocities was certainly warranted, it seemed to be the President himself, not Milosevic, who was reviving memories of the Holocaust in the minds of his listeners, along with several other historical metaphors.

The Congressional Debate

The U.S. Congress was a central battlefield in the metaphor war. As in the Clinton administration's public statements, references in Congress to the Balkan

[61] "Remarks at Millennium Evening, The Perils of Indifference: Lessons Learned From a Violent Century," Federal News Service, 12 April 1999. (Emphasis added.)

[62] "Statement by the President [in the Rose Garden]," Federal News Service, 13 April 1999. (Emphasis added.)

[63] "Madeleine Albright Testifies Before the House International Relations Committee," Federal Document Clearing House, FDCH Political Transcripts, 21 April 1999. (Emphasis added.)

[64] "William J. Clinton Delivers Remarks to the Kosovar People," Federal Document Clearing House, FDCH Political Transcripts, 26 May 1999. (Emphasis added.)

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powderkeg, Munich, and the Holocaust were common, although the most hotly disputed metaphor was Vietnam. Congressional debate also involved a second level of contest in the metaphor war—the meaning and implications of the historical events themselves.

Powderkeg (and Falling Dominoes)

In comparison to the Holocaust and Vietnam metaphors, which came up frequently in Congress during the Kosovo crisis, references to the Balkan powderkeg were relatively rare, although when such references did appear they generally echoed the President's warnings of a wider European war. Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R–FL), for example, argued that, "Historically it is well known that the Balkans have been a *tinderbox* for regional wars, and we must not forget that World War I began in that part of the world."[65]

Some critics of Clinton administration policy devised an interesting response to assertions that the United States should use its armed forces to prevent the Balkan powderkeg from exploding. They sought to redefine the powderkeg argument in terms of another metaphor—falling dominoes. The domino theory gained prominence in 1954, when President Dwight Eisenhower explained American concerns about the dangers of Vietnamese communists gaining control over the former French colony of Indochina, including the possibility that surrounding countries would subsequently fall under communist domination: "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences."[66] Although the notion of falling dominoes shaped American strategic thinking from the very beginning of the cold war,[67] it played an especially important role in the private decision making and public justifications that surrounded the intervention of United States forces in the Vietnam War, and is still closely associated with America's Vietnam policy.[68] The historical association between the domino metaphor and the Vietnam War may provide an explanation for the behavior of congressional critics of the Clinton ad-

[65] 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 1181, 11 March 1999. See similar comments by Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 3094-3013, 23 March 1999; and Senator Joseph Lieberman (R-CT) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 3110, 23 March 1999.

[66] "The President's News Conference of April 7, 1954," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), 383.

[67] Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior" in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 20–50; and Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[68] Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders," *World Politics* 32 (October 1979): 1–56; and Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior."

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ministration's policies towards Kosovo, who responded to arguments about the danger of the "Balkan tinderbox" by recasting these arguments as new versions of the Vietnam-era domino theory, thus portraying the Kosovo conflict in the negative light of the Vietnam War. In the words of Representative Mark Sanford (R-SC): "the domino theory has long been disproven. Clark Clifford was sent by President Johnson down to Vietnam for the very reason that is being described as one of the reasons we need to go to Kosovo, and, that was, if we do not do something, this could escalate, this could really grow. That was disproven there."[69]

Rather than seeking to replace one metaphor (the Balkans powderkeg) with another (falling dominoes), other critics of the NATO bombing campaign accepted the Clinton administration's powderkeg image, but then used this metaphor to argue *against* American involvement in the Balkans on the grounds that it would be reckless and wrong to deploy U.S. troops to a location that was about to explode into a wider conflict. In the words of Representative William Goodling (R-PA): "We must consider the powderkeg we are getting ourselves into. Let us not enter the twenty-first century in the same way we began the twentieth century by getting ourselves involved in a centuries-old Balkan conflict which we cannot and will not resolve . . . now by the introduction of U.S. ground troops."[70] The implication of this argument is that the deployment of American troops to Europe during World War I was a mistake and that the United States does not have a vital interest in using American forces, if necessary, to maintain peace in Europe. Unlike many of his colleagues, in other words, Goodling did not deny that the Kosovo crisis might spread; his argument for not involving the United States forces in Kosovo was the very real danger, from his perspective, that the crisis could spark a larger conflict. In this sense, while Goodling's colleagues were fighting over the applicability of the powderkeg metaphor to Kosovo, Goodling himself chose to challenge the policy implications of the metaphor.

Munich and the Holocaust

Those who favored NATO's firm response to the Serbian military campaign frequently conjured up memories of World War II and the Nazis. One member of Congress baldly asserted, for instance, that Slobodan Milosevic was "a modern day Hitler,"[71] while others suggested that Milosevic's behavior or character merely bore a resemblance to that of Hitler.[72] Some comparisons between the

[69] 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 1243-1244, 11 March 1999. See also Senator John Kerry's (D-MA) remarks in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 3116, 23 March 1999.

[70] 145 *Cong. Rec.* E 609, 12 April 1999. Representative Randy Cunningham (R-CA) similarly argued: "it is a powderkeg. . . . Let us not send our men and women to Kosovo." (145 *Cong. Rec.* H 1197, 11 March 1999).

[71] Representative Chet Edwards (D-TX) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2447, 28 April 1999.

[72] For example, Representative Major Owens (D-NY) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* E 621, 13 April 1999; and Representative Ron Packard (R-CA) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* E 1742, 4 August 1999.

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Serb leadership and the Nazis conveyed the lessons of both the Munich and Holocaust metaphors simultaneously—that is, the importance of countering an aggressive dictator with force and the commitment to "never again" allow genocide to occur. Representative Sam Gejdenson (D-CT), for example, alluded to both of these lessons when he argued against a motion for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Kosovo: "If we pass this proposal, Mr. Milosevic will see a bright green light to continue the work of his role models, Hitler and Stalin."[73] Other participants in the congressional debate over Kosovo also likened Serbs to Nazis, but in a less direct and explicit manner, such as Senator Joseph Biden's (D-DE) description of the manner in which Albanian Kosovars were killed by Serb forces: "These bullet wounds were in the back of their heads. They [the Albanians] were executed, just like they [the Serbs] did in Bosnia, *just like Hitler did in World War II.*"[74] In making this comparison, Biden implied that Serbian forces in Kosovo had behaved like Nazis.

References to the Holocaust appeared regularly in the pages of the *Congressional Record* during the period of the crisis. Few speakers directly asserted that events in Kosovo were equivalent to the Holocaust, but many used language that invited listeners to make this connection for themselves. Representative David Obey (D-WI), for example, declared: "I think we need to have meant it when we said about Europe after Hitler in World War II 'Never Again!' And I think when the President walked into this problem and we saw what was happening in Yugoslavia, that we had an obligation to try to stop it."[75]

Obey never described the precise nature of the "problem" in Yugoslavia, but it did not require much imagination to divine his meaning. Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) similarly juxtaposed the Holocaust and the Kosovo crisis without directly comparing them: "[S]ixty years ago, as Europe moved increasingly close to war, a number of philanthropic organizations came to the aid of those desperately trying to escape the Holocaust. Today, many of those same organizations have turned their attention to helping the latest victims of genocide. . . . As in World War II, these organizations recognize that they cannot stop the genocide without support from the world community. In the case of Kosovo, that means that NATO has had to bring its military might to bear on Slobodan Milosevic."[76] Dodd's apparent justification for juxtaposing the Holocaust and the Kosovo crisis was not the characteristics of the respective genocides themselves, but the activities of philanthropic organizations. Neverthe-

[73] 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2425, 28 April 1999. Similarly, Delegate Robert Underwood (D-GUAM): "Too many lives in past conflicts have been lost because of inaction. Imagine how different the world might have been had the world stood up sooner to an Adolf Hitler or a Heideiki Tojo. We are once again at one of those historical crossroads," in 144 *Cong. Rec.* H 1668, 24 March 1999; see also the comments of Representative Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2398, 28 April 1999.

[74] 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 3048, 22 March 1999. (Emphasis added.)

[75] 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2880, 6 May 1999.

[76] 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4472, 29 April 1999.

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less, simply by juxtaposing these two events, Dodd's comments had the effect of inviting listeners to view the Kosovo situation as analogous to the Holocaust.

Another speaker who achieved a similar effect was Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL): We [Americans] get engaged in wars for values. That is what it was all about in World War II; to make sure that Hitler and his genocide would come to an end once and for all, to make certain in the cold war that we stopped the spread of communism in Europe. Now, today, in this mission in Kosovo, we say we are standing again for values that are important, not only in the United States, but in Europe and around the world."[77] Like Dodd, Durbin implicitly compared the Holocaust and Kosovo by mentioning them both in the same breath, although he did not argue that they were equivalent; his only explicit claim was that American "values" were at stake in both cases. The implication was that Americans would be justified in using armed force to protect the victims of Serb aggression and that the United States had a moral commitment to do so.

In response to these comments, many opponents of the Kosovo operation rejected the portrayal of Milosevic as Hitler, or Serb behavior as Nazi-like. In the words of Representative Goodling: "[P]eople like to somehow or other say this has something to do with Hitler and Nazi Germany. That is nonsense. It has nothing to do with that at all. There is no correlation at all."[78] Others critics provided reasoned arguments for differentiating between Kosovo and the Holocaust, such as the claim that in Kosovo atrocities were being committed by "both sides"—the Serb forces and the KLA—and not just by one group against another, as in the Holocaust. Therefore, the United States did not have a responsibility to intervene in the Balkan crisis.[79]

By contrast, Representative Jim Leach (R-IA) acknowledged that "Holocaustal analogies" did apply to Kosovo, but he warned against taking these comparisons too far: "if we exclusively make Hitlerite analogies, we have no choice whatsoever than to follow a kind of strategy that could lead in and of itself to greater losses of life to innocents than a negotiated settlement . . . [and] renders it impossible for the US to consider anything less than unconditional victory."[80] Leach's comment exposed what seemed to be the core of the debate over the use of World War II metaphors: If the U.S. administration, other members of Congress, opinion leaders, and the public could be convinced that the complex situation in the Balkans was in at least a few important ways analogous to the Holocaust or to Nazi aggression (if these constituencies could just be persuaded to think about the Kosovo crisis in the light of World War II) then it would be difficult to oppose U.S. military intervention in the crisis. This observation may help to explain why some supporters of U.S. intervention, when they were confronted with arguments emphasizing the lack of equivalence be-

[77] 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4143, 22 April 1999.
[78] 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 1899, 13 April 1999.
[79] Representative Scott McInnis (R-CO) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2796, 5 May 1999.
[80] 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2421–2422, 28 April 1999.

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tween the Kosovo crisis and World War II, acknowledged that the two events were not directly analogous. But they continued to argue that there were enough similarities to merit a forceful international response to the Serbs. As Senator Mary Landrieu (D-LA) put it:

> Some of my colleagues here in the Senate are consistently remind[ing] us that Kosovo is not the Holocaust. I agree. What has occurred in the last few months, does not yet compare to the crimes the Nazis perpetrated. But this is a senseless justification for inaction. Should we wait for another Holocaust to occur before we act decisively? What, then, is the point of action? How many children must be traumatized? How many homes need to be destroyed? How many women need to be victims of brutality before we can act? I say the words "never again" mean that we should not wait and we will be decisive in our action. That is why I support using whatever means is necessary to accomplish the goal set out by NATO.[81]

In this statement, Landrieu used a rhetorical method that President Clinton had employed in his public conversation with Elie Weisel. Both Clinton and Landrieu first acknowledged that the comparison between Kosovo and the Holocaust did not stand up to scrutiny, but then proceeded to evoke memories and images of the Holocaust in an apparent effort to justify and enjoin U.S. military intervention in Kosovo.

Vietnam

While most invocations of Vietnam during the congressional debate were made by speakers opposed to American intervention in Kosovo, close examination reveals a wide variation in the precise implications that these speakers attributed to the Vietnam metaphor. Lawmakers' interpretations of Vietnam's lessons were considerably more varied than their reading of the Holocaust's lessons. Because of the relatively unsettled status of the Vietnam metaphor, members of Congress disagreed not only on the question of whether the Vietnam example was relevant to the Kosovo crisis but also over the connotations of the Vietnam metaphor itself. The battle over the significance of the Vietnam War, perhaps more than any other historical metaphor in the congressional debate, took place simultaneously at these two levels.

Several members of Congress, for example, used Vietnam references to highlight the internecine, ancient, and complex aspects of the conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo and to suggest that these were the features of the Vietnam War that led to the American defeat. As Representative Jerry

[81] 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4141, 22 April 1999. Representative Eliot Engel (D-NY) echoed this argument: "The isolationist attitude that I hear amongst some of my colleagues is indeed troubling and puzzling. We have heard these arguments time and time and time again. We heard these arguments during the Second World War when 6 million people plus were ethnically cleansed and the Holocaust was there. I am not saying that this is on the same level, but when innocent people are killed because of their race, or ethnicity, we have a right and a duty, I think, to respond." (145 *Congressional Record* H 1220, 11 March 1999).

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Costello (D-IL) argued: "[S]ince Vietnam ended, [we have paid] a terrible price for our mistake and we are still reaping the bitter fruit of those decisions. The war in Southeast Asia is very similar to the Balkans, a civil war . . . [that] has to be settled by those who are most affected—those who live there . . . and it will be impossible for us militarily from the outside to impose a successful solution on the problems faced by the people of this area."[82]

Many speakers repeated a similar set of facts. The Balkan conflict, like the Vietnam War, had been going on "for hundreds of years"; it was "a 610-year-old ethnic war, civil war, religious war" in a region that "has been inflamed for centuries."[83] The United States was getting involved in a conflict "with less justification than there was in Vietnam in the midst of a cold war, getting into it to involve ourselves in a civil war that for all practical purposes has already gone on for 600 years."[84] Kosovo is a "quagmire of ethnic and religious rivalries that we cannot solve alone. Let us remember Dien Bien Phu, when many of his key advisers pressured President Eisenhower to send our armed forces to help bail out the French. He was a wise president; he turned them down."[85] Representative Lindsey Graham (R-SC) may have expressed these concerns most clearly: "How many more young men and women are going to [be sent] in faraway places to get in the middle of civil wars where there is a dubious reason to be there to start with and no way home?"[86] This version of the Vietnam metaphor implied that the United States was courting disaster if it intervened in distant, deep-rooted conflicts that it did not understand and in which it had no vital national interest.

Another version of the metaphor emphasized the incompetent manner in which the American government waged the Vietnam War. By invoking this interpretation of Vietnam, speakers apparently sought to impugn the Clinton administration's handling of the Kosovo crisis. "More than 30 years ago in Vietnam," stated one such speaker, Senator Max Cleland (D-GA): "we also lacked clear and specific objectives. . . . The result was a conflict where the politicians failed to provide clear political objectives, but intruded in determining military strategy, and where our policy was never fully understood or fully supported by the American people. . . . I cannot in good conscience sit here and *watch it all appear to be happening again.*"[87]

Several lawmakers pointed, in particular, to the lack of a clearly defined "exit strategy" as a planning failure in Vietnam and a weakness in America's Kosovo policy; while others, recalling the collapse of public support in the

[82] 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2394, 28 April 1999.

[83] Representative Scott McInnis (R-CO) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2796, 5 May 1999; Representative Joe Scarborough (R-FL) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2445, 28 April 1999; and Senator Robert Smith (I-NH) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 6035, 26 May 1999.

[84] Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 3097, 23 March 1999.

[85] Representative Stephen Horn (R-CA) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2436, 28 April 1999.

[86] 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 1203, 11 March 1999.

[87] 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 5668, 20 May 1999. (Emphasis added.)

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United States for the Vietnam War, criticized the Clinton administration for failing to explain its policy clearly to the American people.[88] Although this interpretation of the Vietnam metaphor was not incompatible with the first version (the argument that domestic conditions in Vietnam were not conducive to a U.S. military victory), it did have different implications for the Kosovo crisis. If America's failure in Southeast Asia was primarily due to American mismanagement of the war, rather than to the circumstances of the Vietnamese conflict itself, then the key to successful U.S. intervention in Kosovo would depend on the competent organization and execution of such an operation.

A third reading of the Vietnam metaphor emphasized the alleged lack of resolve or steadfastness in America's Vietnam War effort and suggested that the Kosovo mission would not succeed unless the United States used "full force" to achieve its goals.[89] Representative Kevin Brady (R-TX) used this type of argument to criticize administration policy: "Like Vietnam, [in Kosovo] we wage a war we are not committed to win, by the seat of the pants, war by committee, war by posters, war by the politically correct. It is having fatal results. Worst of all, we forgot the most important lesson of Vietnam. *It is fatal to enter a war without the will to win it.*"[90] Senator Robert Smith (I-NH) agreed: "to do anything less than to go in with absolute purpose and absolute decisiveness . . . is another Vietnam."[91] This version of the Vietnam metaphor was also used to condemn the "incrementalist" manner in which the United States was engaging in the Balkan conflict, recalling the ill-fated "escalation" of American involvement in Vietnam, or what is sometimes called "mission creep."[92]

In making this argument, several speakers lectured the administration in the fundamentals of warfare. For instance, one senator argued that the "Vietnam-style" of the NATO bombing campaign had sacrificed the "two principle elements of war: surprise and overwhelming force."[93] Another lawmaker was similarly blunt: "we have no business getting into wars that we are not determined to win . . . this is what brought us the agony of Vietnam."[94] More generally, this third version of the Vietnam metaphor, like the first and second versions, cast a negative light on U.S. involvement in the Balkan crisis, but it also

[88] For example, Representative Doug Bereuter (R-NE) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 1195, 11 March 1999; Representative Jack Kingston (R-GA) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 1246, 11 March 1999; Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 2919, 18 March 1999; Representative Tillie Fowler (R-FL) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2402, 28 April 1999; and Representative Doug Ose (R-CA) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2836, 6 May 1999.

[89] Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4523, 3 May 1999.

[90] 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2445, 28 April 1999. (Emphasis added.)

[91] 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 6034, 26 May 1999.

[92] For example, Representative John Kasich (R-OH) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2339, 27 April 1999; Representative Dave Camp (R-MI) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2413, 28 April 1999; Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4540, 3 May 1999; and Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4523, 3 May 1999.

[93] Senator John Ashcroft (R-MO) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4564, 3 May 1999.

[94] Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* H 2427, 28 April 1999.

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revealed another reading of the lessons of Vietnam: the American failure in Southeast Asia was not primarily due to the domestic conditions in Vietnam (the first version of the metaphor), nor simply to the poor management of the U.S. government (the second version), but to a lack of willingness to employ all necessary means—overwhelming force—to the goal of defeating the enemy. In the words of Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX), "when you go [to war], by God, you go to win."[95]

Other legislators, however, rejected any likening of the Kosovo crisis to the Vietnam War. According to Senator Biden, such comparisons were "heartfelt and searching" but "totally out of proportion" because there was "nothing analogous" between the two situations.[96] Biden pointed to a number of differences: "It is a different continent, it is a different population, it is a different rationale."[97] Senator John Kerry (D-MA) echoed these points, and added that American strategy in Kosovo was shrewder than in Vietnam.[98] Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) argued that it was premature to talk about becoming "bogged down" in Kosovo at such an early moment in the campaign: "we and our NATO allies have been at war in Kosovo for a total of three weeks," whereas the U.S. government enjoyed at least four years of strong congressional support at the beginning of the Vietnam War.[99]

The lines of division between those who endorsed or rejected the Vietnam metaphor, however, became quite hazy because there was a concurrent debate over the meaning of the metaphor itself. Perhaps the best illustration of this dynamic was the controversy surrounding the so-called McCain-Biden resolution in the Senate, which would have authorized the president to use "all necessary force" in Kosovo, including the deployment of ground troops. President Clinton did not support the resolution, arguing that he already had sufficient authority to conduct an aerial bombing campaign through NATO, and that he had no immediate plans to deploy ground troops to Kosovo. The impetus behind the resolution, rather, came from a coalition of Democratic and Republican senators who were dissatisfied with the way in which the Kosovo operation was being conducted.

Some of these senators, like Biden, one of the cosponsors of the resolution, explained their motivation in terms of the perceived imperative to stop the "genocidal aggression" of Slobodan Milosevic's forces, and to preserve stability in the region and Europe. Other supporters of the resolution, such as John McCain (R-AZ), the other cosponsor, did not acknowledge the relevance of the Holocaust and powderkeg metaphors to the Kosovo crisis, and had initially disapproved of the Clinton administration's decision to involve U.S. forces in

[95] 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4523, 3 May 1999.

[96] Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 3097, 23 March 1999, and 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4552, 3 May 1999.

[97] Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4552, 3 May 1999.

[98] Senator John Kerry (D-MA) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4549-50, 3 May 1999.

[99] Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 3668, 14 April 1999.

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the crisis. But once the United States had committed its armed forces to combat, they believed that there should be no hesitation to devote the full power of the American military to achieve victory. In explaining his position, McCain referred explicitly to the lessons of Vietnam, which in his view clearly demanded the use of overwhelming force in U.S. military operations, rather than making partial or incremental commitments of American forces. Senator Kerry, expressing a similar point, warned against turning Kosovo into "a Vietnam" through a "lack of resolve and pursuit" in the prosecution of the Balkan campaign.[100]

Meanwhile, opponents of McCain-Biden continued to argue that the lessons of Vietnam argued against the deployment of ground forces to Kosovo: for example, some of these opponents equated McCain-Biden with the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which, they argued, had given the U.S. president a "blank check" to wage the Vietnam War.[101] The Senate eventually voted to table the resolution, but the debate surrounding the motion illustrated the dual character of the metaphor war in the Congress: not only was there competition to define Kosovo in the light of different historical metaphors, but there was a concurrent struggle to establish the implications of particular past events, including the Vietnam War.

Conclusion: Historical Metaphors in the Kosovo Debate

In the debate over Kosovo, historical metaphors seemed to serve as a kind of shorthand representing competing understandings of the Balkan crisis, each of which suggested different strategies for responding to the crisis. This observation, which is derived from the speeches and statements both of Clinton administration officials and members of Congress, lends support to the proposition that political metaphors are not merely rhetorical flourishes, but rather, as Max Black puts it, "every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model."[102] By casting the Kosovo situation against the backdrop of the Holocaust or Munich, for instance, participants in the debate invoked a set of well known and emotionally charged representations of past events, which provided an apparent rationale for American intervention in the crisis. The Vietnam metaphor, by contrast, invited listeners to interpret Kosovo in a very different light—one that was much less encouraging about the prospects of a successful American intervention in Kosovo. References to the Balkan powderkeg were less obvious in their implications for U.S. policy, because they could be used to warn against the United States becoming entangled in an explosive local conflict, or on the other

[100] Senator John Kerry (D-MA) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4549, 3 May 1999.

[101] For example, Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4517, 3 May 1999; Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4527, 3 May 1999; and Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) in 145 *Cong. Rec.* S 4484, 30 April 1999.

[102] Max Black, "More About Metaphor" in Andrew Ortony, ed., *Metaphor and Thought* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 31.

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hand, to highlight the danger of failing to prevent such a conflict from spreading to neighboring states, and possibly to other parts of Europe.

Indeed, some metaphors appeared to have more settled connotations than other metaphors. There was little disagreement, for example, about the meaning of references to Munich and the Holocaust. When Munich appeared in speeches and statements, it always referred to the failure of the Western democracies to stand up to Hitler in 1938 and, more generally, to the dangers of appeasing dictators. Perhaps because the connotations of the Munich metaphor are so well-established, opponents of American intervention in Kosovo did not attempt to challenge or redefine the metaphor itself, but rather argued that Kosovo was not analogous with Munich, that Milosevic was not Hitler, that the Serbs were not Nazis, and the like. In other words, they questioned the applicability, not the connotations, of the Munich metaphor. Similarly, references to the Holocaust in the Kosovo debate appeared to convey a single interpretation of what the Holocaust signified and of the appropriate foreign policy response to any new Holocaust: the metaphor referred to a genocide in which innocent civilians were targeted for extermination because of their ancestry; and the United States should "never again" allow another Holocaust to occur. Opponents of U.S. intervention in Kosovo did not communicate alternative interpretations of the Holocaust metaphor or seek to redefine the metaphor; disagreement centered instead on the question of whether the Kosovo crisis could, or should, be characterized as a new Holocaust.

This type of disagreement, which focused on the perceived applicability of particular historical metaphors to the situation in Kosovo, is what I have called the first level of the metaphor war in the public debate over U.S. policy toward Kosovo. These arguments were often heated and vitriolic, suggesting that the speakers themselves perceived that a great deal was at stake in the struggle to characterize the Kosovo crisis. But these conflicts were also relatively straightforward, at least in the following sense: one could either agree or disagree that the Munich or Holocaust metaphors applied to the Kosovo situation.

Allusions to Vietnam and to the Balkan powderkeg metaphors, by contrast, fueled more complex disagreements. While speakers argued about the applicability of these metaphors to the Kosovo crisis, just as they did in the case of Munich and the Holocaust, they also quarreled about the actual meaning and the perceived lessons of the Vietnam and Balkans powderkeg metaphors. This was especially true of references to Vietnam. At various moments in the debate, Vietnam appeared to signify, among other things, the ignominious military defeat of American forces in a civil war "quagmire"; the killing and harming of innocent civilians by American forces in an apparently senseless war; the incompetent leadership and conduct of the war by the U.S. government; the danger of gradual escalation of American military involvement in a foreign conflict, or what is known as "mission creep"; and the lack of political and material commitment to defeating North Vietnam, or the notion that U.S. forces were forced to fight with one hand tied behind their back. Most of the speakers

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who saw a connection between Kosovo and the Vietnam War strongly opposed American intervention in the Balkans and used the Vietnam metaphor to argue against such an intervention. But different speakers used the metaphor in different ways, which appeared to reflect ongoing disagreements about the nature and lessons of America's experience in Vietnam. Some speakers, for example, drew parallels between Serbian civilian deaths from NATO bombing and the killing of civilians during the Vietnam War, in order to argue that the campaign against Serbia was being waged too vigorously and that more extensive U.S. intervention in Kosovo would only cause more senseless deaths. Others—most notably, those who traced the American failure in Vietnam to a lack of political and material commitment to the war—were initially wary of U.S. involvement in Kosovo, but supported increased intervention, including the deployment of American ground forces to fight the Serbian military, once the decision to start the NATO bombing campaign was taken. Thus, the connotations of the Vietnam metaphor, rather than merely the applicability of the metaphor to the Kosovo crisis, were a focus of contestation in the debate over Kosovo.

To a lesser extent, participants in the debate also disagreed about the implications of the Balkans powderkeg metaphor. Some speakers insisted that the region's history of political instability and the lessons of World War I supported rapid American action to stem the Kosovo crisis before it ignited a larger conflict, while others argued that the very same danger of a larger conflagration argued against U.S. intervention, and yet others sought to recast the metaphor as a type of domino theory, apparently in the hopes of discrediting it.

Disagreement over the meaning and implications of particular historical allusions (as distinct from disagreement over the applicability of these metaphors to the situation in Kosovo) comprises the second level of the metaphor war, which was in effect the residue of earlier interpretive struggles that had never been fully resolved. What made the Kosovo metaphor war so complex—and, in my view, interesting—was the fact that it was waged on both the first and second levels simultaneously: it was a battle over the meaning of both the present and the past, and their relationship to one another. Fredrick Jackson Turner once remarked that "Each age tries to form its own conception of the past."[103] The Kosovo debate suggests that each age also tries to form its own conception of the present in the light of its own contested interpretations of the past.

Studying the metaphors of political debate not only offers to shed light on a society's struggle to understand its own experiences and the surrounding world. There is a more prosaic—and perhaps more important, from the viewpoint of some political scientists—reason to decipher such metaphors: namely, to gain a better understanding of what political actors are actually saying when they engage in public debate; and perhaps ultimately to figure out why political leaders speak in certain ways and not in others. Much of the Kosovo debate took

[103] Cited in Avery Craven, "The 'Turner Theories' and the South," *Journal of Southern History* 5 (August 1939): 291.

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place in a type of code, comprised in part of direct and indirect references to previous historical experiences. This article has attempted to make sense of that code—that is, to clarify what American political leaders were actually saying when they discussed the Kosovo crisis while at the same time offer a broader explanation of the role that metaphors play in the U.S. foreign policy debates.*

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American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might: A Review Essay

SEYOM BROWN

This timely RAND Corporation study focuses on threats of military action and on the coercive functions of military operations in war.[1] Its publication coincides with increasing acceptance in the policy community of the normalization of force as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and the revival of scholarly interest in coercive diplomacy.

The coercive use of military power—actual or threatened—is as old as war itself, for most wars and war threats have developed within ongoing conflicts where the adversaries were unable to resolve their disputes through bargaining and nonviolent inducements, including economic coercion. The initiation of war has often been seen as a means of getting the adversary to change its behavior. Rarely is total destruction of the enemy the purpose at war's outset, although once underway, overwhelming and unconditional victory can become the objective. These interactions between the political and military dimensions of conflict, what Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman call "the dynamics of coercion," were integral to the power plays among the ancient Greek city states and were at the core of Thucydides' analysis in *The Peloponnesian Wars.* Such dynamics were also captured in Carl von Clausewitz's famous aphorism about war being "a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." An understanding of these dynamics—and how they can get out of control—is of renewed relevance to the practice and analysis of U.S. foreign policy in a period like the present, when U.S. hegemony comes

[1] *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* by Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

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under increasing attack and coercive diplomacy appears to be a necessary and attractive option.

Coercion and force are partners, often seen hand in hand; but sometimes, Byman and Waxman point out, they go their own ways and have divergent aims. Whereas all threats of force are designed to coerce an opponent to comply with one's demands ("remove those missiles from Cuba or we'll take them out"), not all military operations are undertaken primarily as acts of coercion. Some military actions, such as the preemptive moves the current Bush administration is contemplating against Iraq, are the results of a failure of coercion and are designed essentially to smash or hobble an enemy's capabilities—forget any longer about his intentions—or to totally destroy his regime. And many military operations, once hostilities are underway, are directed only at winning the clash of arms itself and prevailing in the key battles on the way to victory.

But other military campaigns are directed largely at the enemy's will to continue fighting, so as to increase the likelihood of winning with the minimum costs possible. As Byman and Waxman show, in some cases (notably U.S. strategies for most of the Vietnam War), the objective can constrain the coercer's military attacks, so as to leave the enemy with something yet to lose—or to save, if he gives in. In other cases (for example, NATO's bombing of infrastructure targets in and around Belgrade in the Kosovo war), efforts to affect the enemy's will can lead the coercer to significantly escalate the war, though still within limits that permit the enemy to retain more by early war termination than by fighting to the finish.

The authors, appropriately, do not exclude actual attacks and intrawar demands from their analysis. They define coercion as "the use of threatened force, and at times the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would" (p. 30).

Drawing on the insights of seminal strategic theorists, such as Thomas Schelling and Alexander George, and a plethora of RAND and other think tank studies, the book is a veritable tour de force (pun intended) as a survey of the policy-oriented thinking about coercive diplomacy since World War II. But it is more than a survey of the work of others.

Byman and Waxman have made a determined effort to mine the available raw record as well as the literature for patterns and pitfalls in U.S. attempts to use force coercively during the cold war and after. In reporting on their findings, however, except for the statement about "escalation dominance" quoted below, they eschew universal generalizations of the kind that might score them points in academia but which have little utility for policy makers who must deal with particular situations.

The result is far from a theory of the dynamics of coercion that stipulates the conditions under which it will succeed or fail. The authors call their second chapter "The Theory of Coercion." But it comprises a discussion of analytic concepts and factors that should be taken into account in analyzing and/or planning to use military force as an instrument of coercion, not a theory. The closest

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they come to a theoretical proposition is the statement that "a critical condition of successful coercion is *escalation dominance*: the ability to increase the threatened costs to the adversary while denying the adversary the opportunity to negate those costs or to counterescalate" (p. 38). They explain that this means "no matter where the adversary chooses to increase pressure, the coercer is always able to overwhelm the adversary in that area" (p. 39). Yet they fail to posit the components of such a condition of escalation dominance. The rest of the book, which discusses the variety of factors that can affect the application of coercive strategies and enemy responses to them, contains much wisdom on the potential impact of numerous variables in addition to the military capabilities and tactics of the belligerents, such as the strength and asymmetry of the motivations on both sides, the cooperation of coalition partners, the level of domestic and international support for further sacrifices, and, quite crucially, how each side perceives these factors to be influencing the coercive situation. What emerges in these chapters is more useful than the attempt to aggregate all of these components into the notion of escalation dominance, which turns out to be, after all, essentially tautological with effective coercion. Better to leave the components as a disaggregated set of frequently interrelated factors. Perhaps additional research could illuminate the casual interaction and relative importance of the components.

Neither do the authors take it upon themselves to offer a grand strategy that would integrate coercive threats and uses of force into U.S. foreign policy. Again, wisely, they point to the context and unique contingency dependence of efforts at coercion. Nor do they offer a "how to do it" primer.

Their principal contribution is to raise a set of considerations, suggested by their survey of post World War II crises and wars involving the United States, which policy makers, planners, and practitioners of coercive military moves should take into account before setting in motion a particular course of action. And they are to be commended for calling it as they see it, even if sometimes it might contradict the current coercive diplomacy chic. They comment somewhat skeptically, for example, on the degree of control over the dynamics of coercion that the increasing precision of air strikes can give the United States. More generally, they caution: "While the U.S. military arsenal may be extremely precise in a technological sense, the ability to finely tune the political effects its use has on an adversary's population, elite, or key regime decision makers remains largely beyond U.S. planners" (p. 237).

The discussion in Chapter 5 of the crucial impact of domestic sensitivities and politics on the dynamics of international coercive situations is one of the most important parts of the book. The authors warn, invoking empirical findings by their RAND colleague Eric Larson, that polls showing less popular sensitivity than official sensitivity to U.S. troop casualties could be misleading. The data indicate that support for coercive operations is likely to erode as casualties rise, particularly when vital interests are not at stake, when the public views victory as unlikely, and when the nonadministration elite do not support the

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policy. This dynamic of eroding popular support when presumably vital interests are not at stake is also likely, the studies show, with respect to collateral damage to noncombatants in the zones of combat. In other words, we should not be generalizing from the high public support for the U.S. antiterrorist war in Afghanistan. Responding to and attempting to deter catastrophic terrorist attacks on the homeland is one thing. Popular acquiescence in coercive strategies in the service of other U.S. interests—humanitarian or commercial—that could involve substantial casualties may not be sustainable. This is an especially important consideration to keep in mind as the United States flirts with the idea of taking on the role of world policeman.

All in all, *The Dynamics of Coercion* should be must-reading for all practitioners and scholars of the art, especially those who, encouraged by the administration's optimism for controllable war, are unworried by the new enthusiasm for coercive diplomacy.

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Electoral Consequences of Porkbusting in the U.S. House of Representatives

GREGORY L. BOVITZ

Members of the U.S. House of Representatives work together to help each other provide constituents with particularistic benefits. By collaborating in this pork-barrel game, each legislator gets the opportunity to claim credit for working to improve the quality of life back home in the district. The political payoffs of pork-barreling activities can be significant, and therefore legislators are generally reluctant to abandon pork in favor of greater fiscal responsibility. However, sometimes legislators take steps to cut pork: they become porkbusters. I argue that porkbusters take these actions in response to electoral and policy incentives that are either underplayed or overlooked in most studies of legislative behavior; moreover, I find evidence that porkbusters are rewarded for certain strategic choices of fiscal discipline over pork.

Legislators can keep the pork-barrel game going by continuing to trade votes (that is, logroll) in order to protect federal funding for each others' pork-barrel projects and programs. Legislators can also opt out of the pork-barrel game. For example, legislators can support termination of their own projects and programs. This strategy can be thought of as taking the fiscal high ground. Alternatively, legislators can opt out of the pork-barrel game by supporting termination of other legislators' pork. By defecting from a logroll in this way, legislators are violating the norm of universalism. Both of these options, however, are generally regarded as highly infeasible from a political perspective.

Taking the fiscal high ground is widely considered to be politically dangerous, because legislators would seem likely to suffer at the polls if constituents incur costs (loss of particularistic benefits) that are directly traceable to legisla-

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tors' actions. I find that most legislators rarely, if ever, take the fiscal high ground. Violating the norm of universalism is less dangerous insofar as one's constituents are not affected directly; however, the possibility of indirect negative effects on the district may discourage defection from the logroll. For example, by violating the norm of universalism and opposing others' pork, legislators can alienate colleagues and in turn lose support for their own constituents' particularistic benefits. Thus, defecting from a universalistic logroll may be politically infeasible for members of Congress insofar as it indirectly impedes them from achieving what they need to be reelected. As I find, despite the potential political costs, legislators regularly opt out of the pork-barrel game by supporting termination of other legislators' pork; violations of the norm of universalism are frequent.

This raises questions: Why do reelection-seeking legislators opt out of logrolls, and what are the political consequences of such choices? In this article, I examine the short-run electoral implications of decisions to defect from the vote trades that are at the heart of the pork-barrel game. I find that legislators are sometimes rewarded at the polls for strategic action against other legislators' pork.[1] The results help explain why initially universalistic logrolls come undone and why certain projects and programs at certain times are susceptible to elimination. The results also highlight the complex nature of legislators' responses to electoral motivations. As is commonly thought, participation in logrolls has broad political appeal; however, legislators can also find that defecting from logrolls has its own potential political payoffs.

In the next section, I briefly explain how and why legislators may benefit from taking what appear to be politically infeasible positions. Then I investigate the electoral consequences of taking such positions. In particular, I assess the effects of legislators' roll-call votes on their margins of victory or defeat in the elections that follow such choices. Because legislators cast so many votes per session, the vast majority of their roll calls cannot be expected to have significant electoral effects. However, as I find, certain project and program termination votes were important enough to have significant consequences on election day. Next, I consider why certain roll-call votes—and not others—have significant effects on congressional elections. Finally, I offer a brief conclusion.

Defecting from Logrolls

Members of Congress who seek reelection must constantly engage in activities related to garnering electoral support.[2] David Mayhew identifies three types of

[1] I do not examine whether or not legislators are later punished by their colleagues for such defections; rather, I focus on the short-run electoral costs in order to establish whether legislators have anything to gain from taking the risk of facing future opposition from fellow legislators. For a discussion of the repercussions of defecting from distributive logrolls, see Keith Krehbiel, *Information and Legislative Organization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 49–52.

[2] David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 49.

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activities related to reelection: advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. One way in which position taking occurs, as Mayhew notes, is roll-call voting. The electoral effects of advertising[3] and credit claiming[4] have been widely examined. There is far less research on the relationship between position taking (roll calls) and elections.

One recent notable example of research exploring the electoral consequences of roll calls is Gary Jacobson's study of the politics surrounding deficit reduction legislation in 1990.[5] Studies of this type, however, are few and far between.[6] A related literature considers the electoral consequences of roll calls in terms of campaign contributions rather than election returns.[7] Yet overall, the electoral consequences of position taking have been understudied.

Roll-call votes that would seem to have some of the most interesting effects on electoral success are those where legislators must choose whether or not to impose concentrated costs on certain constituencies.[8] While legislators rarely choose to impose costs on their own constituents, they often opt to impose such costs on other legislators' supporters. Legislators risk losing popular support by imposing such costs. Indeed, by voting against others' pork, legislators alienate colleagues and as a result legislators can lose support for their own districts' electorally valuable pork. In short, there may be political costs associated with violating the norm of universalism.

[3] Albert D. Cover and Bruce S. Brumberg, "Baby Books and Ballots: The Impact of Congressional Mail on Constituency Opinion," *American Political Science Review* 65 (June 1982): 347–359.

[4] Douglas Rivers and Morris P. Fiorina, "Constituency Service, Reputation, and the Incumbency Advantage" in Morris P. Fiorina and David W. Rohde, eds., *Home Style and Washington Work: Sudies of Congressional Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, "Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel," *Journal of Politics* 56 (May 1994): 377–400; Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, *Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and American Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Jason L. Saving, "Deficits, Democrats, and Distributive Benefits: Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel in the 1980s," *Political Research Quarterly* 50 (December 1997): 809–831; Patrick J. Sellers, "Fiscal Consistency and Federal District Spending in Congressional Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (July 1997): 1024–1041.

[5] Gary C. Jacobson, "Deficit-Cutting Politics and Congressional Elections," *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (Fall 1993): 375–402.

[6] Also see, for example, Robert S. Erikson, "The Electoral Impact of Congressional Roll Call Voting," *American Political Science Review* 65 (December 1971): 1018–1032; Gerald C. Wright, Jr., "Candidates' Policy Positions and Voting in U.S. Congressional Elections," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 3 (August 1978): 445–464; George Serra and David Moon, "Casework, Issue Positions, and Voting in Congressional Elections: A District Analysis," *Journal of Politics* 56 (February 1994): 200–213; Gary C. Jacobson, "The 1994 House Elections in Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Summer 1996): 203–223; John Ferejohn, "A Tale of Two Congresses: Social Policy in the Clinton Years" in Margaret Weir, ed., *The Social Divide: Political Parties and the Future of Activist Government* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 49–82.

[7] See, for example, W. P. Welch, "Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports," *Western Political Quarterly* 35 (June 1982): 478–495.

[8] R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

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Alternatively, legislators may gain vote share for imposing such costs if they are evaluated less on their ability to provide pork and more on their reputation for fiscal responsibility. Despite the remarkable political efficiency of the pork-barrel game, there exist electoral incentives (and, of course, policy motivations) for some legislators to opt out. In particular, the benefits of pork are not consistent for all legislators,[9] and there can be alternative political benefits from taking positions that establish a reputation for fiscal responsibility.[10] Legislators regularly choose to take positions against pork-barrel spending in order to fulfill policy objectives, to establish reputations for fiscal responsibility, and to appease fiscally conservative constituencies. Of course, when legislators take a stand against pork, it is generally against projects and programs benefiting other legislators' constituencies and not their own.

When faced with the choice of terminating one's own pork, legislators tend to protect their districts' interests. On occasion, however, legislators do take quite vocal positions against pork for their own district. For example, in 1983 Representative Robert Wise (D-WV) offered an amendment to the fiscal 1984 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill (HR 3132) to delete $26 million for construction of the Stonewall Jackson Dam, slated to be built in Wise's own district. Wise opposed the dam because he believed that less expensive methods of flood control were available and should be considered. Nonetheless, while some legislators like Wise on occasion opt to take the fiscal high ground, even the most consistent deficit hawks tend to protect their own district's pork. This is true even for fiscal conservatives, who have the most to gain from a reputation for fiscal responsibility and tend to have relatively less to gain from diverting federal outlays to their districts.

Table 1 provides a glance at the behavior of legislators faced with the choice of terminating pork that benefits their state or region. I selected the examples in Table 1 from the full set of House floor votes between 1981 and 1994 that propose termination of either Energy and Water or Interior appropriations items. The basis for selection was that the vote must propose to eliminate existing benefits and involve projects or programs that have obvious geographic ties. All votes that meet these criteria are presented in the table.

As shown in Table 1, both Democrats and Republicans rarely chose to support proposals that take pork away from their constituents. Table 1 reports that 100 percent of legislators vote to protect their own pork in every roll call considered except for the 1987 vote regarding the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). In the case of the ARC, 88 percent of legislators chose not to take the fiscal high ground. Legislators are reluctant to opt out of the pork-barrel game if it means imposing direct costs on their constituents. If the evidence presented

[9] See Alvarez and Saving, "Deficits, Democrats, and Distributive Benefits"; and Sellers, "Fiscal Consistency."

[10] See Jacobson, "Deficit-Cutting Politics and Congressional Elections."

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TABLE 1

Percentages of State and Regional Representatives Protecting Their Own Pork from Termination

Termination Proposal	*Percent of State or Regional Democratic Delegation Protecting Own Pork*	*Percent of State or Regional Republican Delegation Protecting Own Pork*
Delete $189 million for Tennessee-Tombigee Waterway (23 July 1981)	100 (5/5 Tennessee Democrats)	100 (3/3 Tennessee Republicans)
Delete $4 million for Garrison Diversion water project, North Dakota (23 July 1981)	100 (1/1 North Dakota Democrats)	—
Delete $228 million for Clinch River Nuclear Breeder Reactor, Tennessee (24 July 1981)	100 (5/5 Tennessee Democrats)	100 (3/3 Tennessee Republicans)
Eliminate Clinch River Nuclear Breeder Reactor, Tennessee (14 December 1982)	100 (5/5 Tennessee Democrats)	100 (2/2 Tennessee Republicans)[1]
Eliminate $83.7 million for Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project (23 July 1986)	—	100 (3/3 Utah Republicans)
Delete $110 million for Appalachian Regional Commission (24 June 1987)	100 (87/87 Appalachian state Democrats)[2]	70 (39/56 Appalachian state Republicans)[3]
Eliminate earmark of $9 million for Magnetohydrodynamics research project at the University of Oklahoma (25 June 1987)	100 (4/4 Oklahoma Democrats)	100 (2/2 Oklahoma Republicans)

[1] Beard did not vote or otherwise make a position known.
[2] Daniel (VA) and Flake, Schumer, and Towns (NY) did not vote or otherwise make a position known.
[3] Gingrich (GA) and Bunning (KY) did not vote or otherwise make a position known.

in Table 1 reflects the typical voting pattern on termination proposals, then it suggests that legislators generally recognize such policies as politically infeasible.[11]

A comparison between Tables 1 and 2 shows that legislators whose constituents do not benefit from a pork-barrel project or program are far more willing to support its termination. That is, as shown in Table 2, the percentage of legislators protecting others' pork generally tends to be far lower than the percentage of legislators protecting their own pork.[12] For example, only 40 percent of non-Tennessee Democrats and only 38 percent of non-Tennessee Republicans

[11] See Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action*, 72–73.

[12] Interestingly and surprisingly, Republican support for the Appalachian Regional Commission was more consistent among non-Appalachian region legislators than among those from Appalachian states.

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TABLE 2

Percentages of Representatives Protecting Others' Pork from Termination

Termination Proposal	*Percent of Members NOT in the Relevant State or Regional Democratic Delegation who Protect that State's or Region's Pork*	*Percent of Members NOT in the Relevant State or Regional Republican Delegation who Protect that State's or Region's Pork*
Delete $189 million for Tennessee-Tombigee Waterway (23 July 1981)	40 (90/233 non-Tennessee Democrats)	38 (67/175 non-Tennessee Republicans)
Delete $4 million for Garrison Diversion water project, North Dakota (23 July 1981)	65 (140/217 non-North Dakota Democrats)	—
Delete $228 million for Clinch River Nuclear Breeder Reactor, Tennessee (24 July 1981)	46 (97/213 non-Tennessee Democrats)	59 (101/171 non-Tennessee Republicans)
Eliminate Clinch River Nuclear Breeder Reactor, Tennessee (14 December 1982)	39 (89/226 non-Tennessee Democrats)	56 (100/180 non-Tennessee Republicans)
Eliminate $83.7 million for Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project (23 July 1986)	—	61 (144/235 non-Utah Republicans)
Delete $110 million for Appalachian Regional Commission (24 June 1987)	96 (154/161 non-Appalachian state Democrats)	90 (36/40 non-Appalachian state Republicans)
Eliminate earmark of $9 million for Magnetohydrodynamics research project at the University of Oklahoma (25 June 1987)	97 (231/239 non-Oklahoma Democrats)	36 (61/168 non-Oklahoma Republicans)

voted to protect funding for the Tennessee project. By contrast, as noted in Table 1, 100 percent of Tennessee's legislators voted to protect the funding. This type of behavior would seem to contradict the logic of universalistic log-rolling, which entails the formation of oversized coalitions in support of a wide variety of pork-barrel projects and programs.

Legislators form universalistic coalitions (that is, support each other's pork) to ensure that their own projects and programs will pass.[13] However, this norm of universalism is not enforceable, especially over time; legislators can defect from vote trades. By defecting from previous vote trades and taking positions against others' pork, legislators risk fostering opposition against their own projects and programs.

[13] Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, "Political Preferences for the Pork-barrel: A Generalization," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (February 1981): 96–111.

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If legislators have less to gain from playing the pork-barrel game and stand to benefit from a reputation for fiscal responsibility, it may be worth the risk. For example, fiscal conservatives may be inclined to take the risk, because they do not benefit from pork-barrel spending in their districts as much as other legislators do. Republicans, who as a group are known for fiscally conservative tendencies, have little if anything to gain from pork-barrel spending in their districts. This finding is based on separate analyses of each party's incumbents' vote shares for the period 1984–1988.[14] Regression results indicate that Democratic incumbents benefit on election day both for new real outlays in the district and new programs for the district, while Republicans do not.

If fiscally conservative legislators can benefit from taking a stand against others' pork, it may be in their interest to risk losing support for their own pork-barrel spending. The central question that remains is whether legislators benefit from taking positions against others' pork.

The Electoral Consequences of Violating the Norm of Universalism

In order to identify the electoral consequences of defecting from logrolls, I examine the effects of key project and program termination votes from 1981 through 1994 on House legislators' electoral fortunes. These votes were selected from a comprehensive list (available from the author upon request) of all termination proposals considered on the House floor between 1981 and 1994 that fall under the Energy and Water and Interior spending categories. I chose these appropriations categories because they account for a large share of the pork-barrel items in the budget. Moreover, the pork in these two categories tends to be the most controversial.

The only votes omitted from the comprehensive list were those proposing to terminate new authorizations or appropriations. The reason for omitting these cases is that benefits have not yet been doled out, and therefore no benefits are being revoked (that is, concentrated costs are, as of yet, unobservable). The remaining cases are the set of roll-call votes that propose to eliminate spending for an existing project or program. When legislators are faced with the choice of eliminating such spending, they are faced with the dilemma of whether or not to impose concentrated costs (revoke local or group benefits) in favor of diffuse benefits (reduction in government spending and, in turn, the need for tax revenue). In other words, legislators must choose between either playing the pork-barrel game or taking a position of fiscal responsibility.

I employ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis in order to conduct a quantitative test of the hypothesis that porkbusting on roll calls can result in electoral benefits for incumbent legislators. This statistical

[14] Alvarez and Saving, "Deficits, Democrats, and Distributive Benefits," 824–825; also see Sellers, "Fiscal Consistency."

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method facilitates empirical estimation of the impact of incumbent legislators' termination roll-call decisions (the key explanatory variables) on election returns (the dependent variable to be explained), while controlling for the effects of other factors that tend to affect House election outcomes. Regression coefficients that correspond with each roll call represent the estimated change in incumbent share of the two-party vote that results from an "aye" vote regarding a given termination proposal considered on the House floor. Whether these estimates reach conventional levels of statistical significance is reported in the text.

The dependent variable in the analysis is measured as the incumbent's share of the two-party vote in legislator *i*'s district during year *t*. In order to control for the effects of partisan affiliation, I analyze Democratic and Republican incumbents separately for each election. The key explanatory variables are the legislator's choices on termination roll-call votes from year *t* and year *t-1* (the roll-call votes from the two sessions of Congress preceding the election).

In order to isolate the effects of the legislators' roll-call votes on their electoral fortunes, I control for a series of factors that are known to affect incumbent vote share. In particular, I control for the legislator's electoral security, district partisanship, incumbent and challenger spending, and challenger quality. In addition, I control for the legislator's overall voting record in order to isolate the effects of the particular termination votes under examination.

In sum, I posit that legislators' electoral fortunes take the following general form:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{INCUMBENT VOTE SHARE} = (\alpha &+ \beta_1 \text{ Electoral Security} \\ &+ \beta_2 \text{ District Partisanship} \\ &+ \beta_3 \text{ Incumbent Spending} \\ &+ \beta_4 \text{ Challenger Spending} \\ &+ \beta_5 \text{ Challenger Quality} \\ &+ \beta_6 \text{ Voting Record} \\ &+ \beta_7 \text{ TERMINATE} + \varepsilon).\end{aligned}$$

TERMINATE represents a legislator's decision of whether or not to terminate an existing project or program. TERMINATE is a dummy variable where a vote in favor of termination is coded 1 and a vote against termination is coded 0. If the legislator faces multiple termination choices in a given Congress, I consider each vote as a separate explanatory variable in the model. I conduct this analysis for each Congress from the 97th (1981-1982) through the 103rd (1993–1994).

Electoral Security is operationalized as the legislator's margin of victory in the last election. District Partisanship is operationalized as the Democratic candidate's share of the two-party vote in the previous presidential election. In or-

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der to control for the effects of incumbent spending and challenger spending, following Jacobson's seminal work on money in elections, I include the natural logarithm of both dollar amounts as separate independent variables in the model.[15] As Jacobson argues, the advantage of using the natural logarithm of expenditures for empirical analysis of elections is that doing so avoids the assumption of a linear relationship between money and votes, thereby accounting for diminishing returns from campaign spending. Challenger quality is operationalized as a dummy variable coded 1 if the candidate has previously held elected office, 0 otherwise. This coding also follows Jacobson's classic study that views prior electoral success as a proxy for candidate quality.[16]

In order to operationalize the Voting Record variable, I use Poole-Rosenthal D-NOMINATE scores,[17] constructed via scaling techniques that use legislators' entire roll-call records to measure ideology. They provide summary statistics of legislators' overall voting tendencies on the traditional liberal-conservative economic dimension. D-NOMINATE scores for legislators range from -1 to 1, with low scores indicating policy liberalism and high scores indicating policy conservatism.

The electoral consequences of termination votes are in tables available from the author. The electoral effects of the control variables are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. I do not present regression analysis for the 1984 congressional election because there were no Energy and Water or Interior termination votes during the 98th Congress (1983–1984).

Most of the termination roll-call votes under investigation here have no significant effect on electoral outcomes. This is not terribly surprising, because legislators cast hundreds of roll-call votes every session of Congress and only a fraction of those votes can become large enough issues to play a role in the election. However, it is important to note that a significant number of termination votes in the 1980s and early 1990s proved to be controversial, became important political issues and in turn had significant effects on congressional elections. These votes often have significant electoral consequences, not because voters are necessarily aware of the legislators' choices on obscure roll-call votes but because legislators' roll-call behavior affects the actions of political elites, which in turn affects voters' choices.

The regression results highlight seven different termination votes from the Energy and Water and Interior spending categories that played significant roles in electoral politics. A review of the politics surrounding each of these key votes

[15] See Gary C. Jacobson, *Money in Congressional Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 40.

[16] Ibid., 106–107. For a dissenting view on how to measure challenger quality, see Donald Philip Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, "Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (November 1988): 884–907.

[17] Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

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helps explain why certain termination proposals seem to have significant electoral implications and how position taking can affect incumbents' vote share. In brief, the seven roll-call votes have significant electoral effects because their controversial nature makes them symbolic of legislators' fiscal preferences. When termination votes take on this symbolism, they are often included in interest group ratings, which in turn can affect whether legislators receive valuable electoral resources—such as endorsements—that help determine incumbent success on election day.

All seven roll-call votes identified here as having significant electoral effects were featured in the calculation of one or more renowned congressional ratings that serve as heuristics regarding incumbents and guide endorsements. Specifically, all seven roll calls are included in the computation of National Taxpayer Union scores, and some also appear in scores compiled by Citizens Against Government Waste and the American Conservative Union.[18] The widely recognized importance of heuristics and endorsements in voter decision making[19] helps explain the empirical link I identify between relatively obscure House roll calls and election outcomes. For example, if an interest group picks up on a key roll call that affects its endorsements, and those endorsements affect voter choice, there exists a relationship—albeit indirect—between legislative roll-call behavior and election outcomes.

Accolades from interest groups, such as the Taxpayer Hero award from Citizens Against Government Waste, which is based on the group's "waste vote" ratings, are generally coveted by legislators and regularly included in legislators' campaign materials, speeches, and press releases. For example, a 1998 press release from the office of Republican Congressman Ed Royce reports on the Californian legislator's Taxpayer Hero status.[20] Similarly, Congressman Brad Sherman's (D-CA) home page on the Internet includes a press release regarding the congressman's relatively high fiscal ratings from the National Taxpayers Union.[21]

The fact that legislators often attempt to call attention to such scores (and even in some cases to specific roll-call votes) when they are favorable suggests that they perceive associated electoral benefits. Challengers, of course, often call attention to unfavorable ratings of incumbents. Moreover, publicity about vote scores helps explain the link that I identify between roll calls and elections when citizens tend to have relatively little information on the day-to-day operations of Congress. Roll-call records can become salient in elections if interest

[18] Details on the methodology behind how specific roll calls are weighted in Citizens Against Government Waste, National Taxpayers Union, and American Conservative Union ratings are available from the author upon request, or directly from the respective group websites: http://www.cagw.org, http://www.ntu.org, and http://www.conservative.org.

[19] See, for example, Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[20] Available at http://www.housegov/royce/taxpayerheroaward.html.

[21] http://www.housegov/sherman/press/pr980729.htm.

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groups, the media, or the candidates themselves publicize them in the course of campaigns. I now turn to a review of the politics surrounding the seven electorally significant termination roll calls in order to help explain why political elites are inclined to take notice of and react to legislative decisions regarding certain program termination proposals.

Clinch River Breeder Reactor, July 1981

The only Energy and Water or Interior termination roll-call vote that appears to have had any significant electoral impact from 1981 through 1985 is the proposal by Lawrence Coughlin (R-PA) in July 1981 to terminate the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. This controversial project, initially authorized in 1970, was intended to produce nuclear fuel and provide the Tennessee Valley Authority with electricity for distribution. Critics, however, argued that the breeder reactor, which was to be built on the Clinch River near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, was not justified on economic grounds as it would be a costly enterprise that would quickly become obsolete.[22] The 1981 *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* reports that Representative Claudine Schneider (R-RI), a member of the House Science Committee, referred to the Clinch River project as a "total hoax."[23]

Opposition to the Clinch River project came from a unique coalition of fiscal conservatives and environmentalists—two groups who saw termination of Clinch River as a common means to their different ends. For fiscal conservatives, terminating Clinch River was an opportunity to take a stand against wasteful government spending. For environmentalists, terminating Clinch River was an opportunity to prevent the growth of a commercial Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) industry whose long-run environmental effects were still unclear. Many liberal Democrats who generally protect pork-barrel projects were anxious to terminate Clinch River, presumably on the basis of its questionable environmental impact.

How did these liberal Democrats fare in the 1982 election as a result of their efforts against Clinch River in July of 1981? Democrats who voted in favor of Coughlin's proposal to terminate Clinch River received a significantly higher vote share than those who opposed the amendment ($p<0.05$, two-tailed test). The coefficient indicates that the estimated effect of voting to terminate Clinch River, controlling for a variety of factors, was a hefty 3 percent gain in vote share for Democrats.

Of course, there are limits to who can benefit from taking a stand against pork. For example, Democrats from the state of Tennessee presumably viewed termination of Clinch River as politically infeasible because it would have imposed concentrated costs on their state's constituents. All five Democratic rep-

[22] For a detailed discussion of the economics of Clinch River, see Linda R. Cohen and Roger G. Noll, *The Technology Pork Barrel* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991).

[23] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington, DC: 1981), 301.

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resentatives from Tennessee (Marilyn Bouquard, Al Gore, Bill Boner, Ed Jones, and Harold Ford) voted against terminating Clinch River, while a majority of Democrats from states other than Tennessee favored Coughlin's amendment (116 ayes, 97 nays). Even Al Gore, a vocal environmentalist, was unwilling to impose concentrated costs on his own state's constituents in favor of environmental objectives. Such opposition to the termination of popular pork-barrel projects contributed to the ultimate defeat of Coughlin's proposal: 186-206 (R 70-104, D 116-102).

The cases of Gore and his fellow representatives from Tennessee highlight both the resilience of the pork-barrel game and the limits of position taking as a strategy for reelection. Ultimately, as R. Douglas Arnold contends, taking certain positions may be politically infeasible if the policies impose concentrated costs on one's own constituents.[24] However, as shown in Table 2, legislators often view policies that impose concentrated costs on other legislators' constituents as politically feasible; moreover, legislators are sometimes rewarded for violating the norm of universalism in this way. This has important implications for how we think about vote trading and logrolling in Congress. In particular, there may be clear limits to the types of logs that legislators are willing to roll, even if this means fostering opposition against one's own pork down the road. For example, liberals may be unwilling to support logrolls packed with spending items that are environmentally suspect.

Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project, July 1986

In July 1986, Congressman Thomas Petri (R-WI) offered an amendment to the Fiscal 1987 Energy and Water Appropriations bill (HR 5162) that proposed to eliminate the $83.7 million in funds for continued construction of the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project. The purpose of the unit, a multibillion dollar water supply project under construction since the mid-1960s, was to address water shortage problems in the Salt Lake County area. Republican budget cutters targeted the Bonneville Unit's federal funding for elimination, arguing that the federal government had already poured more than $20 billion into the project and it was time for a new local cost-sharing plan to be implemented so that beneficiaries pay more for the benefits they receive.

Rising in support of the amendment, Representative Dick Armey (R-TX) offered comments on the House floor suggesting that elimination of the $83 million for the Bonneville Unit was ". . . a better alternative than risking further sequestering under Gramm-Rudman and further reductions in the cost of living to our Federal retirees and our military retirees and further across-the-board cuts for all programs of Federal spending with few exceptions. . . ."[25] Armey's comments were intended to show that the decision about spending on the

[24] Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action.*

[25] *Congressional Record*, vol.132, no. 96, 23 July 1986.

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Bonneville Unit was not only about the merits of the project itself but also about budgeting priorities at a time when deficit spending was a primary concern. Petri's amendment was endorsed by the National Taxpayers Union, a lobbying group interested in curbing government spending, signifying both its broader implications for fiscal policy making and its electoral salience.

Despite Armey's effort to frame the Bonneville Unit as a budget deficit issue and despite an endorsement for the Petri amendment from the National Taxpayers Union, most members of Congress continued to play the pork-barrel game. Only 149 members voted in favor of Petri's amendment, while 262 opposed it (R 58-115, D 91-147). Were supporters of Petri's amendment rewarded on election day for violating the norm of universalism in favor of fiscal responsibility? The regression results indicate that Republican legislators who voted with Petri did significantly better in the 1986 House elections than those who opposed the termination amendment ($p<0.01$, two-tailed test). Specifically, the estimated effect of voting to eliminate the Bonneville Unit was approximately a 2 percent increase in vote margin for Republicans, all else constant.

Democrats who supported Petri's amendment were not punished. The estimated effect of the Petri amendment vote is indistinguishable from zero for Democrats.

Appalachian Regional Commission, June 1987

The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), originally conceived under the leadership of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and implemented in 1965, was intended to facilitate economic development in the thirteen states of Appalachia—West Virginia, Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. A primary function of the ARC was to fund a variety of public works projects, most notably highway development. Even as early as 1975 ". . . some regarded the whole program as unnecessary. . . . They categorized the ARC as a 'pork-barrel' giveaway program, a mere tool of the politicians who had created it."[26] Thus, it is not surprising that the ARC has come under attack from fiscal conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, cutting back or terminating the ARC is a perfect opportunity for position taking against distributive government spending.

In 1987, Representative Robert Smith (R-NH) offered an amendment on the House floor to terminate the ARC. A classic Democratic public works program in the tradition of the New Deal and Great Society, the ARC was vigorously defended by Democrats in the House. 241 Democrats voted to protect the ARC in 1987, while only seven Democrats voted to terminate it.[27] Not sur-

[26] Michael Bradshaw, *The Appalachian Regional Commission: Twenty-Five Years of Government Policy* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1992), 64.

[27] The seven Democratic opponents of ARC funding were Jim Bates (D-CA), Joseph Brennan (D-ME), Thomas Carper (D-DE), Sam Gibbons (D-FL), Timothy Penny (D-MN), Jim Slattery (D-KS), and Charles Stenholm (D-TX).

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prisingly, none of the Democrats who voted to terminate the ARC were from Appalachian region states. Therefore, consistent with the Tennessee delegation's support of Clinch River in 1981, Democrats in the Appalachian region were unwilling to impose concentrated costs on their constituents. The seven pro-termination Democrats were willing to take a position against the pork-barrel as long as their constituents were not directly affected. In so doing, they violated the norm of universalism that so often underlies the pork-barrel game.

While these seven Democrats were not conservative from a chamber-wide perspective, they were significantly more conservative than the average Democrat. The mean D-NOMINATE score among legislators who voted to protect the ARC was −0.25, while the mean D-NOMINATE score was −0.08 for the seven who voted to terminate the ARC. A simple t-test shows that the difference of these means is significant at the 0.01 level. In short, those Democratic legislators who supported termination of the ARC were among the fiscal conservatives of their party, taking a stance against pork-barrel spending. Interestingly, one of the seven pro-termination Democrats—Timothy Penny (D-MN)—is no longer in office and has since served as a fellow in fiscal policy studies at the Cato Institute, a fiscally conservative think tank in Washington, DC.[28] In this capacity, Penny has become a vocal critic of "wasteful" government spending by Democrats and Republicans alike.[29]

Constituents in Appalachia may be impressed with a legislator's reputation for fiscal responsibility, as long as it does not come at their own expense. This is evident in the inconsistent electoral impact of the ARC vote, depending on whether legislators represent Appalachian states. While there is no effect for the ARC vote on Democratic or Republican electoral fortunes in general, Appalachian Republicans did experience electoral repercussions relating to their choice on the Smith proposal that received significant attention in regional politics.[30]

Republicans from ARC states faced a significant *loss* ($p<0.05$, two-tailed test) in vote share if they chose fiscal responsibility over the particular interests of their region. These negative electoral consequences of taking the fiscal high ground suggest that solidifying a reputation for fiscal responsibility is a feasible strategy only if it does not impose concentrated costs on one's own constituents. In the end, pro-termination Republicans from Appalachian states not only lost vote share, they also failed to achieve the goal of eliminating the ARC. Smith's termination proposal was defeated handily by a substantial margin of 82-337 (R 75-96, D 7-241).

[28] See Tim Penny and Stephen Moore, "The Spending Bug Crosses the Aisle," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 November 1997.

[29] Also see Timothy J. Penny and Major Garrett, *Common Cents: A Retiring Six-Term Congressman Reveals How Congress Really Works—and What We Must Do to Fix It* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1999).

[30] See, for example, Michael York, "Rogers Wins Fight to Keep ARC Funding," *Lexington Herald-Leader*, 25 June 1987.

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Magnetohydrodynamics Program, University of Oklahoma, June 1987

Many have observed that ". . . the organization of Congress meets remarkably well the electoral needs of its members."[31] For example, the committee system enables legislators to specialize in certain policy areas[32] and to use that specialization to generate particularistic benefits for their districts.[33] By using the political process to generate particularistic benefits, legislators create opportunities for credit claiming.

However, "Particularism also has its position-taking side. On occasion, members capture public attention by denouncing the allocation process itself. . . ."[34] That is, instead of playing the pork-barrel game and seeking pork for which they can claim credit, legislators sometimes choose to condemn the process by which pork is distributed. By taking this position, legislators can establish a reputation for fiscal responsibility that may bolster their electoral prospects more than pork itself.[35] Representative Robert S. Walker (R-PA), for example, became widely known as the "archenemy of pork" due to his efforts to eliminate distributive spending and prohibit earmarking of unauthorized funds.

In 1987, Walker sought to take a stand against the common practice whereby legislators circumvent the authorizing process by going directly to the House floor to secure appropriations for unauthorized projects. One target of Walker's attack against unauthorized earmarks was the magnetohydrodynamics project at the University of Oklahoma. Walker objected to the inclusion of an earmark for $9 million in the fiscal year 1988 Interior Appropriations bill that would fund construction on the energy research project in Oklahoma. The basis of Walker's objection stemmed from a concern over funding scientific research that had neither been considered by House authorizing committees nor subjected to any peer review process.

Walker's amendment provided fiscal conservatives with an opportunity to take a stand not only against pork-barrel spending but also against the process that facilitates the procurement of pork. Of course, supporting Walker's amendment also meant imposing concentrated costs on Oklahoman constituents. Moreover, supporting the amendment to terminate federal funds for the Oklahoma research project meant risking opposition against one's own earmarks for 1988 and future fiscal years. Theories of coalition building in Congress describe the incentives that legislators face when considering distributive benefits for other legislators' constituencies; opposing someone else's pork may be

[31] Mayhew, *Congress*, 81.
[32] Krehbiel, *Information and Legislative Organization*.
[33] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973).
[34] Mayhew, *Congress*, 91.
[35] Sellers, "Fiscal Consistency."

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equivalent to opposing your own.[36] Thus, legislators were left with the choice of pursuing a credit-claiming strategy by favoring the provision of particularistic benefits or pursuing a position-taking strategy by opposing unauthorized, particularistic federal spending.

Republican legislators were divided over which strategy was most appropriate for themselves. While 107 Republicans supported Walker's termination amendment, 63 opposed elimination of the Oklahoma project. Among those who opposed elimination and opted to play the pork-barrel game were Representatives James Inhofe and Mickey Edwards, the two Republican members of the Oklahoma delegation. For them, supporting termination was politically infeasible because it meant imposing concentrated costs on their own constituents. But for other Republicans, supporting termination was not politically infeasible; and for fiscally conservative Republicans, voting to eliminate the $9 million earmark was an opportunity for position taking against pork-barrel politics.

Were those Republicans who chose the position-taking route rewarded for doing so? Republicans who voted with Walker did significantly better in the 1988 House elections than those who opposed the termination amendment ($p<0.05$, one-tailed test). Walker's amendment failed (115-298); however, the Republicans who voted in favor of their amendment were still rewarded at the polls for taking the position against unauthorized pork.

Superconducting Super Collider, May 1991

The Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) project, initiated by the federal government in 1988, was an $8 billion venture to build the world's largest atom smasher. The plans for the project called for digging a 54-mile oval tunnel in Waxahachie, Texas that would enable scientists to accelerate particles with superconducting magnets and produce high-speed collisions. First estimated at a cost of $5 billion, by 1991 the project was expected to cost taxpayers more than $8 billion. Representative Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY), in comments on the House floor regarding the SSC's increasing cost estimates, noted that "The way developments are occurring, the SSC will make the infamous $600 toilet seat look like a bargain."[37]

Due to its astronomically high and rising costs and questioned scientific merit, the SSC faced increasing opposition from members of Congress. In 1989, 93 members of Congress cast roll-call votes supporting termination of the SSC. By 1991, the number of SSC critics had increased, as 165 members of Congress

[36] See Barry R. Weingast, "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (May 1979): 245–262; Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, "Political Preferences"; Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, are Not Organized as Markets," *Journal of Political Economy* 96 (January 1988): 132–163.

[37] *Congressional Record*, vol. 137, no. 81, 29 May 1991.

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supported an amendment to the Fiscal 1992 Energy and Water Appropriations bill (HR 2427) to eliminate all funding for the Texas particle accelerator project. However, this 1991 termination amendment, offered by Representative Jim Slattery (D-KS), was rejected 165-251 (R 58-101, D 106-150), demonstrating the powerful political appeal of pork-barrel spending projects.

As a result of the high levels of deficit spending in the 1980s, fiscal responsibility became an increasingly important political theme in the early 1990s. The SSC's high cost and questionable merit made it a natural target for members of Congress seeking to control deficits by cutting outlays. To what extent were supporters of Slattery's amendment rewarded for actively working to cut pork-barrel spending? Democratic legislators who voted with Slattery did significantly better in the 1992 House elections than those who opposed the termination amendment ($p<0.05$, one-tailed test). While the estimates suggest that the vote had no significant effect for Republicans, voting to eliminate the SSC in 1991 resulted in an estimated 2 percent increase in vote margin for Democrats, all else constant.

It would seem that legislators took notice of the positive electoral consequences of violating the norm of universalism by supporting termination of the SSC. Subsequent efforts to kill the SSC received even higher levels of support, as more and more members of Congress sought to develop reputations for fiscal responsibility rather than play the pork-barrel game. House floor votes in 1992 and 1993 comparable to Slattery's 1991 termination amendment received 232 and 280 votes of support respectively. The political appeal of the Texas pork-barrel project was eventually overshadowed by its reputation as wasteful government spending, and after a lengthy procedural battle, members of Congress finally terminated spending on the SSC in 1993.

National Endowment for the Arts, June 1991

The National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) is a popular target for termination among fiscally conservative budget cutters. Criticisms of NEA funding are based on a variety of grounds. For example, some question whether the government should be involved in the arts. Another concern raised by NEA critics is that NEA funds are akin to pork-barrel spending insofar as certain local constituencies tend to benefit at the expense of all taxpayers.

In floor debate over a 1991 amendment to eliminate NEA funding, Representative Philip Crane (R-IL), who offered the amendment, noted that "When you look at the breakdown of where the money went last year, that is also quite interesting, because the State of New York got more money total than the States of California, Texas, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio combined."[38] Cutting NEA funding is not only a strongly symbolic political stance relating

[38] Congressional Record, vol. 137, no. 99, 25 June 1991.

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to the appropriate scope of government but also an effort to cut back on a certain type of distributive pork-barrel spending.

Efforts to eliminate the NEA tend to be controversial and generate a fair amount of public attention, and therefore we might expect decisions that legislators make regarding NEA funding to have electoral consequences. In 1991, only 12 of 262 Democrats supported Crane's amendment to terminate the NEA (rejected, 66-361: R 54-110, D 12-250, I 0-1). For these Democratic legislators to take a position that clearly departed from the party line, they must have had substantial electoral incentives. The twelve anti-NEA Democrats were significantly more conservative than their copartisans and tended to come from southern states.[39] The mean D-NOMINATE score for the twelve anti-NEA Democrats in 1991 was −0.08, while the rest of the Democratic contingent was significantly more liberal with an average D-NOMINATE score of −0.44. A simple t-test shows that the difference between these means is significant at the 0.001 level. Relatively conservative Democrats take less interest in and face less electoral pressure to support federal funding for the arts.

To what extent, if any, were the twelve anti-NEA Democrats affected on election day as a result of their strategic votes on Crane's 1991 amendment? They did significantly better than their copartisans in the 1992 House elections as a result of their position against the NEA ($p<0.05$, one-tailed test). In this case, legislators were rewarded for violating the norm of universalism and taking a stand that solidified their reputations for fiscal responsibility.

National Biological Survey, June 1994

The National Biological Survey (now known as the Biological Resources Division) was created in 1993 to track population levels for species of plants and animals that were on the verge of being threatened or endangered. This agency within the Interior Department was immediately controversial, as many expressed concern that the survey would ". . . be used to expand the reach of the endangered species law and restrict property rights if scientists determined endangered or threatened species lived on privately owned land."[40] Given fears over the potential implications of the National Biological Survey (NBS) for property rights, it was a natural target for termination by Republican House members. Representative Wayne Allard (R-CO) took the lead against NBS funding, sponsoring an amendment to abolish the agency and terminate the $167.2 million allocated in fiscal 1995.

[39] Stenholm (D-TX), Laughlin (D-TX), Hutto (D-FL), Hayes (D-LA), Parker (D-MS), Hall (D-TX), Bennett (D-FL), Taylor (D-MS), Sarpaliu (D-TX), and Tanner (D-TN) came from southern states. Only Luken (D-OH) and Condit (D-CA) among the anti-NEA Democrats came from non-southern states.

[40] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), 515.

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Aside from the substance of the bill, Allard's House floor statements show that he took issue with the NBS appropriation due to the process by which it was determined:

> The Interior appropriations bill contains $167.2 million in funds for the NBS. Every nickel of this money is appropriated in violation of the rules of this House. Once again however, the handy work of the Rules Committee has been called upon to waive all points of order concerning unauthorized appropriations. This happens time after time. It makes a mockery of the rules of this House, and it exposes the futility of the Budget Act in the battle to achieve deficit reduction. While the Rules Committee has made it difficult for us to enforce the rules of the House, it has not made it impossible. My amendment would strike the unauthorized funds.[41]

While not a classic localized pork-barrel project, the NBS qualifies as pork under criteria specified by congressional porkbusters who condemn unauthorized appropriations.[42] Allard's criticism of the process generating NBS spending is quite similar to Walker's crusade in 1987 against unauthorized earmarks for research and development programs.

While Walker focused primarily on process, Allard's argument on the House floor for his amendment also heavily emphasized the substance of the program in question:

> . . . there is a reason why the Secretary of Interior wants this National Biological Survey so badly. It deals with much more than merely counting the number of plants and animals. This is a power grab, and it is a back door attempt to expand the sweep of the Endangered Species Act prior to its reauthorization. The National Biological Survey empowers bureaucrats and environmental crusaders. I believe that it marks another milestone on the road to diminished private property rights. The data collected is not going to sit in a file drawer somewhere, it is going to be used to justify vast restrictions on the rights of property owners. At least 60 percent of this country's land base is owned by private individuals. In order to inventory the entire Nation's resources, private property rights will be compromised.[43]

Allard's proposal gave Republican House members an opportunity not only to take a stand against pork in the form of unauthorized appropriations but also to protect citizens from government interference with private property. In short, Allard's amendment provided an opportunity to take a position as a fiscal conservative with laissez-faire ideals. Consequently, 128 Republicans took advantage of this opportunity by supporting Allard's proposal. However, 48 Republicans did not go along with Allard. What were the electoral consequences of this choice?

The estimated effect for Republicans who voted to terminate the NBS is a dramatic 3 percent gain in vote share, all else constant ($p<0.05$, two-tailed test). Given the ways in which terminating the NBS reflected core Republican values, it is not surprising that GOP legislators were rewarded by their constituents for taking this action.

[41] *Congressional Record*, vol. 40, no. 180, 22 July 1994.

[42] Available at http://www.senategov/nmccain/porkbar.htm.

[43] *Congressional Record*, vol. 40, no. 180, 22 July 1994.

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Discussion

Reflecting on the cases of termination votes, it is important to evaluate how meaningful the findings are on at least two levels. First, are the significant results simply Type I errors or are they based on systematic consequences of roll-call voting for elections? Second, how can we explain the significant effects of some roll calls and not others, given the large volume of roll calls legislators consider in one year and given citizens' general lack of awareness of legislators' decisions?

Given the law of large numbers, the nature of the standard normal distribution, and the convention of a 95 percent confidence interval, one could imagine that at least 5 percent of the coefficients on termination votes considered in these regressions could be significant simply by chance; if this were true, there would be little substantive meaning to the statistically significant results that we observe regarding the impact of roll-call votes on elections. However, approximately 15 percent (7 out of 46) of the coefficients for termination votes considered here are positive and significant for either Democrats' or Republicans' electoral fortunes—three times the 5 percent we might expect simply due to chance alone. Therefore, we can be confident that more than chance is at work when we observe some termination votes—and not others—having a significant, positive effect.

I have one final note on how confident we can be that the estimated effects presented here are systematic and not simply due to chance: according to the evidence presented here, voting to eliminate government projects, programs, or agencies that affect others' districts (violating the norm of universalism) only helps legislators on election day; it never hurts them. If the significant results were simply produced by chance, then one would expect to get significant results with either positive or negative coefficients. But the results consistently show legislators enjoying short-run electoral benefits when they violate the norm of universalism and take a position of fiscal responsibility. This further reinforces the idea that the significant effects of termination politics are systematic in a way that is consistent with recent research on the nuances of the pork-barrel game.

Why are legislators occasionally rewarded on election day for taking stands against relatively minor appropriations? In brief, there appear to be two necessary conditions for termination votes to have observable electoral consequences. First, the vote must be at least somewhat controversial. There cannot be a broad consensus over whether or not the project or program in question should be terminated. Second, the vote must be symbolic of legislators' fiscal preferences in the eyes of either interest groups, constituents, or challengers. It is important to note that while these two conditions may be necessary, they are not sufficient to produce observable electoral consequences.

If a project or program being considered for termination is not controversial, there is unlikely to be any significant variation in legislative behavior.

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Without such variation, a roll call is unlikely to have a significant observable electoral effect. For example, suppose that 100 percent of legislators cast roll-calls in favor of a termination proposal. The vote cannot have any observable electoral repercussions, since legislators who were willing to opt out of the pork-barrel game in this instance were not really setting themselves apart from their colleagues. Everyone was violating universalism in this case.

The termination proposals under examination here were at least minimally controversial in the sense that none received unanimous support or near-unanimous opposition (that is, everyone opposes, aside from the member offering the rollcall). However, even controversial votes may have no observable significant effect on elections. For controversial termination votes to have observable electoral consequences, they must also be seen as symbolic of legislators' policy preferences. If votes carry this sort of symbolism, they can serve as useful heuristics for interest groups and constituents as they evaluate legislators. As R. Douglas Arnold notes, when roll-call votes become heuristics in this way, they can have important electoral effects: ". . . legislators need to watch the general patterns they create as well as the individual positions they take. Interest groups in Washington compile and publish ratings of legislators to show how friendly or unfriendly individual legislators are to the causes they promote."[44] If interest groups offer endorsements on the basis of these ratings and if these endorsements prove influential, then controversial termination votes can have significant direct or indirect effects on elections. Whether or not legislators receive endorsements and other electoral resources often hinges on how they act on these symbolic issues.

The results presented in this article show that certain controversial, politicized roll calls have a significant impact on legislators' vote shares. It is remarkable to find such results since, as David Mayhew notes, ". . . most roll-call positions considered in isolation are not likely to cause much of a ripple at home."[45] Of course, consistent with Mayhew's expectations, the vast majority of termination votes during the period under consideration here have no observable consequences for congressional elections. The challenge for future research is to identify not only necessary but also sufficient conditions for a given roll-call vote to have observable electoral effects.

Many of the votes that appear to be quite controversial and symbolic of fiscal preferences (for example, the SP-100 Space Reactor program) have no observable electoral consequences. It is not immediately clear what issues like the Space Reactor lack in terms of electoral relevance; thus, it is important to examine what makes termination votes distinct from one another in order to determine why some and not others are electorally significant after controlling for a wide variety of factors.

In sum, the relationship between porkbusting votes—all roll calls for that matter—and electoral outcomes is quite complex; the effects of the votes on

[44] Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action*, 80.

[45] Mayhew, *Congress*, 66.

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the outcomes may be direct, indirect, or nonexistent depending on the context. Future research is needed to investigate broader sets of roll calls and elections in order to specify the conditions under which House voting behavior impacts incumbent margins of victory or defeat.

Conclusion

Growing budget deficits in the 1980s and early 1990s generated strong political pressures for Congress to resist the temptations of the pork-barrel game and instead pursue fiscally responsible spending levels. While all legislators are in favor of the idea of cutting "wasteful" government spending, each legislator has a different conception of what is wasteful. As a result, it is rare for legislators to arrive at unanimous agreement in support of proposals to terminate government projects, programs, or agencies. What one legislator sees as pork is seen by another as good public policy. There are political forces that limit the Congress's capacity to be fiscally responsible. But, as the results presented here show, this is only part of the story. Other political forces actually support Congress's pursuit of fiscal responsibility.

I find that in some instances legislators are rewarded for defecting from the pork-barrel game and taking a position of fiscal responsibility. Legislators can enjoy electoral benefits (endorsements) that translate into votes as a result of their choices to cut pork rather than procure it. Moreover, when legislators make strategic choices to cut others' pork rather than their own, they are never punished in the short run at the polls for taking a position of fiscal responsibility. The results presented here provide a new piece to the puzzle of how electoral incentives affect fiscal policy making. Political pressures for fiscal responsibility can be as strong as those driving legislators to focus on particular benefits for constituents.*

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Appendix

Effects of Control Variables on House Elections, 1982–1994 (excluding 1984)

	1982 House Elections		1986 House Elections		1988 House Elections		1990 House Elections		1992 House Elections		1994 House Elections	
Variables	*Dems.*	*Reps.*	*Dems.*	*Reps.*	*Dems.*	*Reps.*	*Dems.*	*Reps.*	*Dems.*	*Reps.*	*Dems.*	*Reps.*
Constant	108.99***	173.44***	64.85***	86.09***	60.48***	112.31***	58.43***	89.31***	91.97***	116.02***	35.76**	119.48***
	(8.01)	(9.20)	(9.88)	(12.21)	(8.57)	(8.29)	(11.00)	(14.79)	(9.41)	(11.81)	(12.43)	(10.33)
D-NOMINATE	3.10	−2.66	6.46*	−8.31**	2.57	−10.06***	5.47	−4.93	−8.79*	1.12	0.66	−5.54
	(3.28)	(3.90)	(3.29)	(3.04)	(2.98)	(3.00)	(3.19)	(3.46)	(4.15)	(4.44)	(3.17)	(3.20)
Dem. Pres. Vote (Previous Election)	0.07	−0.28***	0.18**	−0.19*	0.27***	−0.21	0.28***	−0.01	0.10	−0.06	0.31	−0.17*
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Previous margin	0.17**	0.10*	0.35***	0.29***	0.32***	0.19***	0.24**	0.20*	0.23***	0.10	0.35***	−0.20**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Incumbent Spending	−1.08*	−5.16***	−0.06	−0.01	−0.40	−1.89***	−0.38*	−1.21	−1.79**	−2.02***	0.92	−1.09
	(0.56)	(0.68)	(0.66)	(0.79)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.71)	(0.85)	(0.66)	(0.45)	(0.81)	(0.84)
Challenger Spending	−3.80***	−2.72***	−2.16***	−2.89***	−1.94***	−2.20***	−1.52***	−2.22***	−2.56***	−2.69*	−2.51***	−1.90***
	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.40)	(0.86)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Challenger Quality	0.12	−2.41*	−2.92	−1.42**	−2.37	−1.14	−2.85*	−1.72	−1.14	−3.36*	−2.04	−2.19
	(1.24)	(1.15)	(1.22)	(1.03)	(1.27)	(1.02)	(1.45)	(1.65)	(1.36)	(1.65)	(1.10)	(1.24)
Representing an Appalachian State	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	−0.95	2.52						
					(0.83)	(1.08)						
R^2	0.74	0.73	0.67	0.76	0.70	0.73	0.54	0.50	0.55	0.49	0.79	0.67
Number of cases	123	121	170	141	176	134	196	117	171	103	160	107

Note: the coefficients are OLS estimates; the dependent variable is the incumbent's share of the two-party House vote for the election in question.

* $p<0.05$, two-tailed test; ** $p<0.01$, two-tailed test; *** $p<0.001$, two-tailed test.

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

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Issue Positions of Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. House, 1998: A Research Note

SCOT SCHRAUFNAGEL
JEFFERY J. MONDAK

Students of Congress have devoted considerable effort to assessing the relative ideological and issue positions of Democratic and Republican legislators. The significance of these questions is self-evident, as effective representation requires both that representatives from competing parties offer distinct positions and that those differences be sufficiently transparent for voters to hold a party's elected officials accountable for their actions. Most research in this area has used measures derived from party platforms and legislators' roll-call votes. As a complement to these past studies, this research note reexamines the issue positions of Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. House with data from a preelection survey of legislative candidates, Project Vote Smart's 1998 Congressional National Political Awareness Test (CNPAT).

Comparisons of Democrats and Republicans

A wide array of measurement approaches has been used to compare the issue stances and ideology of Democrats and Republicans. Much of this research has centered on the behavior of partisans elected to the U.S. House. Analysts have

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examined the parties' platforms,[1] congressional roll-call votes,[2] and ideological stances as measured by organizations such as the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA).[3] Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal devised their own ideological classification, with data derived from an extensive analysis of roll-call votes.[4] In an extremely rich analysis, they demonstrate the existence of ideological differences between American political parties throughout the nation's history.

Collectively, these studies have consistently found differences in the stances taken by Democrats and Republicans. However, it is important to recognize the scope of these past approaches. A party's platform provides one statement regarding issue positions, but reveals nothing about how many of the party's members concur with those positions. Analyses of roll-call votes (and of ideological scores informed by those votes), while clearly valuable, are limited by two factors. First, rather than provide a comprehensive survey of issue preferences, roll-call analysis necessarily focuses only on the issues that arose and the specific format in which they arose during a given session of Congress. For instance, votes with respect to the legality of a particular abortion procedure may tell us little regarding legislators' broader attitudes concerning abortion. Second, factors other than a legislator's position on an issue can affect the roll-call vote, including pragmatic considerations ("this isn't ideal, but it's the best we're likely to get"), competing considerations ("normally I would be for this, but not with these amendments"), and partisan considerations ("the leaders are really twisting my arm on this one"). Roll-call votes tell us how members of Congress behave, which, of course, is extremely important. But they do not necessarily tell us what those legislators truly think or prefer.

These limitations suggest that a survey of Democratic and Republican House members would provide an informative complement to past research. Some survey data of party leaders do exist, and these data provide insight regarding differences in the issue positions of Democrats and Republicans. John

[1] Ian Budge and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Mandates and Policy Outputs: U.S. Party Platforms and Federal Expenditures," *American Political Science Review* 84 (March 1990): 111–31; Gerald Pomper, *Election in America* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1968).

[2] Examples include Aage R. Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968); John J. Coleman, "The Decline and Resurgence of Congressional Party Conflict," *Journal of Politics* 59 (February 1997): 165–84; Keith Krehbiel, "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (April 1993): 235–66; James M. Snyder, Jr. and Tim Groseclose, "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting," *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (April 2000): 193–211.

[3] Tim Groseclose, Steven D. Levitt, and James M. Snyder, Jr.,"Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress," *American Political Science Review* 93 (March 1999): 33–50; Bryan D. Jones, James L. True, and Frank R. Baumgartner, "Does Incrementalism Stem From Political Consensus or From Institutional Gridlock?" *American Review of Political Science* 41 (October 1997): 1319–39.

[4] Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

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Green and his colleagues report data from the 1996 rendition of the Party Elite Study. These data are derived from a sample of 976 delegates to the Democratic and Republican national conventions.[5] The authors' analyses reveal substantial differences between Democratic and Republican delegates in the areas of economic policy, health care, abortion, and aid to minorities. Similarly, Walter Stone and his colleagues examine data from Democratic and Republican delegates to state conventions in Iowa and Virginia in 1980 and 1988, and show sizable differences between party elites on the issues of abortion, defense spending, affirmative action, and a balanced budget.[6]

For our purposes, the limitations of extant survey data are clear. First, the two surveys discussed above both drew data from convention delegates, not from U.S. House members. Although the respondents are elite members of their respective parties, there is no assurance that their positions closely resemble those of the parties' elected representatives. This is an especially important point given that elected representatives may perceive electoral incentives to moderate their positions, whereas convention delegates are not subjected to comparable pressures. Second, surveys of convention delegates have addressed only a relative handful of issues. Our goal is to compare Democrats and Republicans on as wide of an array of issues as possible. To accomplish this goal, data from a much more extensive survey are required.

Our analysis draws on data from Project Vote Smart's 1998 Congressional National Political Awareness Test. In an analysis similar to ours, Robert Erikson and Gerald Wright examine data from the 1994 CNPAT.[7] Using these data, Erikson and Wright demonstrate that Democratic and Republican House candidates differed substantially in their preferences with respect to federal spending on ten issues (national defense, law enforcement, drug interdiction, etc.), and on possible changes in eight taxes (capital gains, taxes on cigarettes, taxes on alcohol, etc.). Assessment of differences between Democrats and Republicans was one of only several tasks addressed by Erikson and Wright. Hence, although their analysis represents an excellent first step in using CNPAT data to evaluate partisan issue differences, many additional insights can be derived from these data.

[5] John C. Green, John S. Jackson, and Nancy L. Clayton, "Issue Networks and Party Elites in 1996" in John C. Green and Daniel M. Shea, eds., *The State of the Parties*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

[6] Walter J. Stone, Ronald B. Rapoport, and Alan I. Abramowitz,"Party Polarization: The Reagan Revolution and Beyond" in L. Sandy Maisel, ed., *The Parties Respond* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999).

[7] Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright, Jr., "Voters, Candidates and Issues in Congressional Elections" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997). For other uses of data from Project Vote Smart, see Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III, "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (January 2001): 136–59; and Evan J. Ringquist and Carl Dasse, "Lies, Damned Lies, and Campaign Promises," unpublished manuscript, 2000.

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Reexamining the Issue Positions of Democrats and Republicans

Our approach will include two key extensions on Erikson and Wright's analysis of CNPAT data. First, we will draw on data from all CNPAT items, not only those concerning the budget and taxes. Second, we will report partisan differences for the House as a whole, but also for important subgroups of legislators. Project Vote Smart surveys executive and legislative candidates vying for state and national offices. The 1998 survey was completed by 90 Democrats and 101 Republicans who were elected or reelected that November (we have coded Bernard Sanders, I-Vermont, as a Democrat). Survey results are published on Project Vote Smart's web site as a public service to voters. The 1998 CNPAT included over 200 closed-format items, divided into nineteen issue areas. The issues appear on the survey in alphabetical order (for example, Abortion, Budget and Spending, Campaign Finance Reform). For most issues, the respondent is asked to indicate which, if any, of several statements he or she supports. For example, the last issue, Welfare and Poverty, appears as follows:

> **Welfare and Poverty:** Indicate (✓) which principles you support (if any) regarding poverty and the welfare system.
>
> a) Provide tax incentives for companies to hire and train homeless people who want to work.
> b) Increase funding of homeless shelters and low income housing projects.
> c) Increase funds for housing assistance for welfare recipients who need housing to get or keep a job.
> d) Provide homeless families with apartment vouchers they can use to supplement the cost of an apartment.
> e) Continue to give states and local governments responsibility for welfare programs through block grants.
> f) Eliminate federal funds for welfare programs at the federal, state or local levels.
> g) Maintain current welfare-to-work requirements in order for states to qualify for block grants.
> h) Convert government-funded low-income housing projects into private housing, managed and owned by the residents.
> i) Require that unwed teenage mothers live with a parent or guardian (if possible) and attend school to receive benefits.
> j) Other

To devise measures of legislators' issue positions, we reduced data from each issue area to a single scale. Our approach included several steps. First, because responses in the "other" category are not comparable across respondents, these were ignored. Second, we assigned values of "1" to statements checked by respondents and values of "0" to those left blank. The original survey used ordinal scales on a few of the issue areas (on taxes, respondents used a six-point scale, ranging from greatly increase to eliminate, to assess different taxes); in these cases, we retained the original values from the survey. Third, we reversed scores as necessary so that low values represented conservative stances and high values represented liberal stances. For Welfare and Poverty,

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for instance, scores were reversed for items e, f, g, h and i. Fourth, the data for each issue area were examined using factor analysis and reliability testing procedures to determine what combination of items best represented the general issue domain in question. For Welfare and Poverty, for example, our final scale includes items b, c, d, e, g, h, and i (alpha = 0.79). Fifth, scales were constructed by summing the appropriate item scores. To facilitate comparison across issues, each scale was recoded so that its possible values range from 0 to 1.

Using these procedures, we created issue scales for nineteen issues: abortion, affirmative action, campaign finance reform, crime, drugs, education, the environment, federalism, gun issues, health care, immigration, military spending, social spending, taxes I (income tax issues), taxes II (tax deductions), taxes III (tax reform), trade, the United Nations, and welfare and poverty. For the most part, our issues match the issue areas that appear on the CNPAT. There are a few differences, however. For example, we analyze no data on Morality and Ethics, a section of the CNPAT that included only a single open-ended question. In other cases, most notably taxes, we subdivided the CNPAT categories into distinct subcategories. Technical information regarding the construction of each issue scale is reported in the Appendix. There, we list the items used to construct each scale (using the original section names and item numbers from the CNPAT) and the reliability estimate (coefficient alpha) obtained for each scale.

The CNPAT data reveal how legislators represented themselves to voters on an extensive array of issues. Consequently, by comparing issue scores for Democrats and Republicans, we can identify which issues, if any, are characterized by clear partisan differences. The bottom line is that the data are well suited for the research question under consideration.

Two features of the CNPAT data, one limitation and one strength, require elaboration. A limitation we face is that data are available for only 191 legislators. It is possible that the members for whom we have data hold different issue positions from their colleagues who chose not to answer the CNPAT. As a check on the quality of the sample, we examined 1999 ADA scores. Democrats who answered the CNPAT had average ADA scores of 89.50, whereas those who did not answer the survey had average scores of 86.15. This difference is statistically insignificant ($p > 0.10$). Hence, to the extent that issue positions are correlated with ideology, our Democratic sample is not problematic. The news is not as good among Republicans. Republicans who answered the CNPAT are less conservative (average ADA score = 19.10) than those who did not (13.97). This difference is statistically significant ($p < 0.02$). Because the available data oversample moderate Republicans, it follows that our issue analyses may tend to understate differences between Democrats and Republicans.

A second important issue concerning the CNPAT data relates to how the questions were asked. We have suggested that one benefit of survey data relative to roll-call data is the opportunity to explore legislators' general positions on various issues. In a roll-call vote, an issue is configured in a very specific

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form. In contrast, the CNPAT frames issues broadly. On abortion, for example, questions range from "abortions should always be legally available" to "abortions should always be illegal." On budget and spending, the second CNPAT issue, respondents are asked what level of spending they support for each of various programs, with choice options ranging from "greatly increase federal funding" to "eliminate federal funding." Similar substantive breadth exists for the other CNPAT issues.

The central advantages of the CNPAT data are that the survey included a wide array of issues and a broad range of response options on each issue. Although it would have been preferable for more House members to have answered the CNPAT, the available sample is sufficient to allow for comparison of the issues positions of Democrats and Republicans.

Analysis

Several statistics can be derived from the issue scores we have calculated. The first four statistics we will report represent the difference between the mean issue scores of four groups of Democrats and Republicans. We calculate these differences for, first, all House members for whom data are available; second, respondents who are either the chair or ranking member of a standing committee; third, respondents who are either the chair or ranking member of a standing committee and subcommittee; and finally, respondents who are members of committees with jurisdiction over the issues in question, provided that we had data on at least ten members of a given committee. The first test yields data pertinent to the question of whether Democrats, viewed collectively, hold issue positions that differ from those of Republicans. Irrespective of what this first test demonstrates, one could argue that congressional decision making is dominated by senior representatives and by members of relevant committees. From this perspective, comparison of rank-and-file members would be less revealing than comparison of House leaders and of committee members. We account for this viewpoint in our second, third, and fourth sets of tests.

Comparison of means provides information regarding whether Democrats as a whole differ from Republicans as a whole. However, such a comparison does not reveal anything regarding the cohesiveness or homogeneity of the parties. Consider an example. In one scenario, all Democrats receive scores of 0.70 on an issue, and all Republicans receive scores of 0.30. Hence, the Democratic mean is 0.70, the Republican mean is 0.30, and the difference between the means is 0.40. In a second scenario, 70 percent of Democrats receive scores of 1.00, and the rest receive scores of 0, yielding a mean of 0.70. Conversely, 70 percent of Republicans receive scores of 0, with the rest receiving scores of 1, producing a mean of 0.30. The difference between the Democratic mean and the Republican mean again is 0.40, just as in the first scenario. Based solely on a comparison of means, we would reach identical conclusions in these two scenarios. In reality, though, they are quite different.

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As a simple measure of partisan homogeneity, we have created a fifth statistic that we will refer to as "differentiation." Differentiation is the proportion of respondents whose scores on an issue are closer to their own party's mean than to the opposing party's mean. This statistic has a simple intuitive interpretation. For example, a differentiation score of 0.70 implies that there is a 70 percent likelihood that any given House member will hold a position consistent with that of his or her party on the issue in question. Differentiation scores have logical bounds of 0.50 and 1.00. A value of 0.50 would mean that partisanship provides no structure whatsoever for House members' issues preferences. In contrast, a value of 1.00 would mean that partisanship fully structures issue preferences, with Democrats holding preferences that cluster around one mean value and Republicans holding preferences that cluster around a second mean value.

Results of the five comparisons we have described are reported in Table 1. Data in the first column reveal that Democrats and Republicans differ by statistically significant margins on 18 of the 19 issues under consideration, the one exception being tax deductions. The average difference score is 0.33. This implies that on a typical issue, if the average Democratic score were 0.66, then the average Republican score would be 0.33.

Differences among party leaders resemble those for rank-and-file members. The relative effects vary from one issue to the next, but virtually all mean differences achieve statistical significance, and the average differences for the four groups (all members, committee leaders, committee and subcommittee leaders, and committee members) are nearly identical. Differences between the issue positions of Democratic and Republican House members persist regardless of which subset of representatives is being assessed.

Differentiation scores are reported in the last column of Table 1. The average differentiation score is 0.78, which indicates that slightly more than three-fourths of House members in our sample hold issue positions consistent with their parties on any given issue. For the most part, issues with high differentiation scores also have high differences in means. However, there are three notable exceptions: defense spending, social spending, and income taxes. The differences in means for these issues are relatively slight (less than 0.27 in each case), yet these issues produce three of the four highest differentiation scores. On these issues, Democrats and Republicans are separated by a thin, but distinct, line.

Thus far, we have examined issues individually. This analysis reveals how Democrats and Republicans compare on each issue, but it does not tell us whether House members hold consistent positions across issues. If representatives' issue preferences reflect an underlying ideological orientation, then further scrutiny of issue positions may provide evidence of such attitudinal structure. The first step in testing for issue consistency is to create a single indicator that summarizes data from all nineteen issues. To devise such an indicator, we first weighted data from Democrats so that Democrats and Republicans count equally. Next, for each issue, we subtract the mean issue score from the respon-

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TABLE 1

Partisan-Based Issue Differences in the U.S. House, 1998

	Difference in Mean Issue Scores, Democrats vs. Republicans				
Issue	*All Cases*	*Committee Leaders*	*Committee and Subcommittee Leaders*	*Committee Members*	*Differentiation All Cases*
Abortion	0.52***	0.48#	0.43***		0.80
Affirmative action	0.29***	0.25#	0.24***		0.74
Campaign finance reform	0.37***	0.31**	0.35***		0.79
Crime	0.37***	0.31*	0.32***		0.75
Defense spending	0.27***	0.23*	0.26***		0.86
Drug policy	0.37***	0.30#	0.32***	0.28**	0.80
Education	0.56***	0.51**	0.49***	0.63**	0.90
Environment	0.34***	0.31*	0.30***	0.14	0.76
Federalism	0.25***	0.32**	0.24***		0.72
Gun issues	0.42***	0.21	0.34***		0.78
Health care	0.53***	0.59***	0.50***	0.52***	0.84
Immigration	0.35***	0.19#	0.28***		0.81
Social spending	0.22***	0.23**	0.21***		0.88
Taxes—income tax	0.23***	0.22**	0.23***	0.37***	0.91
Taxes—deductions	0.03	0.08#	0.00	0.15#	0.61
Taxes—reform	0.13*	0.15	0.04	0.06	0.58
Trade policy	0.25***	0.51*	0.31***		0.64
United Nations	0.42***	0.34**	0.37***		0.79
Welfare	0.43***	0.52**	0.43***		0.79
Average	0.33	0.32	0.30	0.31	0.78

Source: 1998 CNPAT.

Note: Data are from 90 Democrats and 101 Republicans. All issue scales range from 0 (most conservative) to 1 (most liberal). Cell entries in the first four columns indicate the difference between the Democratic mean and the Republican mean for all members in the sample (average N = 176); committee leaders and ranking members (17) committee and subcommittee leaders and ranking members (83); and members of committees with jurisdiction over the issue (15). Cell entries in the fifth column indicate the percentage of all members (average N = 176) who received issue scores closer to the mean for their party than to the mean for the opposing party. See Appendix for additional coding information.

*** $p < 0.001$
** $p < 0.01$
* $p < 0.05$
# $p < 0.10$

dent's score. For example, if the respondent's score on an issue is 0.80 and the mean on that issue is 0.48, then the new value is 0.80 – 0.48, or 0.32. Finally, we sum these values across the nineteen issues, producing a measure of Issue Extremity.

Mean scores for the nineteen issues center near 0.50. Consequently, subtracting the mean from the respondents' scores produces variables that typically range from approximately −0.50 to 0.50. Because there are nineteen issues, it follows that the theoretical bounds of Issue Extremity are approximately −9.50 (the maximum possible conservative score) and 9.50 (the maximum possible liberal score). In reality, the lowest observed score is −6.50, a score attained by Ronald Packard (R-CA); conversely, Barbara Lee (D-CA) received

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the highest observed score, 7.36. The Republican mean is −2.96, and the Democratic mean is a mirror-image 2.96. Only one Democrat, James Traficant (OH), received an Issue Extremity score (−3.18) more conservative than the Republican mean. Likewise, Constance Morella (MD) is the only Republican to receive an Issue Extremity score (3.49) more liberal than the Democratic mean.

At question is the extent to which representatives exhibit ideological consistency across issues. Three pieces of evidence suggest that ideological consistency is present. First, the average correlation across the nineteen issues (the correlation of abortion scores with affirmative action scores, and so on) is 0.50. The correlation data, which are reported in Table 2, reveal that representatives who take an extreme stand on one issue tend to take similarly extreme stands on other issues. Of the 171 paired correlations reported in Table 2, most are quite large, and all but twenty-two attain statistical significance. The insignificant correlations all involve one of three issues: Taxes II (tax deductions), Taxes III (tax reform), and trade. The second piece of evidence regarding ideological consistency is that the correlation between Issue Extremity and ADA ideological scores is 0.90. Ideology as perceived by the ADA is reflected quite strongly in the positions House members voice on a wide array of issues. Third, Democrats (standard deviation = 2.55) and Republicans (2.09) both vary in Issue Extremity. Some Democrats are consistently liberal, whereas others are consistently moderate; similarly, some Republicans are consistently moderate whereas others are consistently conservative.

Thus far, our discussion has taken place primarily on a somewhat abstract level. The tangible meaning of these data may be made more clear by linking the data to actual U.S. House members. Toward this end, Table 3 reports Issue Extremity scores for thirty legislators, the ten most liberal from our sample, the ten most conservative, and the ten most centrist. House members in the first and third columns of Table 3 mark the poles of issue disagreement in Congress. As one example, Lee, who received the highest liberal score in our sample, believes that federal funding for AIDS programs, the arts, and environmental programs should be greatly increased. In contrast, Packard, who received the highest conservative score, believes that federal funding for AIDS and environmental programs should be greatly decreased and that federal funding for the arts should be eliminated.

Conclusions

Our objective in this research note has been to assess the extent to which Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. House support similar or dissimilar issue positions. Data from a 1998 survey of 191 winning congressional candidates were used to construct preference scales concerning nineteen issues. These scales then were subjected to a series of comparative tests.

The analysis has demonstrated that Democrats differ from their Republican counterparts by a statistically significant margin on eighteen of the nineteen

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TABLE 2

Ideological Consistency: Interitem Correlations for Nineteen Issue Positions

	Abortion	*Affirmative Action*	*Campaign Finance Reform*	*Crime*	*Drugs*	*Education*	*Environment*	*Federalism*	*Gun Issues*	*Health Care*	*Immigration*	*Military*	*Social Spending*	*Taxes (I)*	*Taxes (II)*	*Taxes (III)*	*Trade*	*United Nations*	*Welfare*
Abortion	1.00	0.55	0.57	0.56	0.60	0.68	0.61	0.47	0.63	0.68	0.63	0.56	0.62	0.55	**0.05**	0.13	**0.06**	0.69	0.63
Affirmative Action		1.00	0.58	0.46	0.47	0.53	0.70	0.47	0.61	0.61	0.56	0.60	0.69	0.62	**0.08**	**0.08**	**0.05**	0.55	0.56
Campaign Finance Reform			1.00	0.49	0.51	0.65	0.77	0.37	0.70	0.65	0.56	0.73	0.69	0.70	**0.09**	0.16	0.22	0.60	0.60
Crime				1.00	0.76	0.60	0.54	0.49	0.61	0.66	0.62	0.59	0.64	0.62	0.17	**0.12**	**0.11**	0.60	0.73
Drugs					1.00	0.61	0.60	0.53	0.64	0.71	0.63	0.64	0.66	0.70	0.16	0.14	0.17	0.67	0.75
Education						1.00	0.64	0.48	0.67	0.78	0.67	0.64	0.72	0.75	0.20	0.23	0.18	0.65	0.68
Environment							1.00	0.46	0.77	0.71	0.58	0.71	0.76	0.78	**0.10**	0.15	**0.10**	0.72	0.65
Federalism								1.00	0.46	0.58	0.51	0.44	0.59	0.57	**0.14**	0.14	**0.09**	0.54	0.58
Gun Issues									1.00	0.72	0.64	0.66	0.72	0.70	0.16	0.26	**0.08**	0.68	0.67
Health Care										1.00	0.75	0.70	0.78	0.77	**0.12**	0.23	0.29	0.75	0.77
Immigration											1.00	0.52	0.73	0.62	**0.07**	0.19	**0.12**	0.67	0.72
Military												1.00	0.68	0.76	0.25	0.24	**0.11**	0.58	0.66
Social Spending													1.00	0.77	**0.12**	0.22	0.22	0.72	0.78
Taxes (I)														1.00	0.21	0.31	0.17	0.69	0.72
Taxes (II)															1.00	**0.13**	**0.09**	**0.12**	**0.10**
Taxes (III)																1.00	0.14	0.28	0.21
Trade																	1.00	0.19	0.31
United Nations																		1.00	0.68
Welfare																			1.00

Source: 1998 CNPAT.

Note: Cell entries are bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients for nineteen issue positions. Cell entries in bold are statistically insignificant ($p > 0.10$, one-tailed test).

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TABLE 3

Issue Extremity and Issue Centrism in the U.S. House, 1998

Most Liberal Issue Preferences		*Most Centrist Issue Preferences*		*Most Conservative Issue Preferences*	
Barbara Lee (D-CA)	7.36	David Phelps (D-IL)	0.01	Ronald Packard (R-CA)	−6.50
John Conyers (D-MI)	7.20	Lloyd Doggett (D-TX)	−0.02	Walter Herger (R-CA)	−6.39
J. McDermott (D-WA)	7.13	Vernon Ehlers (R-MI)	−0.16	Gary Miller (R-CA)	−6.24
Barney Frank (D-MA)	7.04	Wayne Gilchrest (R-MD)	0.17	David McIntosh (R-IN)	−6.10
Fortney Stark (D-CA)	7.04	C. Shays (R-CT)	0.21	John Shadegg (R-AZ)	−5.93
Lynn Woolsey (D-CA)	6.88	Tom Campbell (R-CA)	−0.23	Chris. Cannon (R-UT)	−5.92
Wm. Delahunt (D-MA)	6.61	Benjamin Gilman (R-NY)	−0.23	David Weldon (R-FL)	−5.79
Chaka Fattah (D-PA)	6.44	Ellen Tauscher (D-CA)	0.28	Sue Myrick (R- NC)	−5.70
George Miller (D-CA)	6.31	Wm. Lipinski (D-IL)	0.31	John Boehner (R-OH)	−5.51
John Lewis (D-GA)	6.14	Rick Lazio (R-NY)	−0.46	Jim DeMint (R-SC)	−5.38

Source: 1998 CNPAT.

Note: Cell entries are Issue Extremity scores derived from respondents' answers to survey questions concerning nineteen issues.

issues we considered. The one issue on which the parties did not differ was tax deductions. However, Democrats and Republicans do differ on questions concerning income taxes and tax reform. This means that the parties disagree on the general issue of taxes, although they concur on one specific dimension of that issue. On most issues for which differences were identified, the statistical tests yielded highly significant effects. Moreover, assessment of individual House members found that, on any given issue, there is nearly an 80 percent likelihood that a representative will take a position more consistent with the consensus view of his or her own party than with the consensus view of the opposing party. Also, it is important to recall that our sample of Republicans is somewhat more moderate than House Republicans as a whole; hence, if anything, our analyses have slightly understated partisan differences in the U.S. House.

The analyses we have conducted provide evidence regarding not only the existence of issue differences between House Democrats and Republicans, but also the magnitude of those differences. The issue scales used here range in value from 0 to 1.0. In most cases, Democrats and Republicans occupied positions in the center 50 percent of the scales, and the average difference in means between the two parties was 0.33. Thus, Democrats typically are about as far from the extreme left as they are from Republicans; similarly, Republicans are equidistant from Democrats and the extreme right. This suggests that the parties could reasonably be described as center-left and center-right.

Researchers typically have relied on measures derived from roll-call data when examining the ideological stances and issue positions of Democrats and Republicans in Congress. Although a different approach has been used in this article, the central conclusion is the same. Democrats and Republicans consistently differ on the issues. These differences are statistically significant, although the substantive magnitude of these differences is best characterized as moderate.

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Our analysis has been limited to data from a single year. However, the results suggest that further inspection of CNPAT data is warranted. Because the CNPAT surveys legislators on a wide array of issues and because each issue is examined broadly, analysis of CNPAT data offers a useful complement to research drawing on roll-call vote data.

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APPENDIX

CNPAT Items Used to Construct Issue Scales

Issue	*Items Used to Construct Issue Scale*	*Alpha*
Abortion	CNPAT Section: Abortion CNPAT Items: a-e (these items concerned when, if ever, abortion should be legal; thus, they were treated as forming a single five-point scale which was then summed with the remaining items); f, g, h	0.940
Affirmative action	CNPAT Section: Economy and Employment, section 2 CNPAT Items: a, b, c, d, e, f	0.699
Campaign finance reform	CNPAT Section: Campaign Finance Reform CNPAT Items: a, b, c, d, g, h, i	0.781
Crime	CNPAT Section: Crime CNPAT Items: a, b, c, g, j	0.783
Defense Spending	CNPAT Section: Budget and Spending, section 2 CNPAT Items: d, e, f, g	0.885
Drugs	CNPAT Section: Drugs CNPAT Items: a, b, c, d, e, f, g	0.715
Education	*CNPAT Section: Education* CNPAT Items: a, b, c, d, e, g	0.843
Environment	CNPAT Section: Environment CNPAT Items: a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l	0.876
Federalism	CNPAT Section: Federalism CNPAT Items: c, d, e, g, h, k	0.682
Gun issues	CNPAT Section: Gun Issues CNPAT Items: b-e (these items concerned what level of federal restrictions should be placed on the purchase of firearms; thus, they were treated as forming a single four-point scale which was then summed with the remaining items); a, g	0.796
Health care	CNPAT Section: Health Issues CNPAT Items: b, c, g, h, i, j, k	0.846
Immigration	CNPAT Section: Immigration CNPAT Items: a, b, c, d, e, f, h	0.725
Social spending	CNPAT Section: Budget and Spending, section 1 CNPAT Items: a, b, c, d, e, f, g, l, m	0.912
Taxes—income tax	CNPAT Section: Taxes, section 1 CNPAT Items: a, b, c, d, e, f, g, j, k, l, m	0.918
Taxes—deductions	CNPAT Section: Taxes, section 1 CNPAT Items: h, i, n, o	0.734
Taxes—reform	CNPAT Section: Taxes, sections 2, 3, 4, 6 (each of these sections includes only one item)	0.865
Trade	CNPAT Section: Trade CNPAT Items: a, b, c, d, g	0.876
United Nations	CNPAT Section: Foreign Policy, section 3 CNPAT Items: a, b, c, f	0.700

Source: 1998 CNPAT.

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SEPTEMBER 11, TERRORIST ATTACKS, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Edited by Demetrios James Caraley

This collection of essays by a distinguished group of scholars represents the first serious attempt to explain the causes and consequences of the September 11 terrorist attacks.

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Book Reviews

Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf *by Gary R. Hess. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 262 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $18.95.*

In *The Federalist*, No. 74, Alexander Hamilton states that "the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand." Gary Hess focuses precisely on that dynamic by analyzing presidential leadership in the three wars in the latter half of the twentieth century. His focus is twofold: to evaluate the decision to go to war, and then to evaluate the president's wartime leadership. Each chapter deals with one of these two questions, providing the reader with a coherent framework to compare the decision making of three presidents. This makes it easy to see what the three situations have in common and what distinguishes them from each other.

Hess's approach is unabashedly presidency-centric. He states in his introduction that he attempts "to recreate the sense of crisis . . . as seen from the perspectives of the three presidents and to recount their actions within the context of unfolding events and anticipated contingencies" (p. 5). There is some justification for this perspective, given the unitary nature of the presidency, especially in his role as commander-in-chief. To his credit, however, Hess tempers this institutional partisanship by thoroughly discussing the constitutional limits to the president's war power, as well as the historical constraints that faced these presidents.

Hess is skillful in his storytelling. In all three cases he effectively details the larger historical context of the crises, the process of escalation, and the deliberation that occurred within the executive branch. He emphasizes the importance of mental templates for action, especially the "lesson" of the 1930s. The Munich/appeasement paradigm is common to all three wars. Hess also does an admirable job of detailing how each war affected the thinking of later presidents and how problematical the application of the "lessons" of history can be. For example, Lyndon Johnson sought to avoid Harry Truman's mistake by resisting the move toward a wider war, all the while proving himself incapable of obtaining a Korea-like status quo when the nature of war in Vietnam was so fundamentally different. Similarly, George Bush drew lessons from both Korea and Vietnam, most effectively coordinating political and military objectives, while wrestling with the great uncertainty that followed the end of the cold war.

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The book is clearly organized and easy to follow. In each case Hess lays out the process that led to war and then explores the president's role as a wartime leader. He includes an extensive bibliographical essay that will be helpful to anyone who wants to do further research. One frustrating drawback is the utter lack of citations in the text. Hess often refers to things like "one Truman biographer" (p. 32), but there is no way to identify the biographer to seek out the source.

Most refreshing is Hess's willingness to take his descriptive data and evaluate these presidents according to his normative criteria. Thus, Hess sees the war in Korea as most justifiable, with Vietnam most problematical. He thinks Truman demonstrated a blatant disregard for constitutional processes, while Bush adhered most faithfully to his obligations, however reluctantly. Hess is willing to argue that presidential decisions matter, and the quality of decision making in these three cases led to different results. But throughout the book, he also emphasizes the tremendous problems that faced these presidents because they waged limited wars, in which "presidents must seek to build popular support without generating demands for victory" (p. 6). The demands on presidents are greater when they wage limited wars, and all three of these presidents ended up political casualties of war. Hess's analysis merits a wide audience—not the least of which should be current policy makers.

DAVID A. CROCKETT
Trinity University

The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming *by David Victor. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001. 160 pp. $22.95*

Policy prescriptions that offer fresh combinations of emissions trading and tax instruments for reducing greenhouse gas emissions beg important questions about political feasibility. Should the 1997 Kyoto Protocol be scrapped and replaced by a more promising regime? Will a hybrid solution work best? Is the *best* the enemy of the *good*?

According to David Victor, there is very little good to be found in the Kyoto Protocol. The alarming title of his monograph is intended to be predictive. The impending collapse of the protocol is assured by its implied reliance on an international system of emissions trading—a cap-and-trade system that regulates the quantity of emissions without regard for the price of emissions credits. To this he adds the perennial problems of allocating permits, monitoring, and enforcement across 38 industrialized countries initially, and 190 countries, eventually.

This slender volume provides a penetrating and well-documented overview of the strategic issues and policy dilemmas that arise in the debate over climate protection. The author's perspective is that of a policy analyst concerned about

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the architecture of international agreements to manage global warming. Climate risks, while uncertain, are serious enough in his view to warrant much more effective policy responses than Kyoto provides. Appealing to atmospheric science and the political and economic realities of converting science into policy, he concludes that the protocol was a product of political expediency—a hasty agreement made possible by a "great veil of uncertainty" (p. 26) that permitted negotiators to avoid action on all critical details. It ignores not only the costs of acquiring emissions permits but also the scientific infeasibility of placing emissions of diverse greenhouse gases in a "single basket" and treating them as if they were interchangeable.

The working model from which the Kyoto Protocol emerged was the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. In Victor's view, the Montreal agreement, with its targets-and-timetables approach, was ill suited to address the complex trading issues involved in climate protection. Similarly, domestic trading systems, such as the U.S. sulfur-trading program, are not useful models, because there are no adequate cross-national pressures for reciprocity and retaliation from which to fashion a coordinated trading system that has integrity.

The author's solution to these problems is a hybrid system of trading and taxes in which governments set targets for both the quantities of emissions reductions to be achieved and the maximum price of emissions permits to be traded. Without cost containment, governments will pursue compliance strategies on paper that hedge their risks of paying exorbitant permit prices. Victor calculates that global permits for carbon dioxide emissions alone could be worth about $2 trillion. And he notes that Russia and Ukraine have successfully exploited their own economic misery to obtain very generous emissions targets under the Kyoto agreement, thereby creating billions of dollars of surplus emissions credits to be sold to Western nations without producing any improvement in climate protection (so-called hot air trading).

Although the author acknowledges several counterarguments about the virtues of the protocol and the promise of future adjustments, he finds the agreement to be hopelessly flawed by both design and the insurmountable challenges it poses for fair and effective implementation, timely evaluation, and careful monitoring and enforcement. The only door the author leaves open to revision would involve renegotiating the emissions targets previously granted Russia and Ukraine, concentrating exclusively on those greenhouse gases that can be reliably monitored, building new institutional capacity for independent analysis of country emissions reporting and compliance, and scrapping the cap-and-trade system in favor of his hybrid trade-and-tax system.

LAMONT C. HEMPEL
University of Redlands

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The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone *by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. New York, Oxford University Press, 2002. 222 pp. $26.00.*

If the U.S. secretary of state were elected, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. would be a strong contender for the office, and on the strength of the platform he outlines in his latest book, he'd get my vote. In this volume, Nye, who is the dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and a well-known scholar of international relations, indirectly but unmistakably takes on the Bush administration's penchant for unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy, suggesting that the world is more complicated than they appreciate. For many of his likely readers in the foreign policy establishment, Nye is probably preaching to the choir; but it is useful and sometimes quite revealing to have the arguments for multilateral engagement with the world laid out so lucidly.

Unilateralism, according to Nye, is predicated on a conception of the world that privileges certain facets of power—mostly military, but sometimes economic—over what he calls "soft power," or "getting others to want what you want" (p. 9). Like Antonio Gramsci's hegemony, soft power is born of the ability to shape the global political and cultural agenda. Because the language of the internet is English (American English!), because half a million foreign students are at American universities, because people around the world watch American television shows, eat in American fast food joints, emulate American teen-age fashion crazes, the United States enjoys a privileged position in the world independent of its military might and economic muscle. Used effectively, soft power can be an inexpensive, efficient, and compelling instrument of influence; but, suggests Nye, ignored or belittled, it can backfire in anger and resentment.

How to use soft power effectively? Nye argues that the United States has a great deal of soft power or good will in the world; only arrogant, isolationist, or unilateralist policies will prompt other states to band together to oppose the United States. Citing Teddy Roosevelt's observation as the United States rose to power at the beginning of the last century to "speak softly but carry a big stick," Nye urges that "now that we have the stick, we need to pay more attention to the first part of his admonition. And we need not just to speak more softly but to listen more carefully" (p. 157). That recommendation will warm the heart of many, both in and out of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, who have squirmed as the Bush administration turned a deaf ear to allies—not to say nearly everyone else around the world—on issues as varied as the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the International Criminal Court, and the myriad puzzles in the Middle East.

Nye is too sophisticated a political analyst to be content with rhetorical flourishes, but in his efforts to outline concrete policy positions, a bit of equivocation does appear. His list of tests for determining when multilateralism is to be preferred, for example, includes the following caveat: "we should be cau-

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tious about multilateral arrangements that interfere with our ability to produce stable peace in volatile areas. Because of our global military role, the United States sometimes has interests and vulnerabilities that are different from those of smaller states . . ." (p. 160). That is a qualification to a commitment to multilateralism large enough to make even Bush National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice happy. That the world presents dilemmas in practice sometimes awkwardly subsumed in principles does not diminish the importance of the principles, however. Nye has done us an important service in laying out the moral and empirical principles behind multilateral approaches to foreign policy.

LISA ANDERSON
Columbia University

The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation *by Nancy Burns, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2001. 453 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $27.95.*

This major book covers an important juncture in the study of American political participation and gender at the end of the twentieth century. While it's long been observed that women have been less active and attentive to politics than men, the authors summarize the changes and stability over time in the relationship between gender and different forms of participation, and they delve deeply into seeking explanations for the gender differences that persist. This book is required reading for anyone interested in gender and social and political behavior, and for scholars and students of political participation.

While the authors examine the substantial survey trend data, their in-depth analysis focuses on the multiwave 1989–1990 Citizen Participation Study, beginning with an initial brief survey of a sample of 15,000, which enabled them to oversample African American and Latinos, as well as activists. At the end, the study interviewed a modest sample of married couples, enabling the authors to examine and link household characteristics and their hierarchy to political participation. This research goes substantially beyond what Verba, Schlozman, and Brady reported from the 1989–1990 surveys in *Voice and Inequality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics.*

This review cannot do justice to the book's rich data and analysis. The data show that the gap in political participation and related gender differences has been closing, but not substantially overall, though there is now no gap for voting. So it is as important as ever to identify the sources of these differences. While these sources are well-known in the participation literature (education and socioeconomic status, mobilization, sense of political efficacy), the authors assess them in a most analytical and compelling way. They demonstrate persua-

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sively that differences in three factors—resources (time, money, and civic skills), recruitment (or mobilization, being in a social network that leads one to be targeted by requests for political activity), and psychological orientations to politics (especially political interest, information, and efficacy)—largely explain why men participate more than women. This participation difference in their data was 0.31 on an eight-point participation scale, including protest activity and making a campaign contribution. This is not an enormous difference but one that is large enough to matter in a struggle for scarce resources and equality in influencing and benefiting from government actions. The difference, as well as the substantially larger gender difference among Latinos, is fully accounted for when the three factors are controlled in multivariate analysis.

Specifically, it is how women differ from men in the amount or level of these factors that matter and not how resources, recruitment opportunity, and psychological orientation have different consequences for men and women. The authors make a strong case for estimating multivariate regression models separately by gender to determine to what extent there may be inequalities in the mechanisms or processes by which these factors augment participation. These generally do not occur. The main inequality remains in people's different levels of civic skill, opportunity, and motivation, and not in how the same levels of these give more advantage to men than women. One exception may be, according to the married couples data, that women's participation benefits from the say that women have in family discussions, whereas men get a boost from their control over family financial discussions.

The book has the usual types of problems associated with multivariate survey analysis (that is, inadequate measurement, including that of control variables that have to account fully for alternative explanations; the direction of causal inference in the case of estimating the effects of psychological orientations that may themselves be affected by participation in politics; and omitted variables that affect both participation and the purported influences on participation). But overall, the book's findings and conclusions put the burden on its critics. The book challenges—if not demolishes—some myths or common wisdom. It shows that the lore of soccer Moms outparticipating working mothers can only be found for more highly educated women. Moreover, having a wife who spends more time at home appears to lead men to participate more, without affecting the wife's civic engagement. Men's political participation does not just benefit from experiences in social organizations but also in organizations that are tangentially involved in politics, challenging arguments about how organizations are supportive of participation through purely social mechanism without any explicit link to politics. Gender and racial/ethnic group consciousness does not lead to higher levels of political participation per se, though it is associated with more gender and racial issue-focused participation. Being a victim of gender discrimination appears to enhance, not diminish participation. Perhaps the most compelling and far-reaching finding is that women in a politically encouraging environment, where women are visibly situated in political

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office or positions, is associated with greater participation among women. Participation is an individual-level phenomenon, but what happens in elite-level politics and the broader political and institutional context matters for the behavior of women and others less engaged in political life.

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO
Columbia University

At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy *by Henry R. Nau. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2002. 314 pp. $29.95.*

This book seeks to bridge the gap between two major schools of thought: realism, which sees U.S. foreign policy as driven by material factors, and constructivism, which emphasizes the influence of ideas on American behavior abroad. As the subtitle suggests, Nau argues that U.S. foreign policy can only be understood by taking into account both power-related considerations and America's sense of its own identity.

Realism, with its focus on national security and the balance of power, has been the dominant perspective among students of international politics in this country for half a century. As an explanation for U.S. foreign policy, however, it has not enjoyed such an exalted position. Constructivism, on the other hand, is a relatively new approach to the study of international relations generally, but analysts of U.S. foreign policy specifically have long been interested in the ways that American ideals and identity affect the country's international behavior. For example, many scholars have seen "American exceptionalism"—the belief that the United States is different from and morally superior to other countries—as responsible for producing the extremes of isolation and intervention that have characterized the history of U.S. foreign relations. Other observers have viewed "cultural distance"—the degree to which America's culture is similar to or different from the cultures of other states—as a crucial source of U.S. attitudes and behaviors.

Nau builds on these ideas to construct a framework for understanding relations between the United States and other countries. Two factors comprise the framework. First is the distribution of power, equal or unequal. Second is the convergence or divergence of national identities. According to Nau, unequal power and convergent identities yield hierarchy, represented by the U.S.–NATO relationship. Unequal power and divergent identities produce U.S. hegemony, reflected in American relations with most of the developing world. Equal power and convergent identities yield security community, illustrated by U.S. relations with its partners in the G-7. Finally, equal power and divergent identities produce what Nau calls double-track anarchy, characterized by both the balancing of power and economic engagement. This outcome is reflected in U.S. relations with Russia and may be reflected in future U.S. relations with China.

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The purpose of *At Home Abroad* is not merely to explain U.S. foreign policy. Nau also offers guidance for U.S. policy makers in the new century. The book contains chapters on U.S. relations with the industrialized democracies of Western Europe, the Central and East European states that were once part of the Soviet empire, Asia, and the developing world. Contending that none of the positions in the traditional debate over U.S. foreign policy—nationalist (neoisolationist), realist, primacist, and internationalist—properly and effectively integrates American power and American values, Nau provides policy recommendations derived from his power-identity perspective. In U.S. relations with the industrialized democracies of Western Europe, he advocates permanent partnership embedded in competitive economic multilateralism. The author sees fostering economic growth and defending domestic stability as the main goals of U.S. policy in relations with democratizing countries. And he maintains that balancing power and bridging differences in identity must be the central tasks of U.S. officials in dealing with the developing world.

At Home Abroad has something for everyone. The work is not theoretically path-breaking, but scholars will find value in Nau's novel synthesis of competing paradigmatic traditions. Policy makers and nonprofessionals with special interest in international affairs should be pleased with the author's straightforward prose, his concern with the real world of diplomacy, and his willingness to offer concrete policy recommendations. This book will make excellent reading for advanced undergraduate courses in U.S. foreign policy.

STEPHEN R. ROCK
Vassar College

The Battle for Congress: Consultants, Candidates, and Voters *edited by James A. Thurber. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 260 pp. Cloth, $42.95; paper, $17.95.*

Want to know how to win an American congressional election? Or learn how modern political gunslingers shoot it out, waging war for U.S. House seats? How about comparing generalizations from political science research to real-world campaigns? If you're interested in any or all of the above, this book's a must read.

Focusing on six competitive House races in the 1998 American elections, this edited volume fills an important gap in the literature on congressional elections. Emphasizing the role of political consultants and the mechanics of modern electoral competition, each chapter provides scholars, journalists and professional politicians with a fascinating microanalysis of how battles for congressional seats were won and lost in the late twentieth century. Complementing much of what we already know about congressional elections—incumbents are hard to beat, turnout is lower in off-year elections, and nationalizing House contests is not an easy task—the book demonstrates how these macroconclusions play out in the trenches and war rooms of individual races.

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The seven-chapter book, including an introduction by editor James A. Thurber, reports on six case studies, one on each of the campaigns. The races were selected because each represented a competitive district. Altogether they were "most likely to illustrate some of the most talked about trends in campaigns and elections—particularly the role of consultants, media, and candidate "packaging" (p. 5).

The introduction explores the implications for governing in an environment where candidates are beholden to themselves, their constituents, and their contributors, as opposed to "parties, the president or some larger national public purpose" (p. 7). Thurber argues that campaign consultants and other political professionals, such as pollsters and media experts, have "replaced party leaders who supervised older party-based campaigns" (p. 4). Each of the remaining chapters is devoted to a campaign case study. Two are focused on districts with vulnerable Democratic incumbents and strong Republican challengers, two with vulnerable Republican incumbents and strong Democratic challengers, and two open seat contests.

The studies did not employ identical methodologies, but each focused on several common themes, helping tie the six campaign chapters together. For example, each includes a section on the district background/political context, the use of polls, earned versus paid media, the impact of outside groups, campaign strategy/themes/message, and the "get out the vote" efforts. Several chapters explore the tension always present in congressional races between utilizing national and local campaign themes. In the 1998 election each political party had a polarizing national figure—Bill Clinton (the Monica Lewinsky scandal was in full bloom several months prior to the election) and Speaker Newt Gingrich.

The book also raises some interesting future research questions. First, it begins with the premise that consultants have in many ways "replaced" party leaders in campaigns. A modified interpretation is that consultants are more properly viewed as the modern manifestation of party activists. Most political consultants operating in the field in congressional races are closely linked and coordinated to the activities and resources of centralized party organizations in Washington such as the National Republican Congressional Committee. Another question the book raises deals with the role of consultants in less competitive races. Competitive House races have become an "endangered species." These contests, after all, represent the vast majority of congressional elections in America today.

While these questions deserve further attention, they were clearly outside the scope of this volume. In sum, this book provides a rich and detailed description of the strategies, tactics, and mechanics of modern campaigns. Congressional scholars as well as campaign professionals can draw valuable insights and lessons from this book.

GARY J. ANDRES
American University

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The Role of the Supreme Court in American Politics: The Least Dangerous Branch? *by Richard L. Pacelle, Jr. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2001. 186 pp. Paper, $23.00.*

Richard Pacelle seeks to explain the appropriate role for the Supreme Court in the American polity. He sets up this timely, important, and controversial question by examining the Court's involvement in the 2000 presidential election, when it decided *Bush v. Gore.* Using this landmark decision as a backdrop, Pacelle explores the contours of the debate between judicial activism and judicial restraint. He begins by defining these concepts. For Pacelle, the Court is activist when it significantly changes or overturns legislation or existing precedent and when it broadly interprets constitutional provisions. When the Court defers to the elected branches and precedent and narrowly construes the Constitution, it is restraintist. After defining these concepts, Pacelle initially traces the historical variation of the Court's activism.

Pacelle explores both sides of four specific debates over judicial activism. Chapter 3 examines the democratic dimension of the debate. Restraintists argue that because justices are not democratically elected, they should defer to the other branches; while activists suggest that the Court is intentionally undemocratic in order to check the elected branches. Chapter 4 considers the institutional dilemma. Here, Pacelle demonstrates that rules (jurisdiction and justiciability) constrain the Court's ability to make policy, while its legitimacy may allow the justices to take an active policy-making role. Chapter 5 discusses whether the Court actually has the capacity (knowledge and power) to be an active policy maker. Finally, Chapter 6 explores how the intersection of legal and extralegal factors affects the ability of individual justices to be active policy makers.

This book has two key strengths. First, Pacelle allows the reader to determine whether he or she believes that the Court should be an active or restrained policy maker. Most scholarly accounts consider only one side of this debate, often in highly partisan tones. But Pacelle cogently and objectively explores the strongest arguments for and against judicial activism. In so doing, he demonstrates a much broader theoretical understanding, which moves his argument beyond the existing literature. Second, while the debate over judicial activism almost always takes place on a purely normative level, Pacelle provides a systematic analysis of the factors that inhibit or allow the Court to play an active policy-making role in the federal government. Such an analysis clearly raises the debate to a higher level beyond the rhetoric that currently pervades this literature.

In general, this monograph provides an accessible account of the Supreme Court's role as a policy maker, which makes it a must read for even the most casual of Court observers. The book is even more important and timely given Pacelle's discussion of the Court's decision in *Bush v. Gore.* At the same time, the reader should note that Pacelle's analysis makes a key contribution to the

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scholarly debate surrounding the more general issue of Supreme Court decision making. Although he does not explicitly forward this argument, his ultimate claim about the Supreme Court's role as a policy maker—that it should strike a balance between activism and restraint—suggests that the justices should act strategically vis à vis the elected branches of government. Specifically, Pacelle suggests that the justices should restrain themselves when making decisions that are more appropriately decided by the elected branches such as economic issues. But they should take an activist approach when deciding cases that involve civil liberties or civil rights. This conclusion clearly adds an additional dimension to the existing separation of powers literature, as well as to the more general literature that focuses on how the justices must be cognizant of actors external to the Court including the public when making decisions.

TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON
University of Minnesota

Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires *by Alexander J. Motyl. New York, Columbia University Press, 2001. 128 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $23.50.*

Empire has again become a main topic of discussion among political elites and, after the customary time-lag, among academic elites as well. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the last and the largest of the great land empires of Eurasia, posed anew the perennial question of the causes for the decline and fall of empires. In addition, the rise of the United States to the position of the sole superpower, one with a uniquely global sway, has posed other perennial questions about the definition and methods of empire. Empire is certainly an idea whose time has come, as it has come so many times before. And so the time has come for the appearance of academic books that address one or more of the perennial questions about empire.

Alexander Motyl's new work is one of these. Motyl is the author of four earlier books dealing with nationalities in the former Soviet Union. In his latest work, he constructs a systematic and sophisticated theory about the decline, collapse, and occasional revival of empires. The theory is meant to be general and comprehensive, and Motyl draws upon the historical experience of a wide range of empires, particularly those of the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, the Romanovs, Wilhelmine Germany, and the Soviets. But, given Motyl's own historical experience with the Soviet empire, it is not surprising that this empire seems to provide the prism through which he views the others and the paradigm for his general theory. Conversely, Motyl is utterly uninterested in the United States and anything that might be seen as an American empire. By his carefully-constructed definitions, the United States is a case of hegemonic rule, rather than empire.

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Motyl sees his theory as a structural one; it focuses on the domination of a core elite and state over peripheral elites and societies within a hierarchically-organized political system. He sees a "structural isomorphism" between empires and totalitarian states, as these were once analyzed by theorists of totalitarianism. The very structure of empires eventually promotes decay or devolution of power from the center to the periphery. At a certain point, the decayed empire becomes vulnerable to exogenous shocks, which can result in attrition (the progressive loss of territory) or even collapse (the rapid and comprehensive breakdown of the hublike imperial structure).

Motyl explicitly advances his structural theory in opposition to what are the leading competing theories in contemporary political science, what he refers to as "agency-oriented, choice-centered, internationalist accounts," the most prominent example being rational choice theory. In his judgement, such accounts are "at best of limited utility and at worst either self-contradictory or meaningless" (p. 37).

These quotes make fairly clear who will like this book and who will not. Political scientists (including this reviewer) and sociologists who believe that a real explanation is one that systematically integrates a few independent variables and covers a large number of outcomes will find Motyl's argument to be a systematic, comprehensive, and useful theory. Conversely, political scientists and historians who believe that a real explanation is instead one that encompasses particular circumstance, individual choice, and even random chance will find his argument to be more of an abstract, deductive, and self-evident tautology. In any event, with his careful drawing of conceptional distinctions and his explicit comparison of historical cases, Alexander Motyl has made an important and useful contribution to the renewed scholarly discourse about empire.

JAMES KURTH
Swarthmore College

Warfare and the Third World *by Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman. New York, Palgrave, 2001. 413 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $24.95.*

Two major distortions have characterized the study of war over the past fifty years. First, has been an overwhelming emphasis on great power conflict. During the cold war, by far the greatest amount of scholarly attention focused on such issues as how to stop the Soviets from invading Western Europe or how to prevent superpower nuclear conflict. Following the end of the cold war, we have been exposed to learned treatises on the coming threats from the People's Republic of China and even from a newly nationalistic Germany. It's no matter that most of the wars, including those involving the United States, have oc-

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curred in the Third World. It seems far better, to concentrate on the remote possibility of catastrophic conflicts occurring among developed states than to pay attention to actual wars in the Third World. The second distortion is that most of the security literature has dealt with the origins and solutions to warfare. Why wars occur and how to stop them has preoccupied most of the scholars in this area. The conduct of wars has received far less attention.

This volume by Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman is a welcome corrective to both of these tendencies. The authors provide one of the best comprehensive treatments of conflict in the Third World to be found anywhere. Each chapter looks at warfare from a different perspective, including such subjects as the role of culture, security assistance, tactics, and strategies. A wide range of conflicts are considered from full scale conventional war (the Israeli-Arab wars, India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq) to the low intensity of conflicts (Chiapas, Moldova). In each chapter, the authors seek to explain how the conduct of the warfare is influenced by the topic under discussion. Thus, for example, cultural factors are given strong weight in explaining Israel's victory over the Arab states. India's ability to mount combined arms operations (a rarity in the Third World) makes its 1971 victory over Pakistan understandable. Throughout the book are insightful gems, such as their observation that in the 1990s, forty-six out of forty-nine conflicts were fought by small arms alone. The chapter on military geography is especially noteworthy in highlighting issues often overlooked by the literature.

The main value of this work is its comprehensiveness. Virtually every conflict is reviewed with some of the more prominent appearing throughout the work. Harkavy and Neuman also provide an important service in reviewing many of the dominant theories of warfare and then applying them to Third World conflicts. As they clearly demonstrate, theories developed with nineteenth-century Europe in mind are often lacking when applied to the messy conflicts of the Third World, most of which are intrastate in nature.

This book will not please everyone. The authors are very cautious—perhaps too much so—in declaring which explanations for Third World conflict are most persuasive. They offer no theories of their own, preferring to review and critique what others have put forth. And there is virtually nothing on terrorism, a glaring omission in light of September 11.

These quibbles notwithstanding, *Warfare and the Third World* is an invaluable addition to the study of conflict. At a time when the United States is supposedly at war with a Third World enemy, understanding how wars are won and lost in the developing world is of utmost importance. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in how wars have been fought in recent times and how they are likely to be fought in the twenty-first century.

STEVEN R. DAVID
Johns Hopkins University

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Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda *by Michael Barnett. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2002. 215 pp. $25.00.*

During the Rwanda genocide, Michael Barnett, a distinguished scholar of international politics of the Middle East, held a fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations that gave him the opportunity to serve as a political officer at the United States Mission to the United Nations. From that vantage point, he followed Rwandan developments on a daily basis. At first, he felt that the UN's failure to intervene to stop the killing had been understandable. Immersed in the UN's organizational culture, he initially shared its view that the UN was ill equipped to succeed in peacekeeping in the midst of a "civil war" and that another failure, hard on the heels of the debacle in Somalia, would expose the UN to grievously damaging criticisms, especially from skeptics in the United States. Even after it became apparent that the killings unleashed in April 1994 were a planned genocide, not simply a civil war, Barnett argued that the UN's inaction had been understandable in light of the practical constraints on it and the unforeseeable nature of the events. However, he later changed his mind when he learned that high UN officials had had far earlier knowledge of the true nature of the genocide than he had at first suspected. As a result, he decided to write "an ethical history of the UN's indifference to genocide" (p. 4). Having been on both sides of this debate and having an insider's feel for the UN's organizational culture, Barnett has been able to deliver a subtle, balanced, yet stinging account.

As background for understanding the UN's moral abdication, Barnett recounts the UN's longstanding view of prudent peacekeeping as necessarily grounded in the principles of "neutrality, impartiality, and consent" of the parties to the conflict (p. 12). During the early 1990s, the UN developed a fixed, generic script for ethnic civil wars in which the UN's role was to broker ceasefires and power-sharing agreements between willing parties (p. 112). The troubled peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Bosnia reinforced the UN's inclination to intervene only if success was foreseeable by sticking to this script.

Barnett's chronology of international turpitude is compellingly written with an eye for telling details gleaned from UN internal documents and his own interviews with key participants. He recounts the perverse effects of the UN-backed Arusha power-sharing agreement, which simultaneously emboldened moderates to press for democratic political change and at the same time pushed the extremist Hutu faction in the Rwandan government, threatened by the accord, to prepare a campaign of genocide against the minority Tutsi to derail implementation of the Arusha accord. General Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian commander of the ill-provisioned UN peacekeeping force, warned UN headquarters that such plans might be afoot and asked for the resources and authorization to forestall them, but the Secretariat refused to accept any attempt to redefine the situation in a way that would challenge the mantra of neutrality, impartiality, and consent. For a few crucial weeks after the genocide began, UN

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Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his staff continued to insist on viewing the events in terms of the traditional strictures on peacekeeping in a civil war rather than as a genocide in need of a forceful, emergency intervention. Barnett says that present historical knowledge is consistent with two explanations for this: first, the UN misevaluated information about Rwanda through the prism of a bureaucratic mindset; second, top UN officials exploited factual ambiguities and traditional peacekeeping doctrines as political cover to evade their responsibility to press for an intervention that would be unpopular with the great powers and organizationally risky for the UN.

Barnett ends his narrative, in which Dallaire figures as the tragic hero, with a call for an ethic of personal responsibility in the face of pressures for bureaucratic self-protection and political expediency. Arguably, however, a strategy for forestalling the horrors of genocide is doomed to failure if it must depend on personal heroism in the face of the kind of widespread ignorance, great power apathy and opportunism, misconceived diplomatic strategies, logistical insufficiencies, and poorly trained and equipped peacekeepers that Barnett describes in the Rwanda case. No doubt Barnett would agree that what is really needed is not just last-minute heroism in the face of long odds, but the painstaking development of a working peace system that can be run by merely mortal bureaucrats.

JACK SNYDER
Columbia University

Washington *by Meg Greenfield. New York, Public Affairs Books, 2001. 241 pp. Cloth, $26.00; paper, $14.00.*

How can a celebrated journalist escape the "traitor" label while using an anthropologist's tools to dissect Washington's political culture and its impact on politicians' lives? The answer is to write your story secretly and have it published posthumously. That is exactly what Meg Greenfield, the *Washington Post*'s fabled editorial page editor, did when she wrote *Washington.* Graced with a foreword by *Washington Post* publisher Katharine Graham and an afterword by historian Michael Beschloss, this insider's view of the Washington, D.C. cosmos was published two years after Greenfield's death.

The book chronicles the reality of life for Washington politicians during eight presidencies, starting with the John F. Kennedy administration and ending with Bill Clinton. Using the metaphor of the narcissistic, status-seeking social codes rampant at the high school level, Greenfield depicts a universe of image-conscious, extraordinarily ambitious and competitive men who pretend to be whatever is fashionable in the politics of the hour. That rarely includes displays of compassion and tolerance for their fellow actors on the Washington stage or even concern for maintaining a healthy family life for themselves. As

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Greenfield puts it, Washington politicians "eagerly dehumanize themselves" (p. 7) to reach the pinnacle of whatever counts for success. With her typical sense of fairness, she also acknowledges that the image of being successful is a prerequisite for substantive achievements in governing the nation.

Greenfield brings her characterizations of Washington types to life by brief vignettes of representative Washington movers and shakers. When she talks about the importance of having powerful mentors, for example, names like Sam Nunn, who was mentored by John Stennis, or Walter Mondale, who was mentored by Hubert Humphrey, pop up briefly and sympathetically. Greenfield is not a tabloid mudslinger; she is a classy, perceptive, and utterly fair reporter who depicts reality as she sees it.

Greenfield also describes the changes in Beltway journalism that she witnessed during her four decades of covering the scene. Most notably, there was the withering from the 1960s onward of the mystique that incumbent administrations were honest and capable and that journalists could trust their word. Respect for politicians was replaced by unremitting cynicism that made journalists hunt routinely for hidden unsavory motifs in politicians' pronouncements. The loss of trust, shared by the American public, has doomed presidents and their administrations to operating with less credibility, less privacy, and less power than their predecessors. Constant prying and carping has enhanced politicians' efforts to hide actions, deny responsibility, and sugarcoat mistakes.

Beyond its insightful portrayal of political life at Washington's pinnacle, the book also chronicles the development of a topnotch journalist whose youthful idealism grows into a mature realism concerning the dynamics of the rocky marriage between journalists and politicians. Greenfield knows the journalistic rules by which the game is played and admits to conforming to them even when it entails uncomfortable compromises with the desire to tell all. She also admits, with obvious lack of contrition, that she has often strayed from the commands of neutrality when it meant distancing herself from her story subjects. As demonstrated in her book, she believes that flesh and blood personalities should not be studied with clinical detachment, bereft of the context that shows their human settings and motivations. Acting on that insight makes the book a major contribution to understanding Washington politics. In conversational, colorful prose, Greenfield makes the denizens of the Beltway, politicians as well as journalists, come to life. She paints the nation's capital in all its phoniness, all its pretense, all its stylized moves, while still retaining all its human nuances. To experience Washington through the eyes of one of its most discerning, empathetic, and articulate observers is a rare and unique treat, enjoyable as well as enlightening for students of American politics.

DORIS GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

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The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda *by Alan Kuperman. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 162 pp. Cloth, $38.95; paper, $16.95.*

Ever since the international community stood aside during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, there has been considerable debate about whether a humanitarian intervention might have halted the crimes. Echoing United Nations Force Commander Roméo Dallaire's emotional plea at the time of the genocide, many have asserted that an intervention might have halted the killings. Alan Kuperman steps into this counterfactual world and delivers his own verdict: any intervention would have been too little, too late.

Most of the book tries to support this claim. With the manner of a seasoned coroner, Kuperman clinically diagnoses the rates of killing with precision-like actuarial tables. This exacting and nearly emotionless method leads Kuperman to offer four observations: the United States could not have diagnosed the killings as a genocide until after 20 April 1994; at this point it could have chosen between several military options, including a maximum operation that would require forty days to ramp up and a minimal operation that would have taken two weeks of preparation time; most of the deaths occurred before any military operation could have been dispatched; and at best, an intervention would have saved between 75,000 and 125,000 people.

Kuperman makes several important points. One, there is a huge difference between having good intentions and having the capabilities to carry out these intentions. Military operations cannot be instantly produced and transported into the field; they take time to assemble. Two, effective humanitarian intervention comes before the killing is underway. Kuperman is not opposed to humanitarian intervention. Instead, he wants to disabuse those who believe that intervention can be done on the cheap or at the midnight hour. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure that will probably be too late to help the patient.

Kuperman's arguments are controversial, not because of the claim that intervention is more difficult to accomplish than many presume, but rather because they carry several troubling normative implications. One, he presumes that UN or American officials did not have a duty to aid until they could identify the genocide. But by mid-April many knew of crimes against humanity. On what moral grounds does Kuperman decide that crimes short of a genocide do not demand a response? Two, because he argues that only a military intervention would dampen the genocide, he conveys the impression that intervention is an all-or-nothing proposition and thus reinforces policy makers' preference to do nothing. But there were lots of options short of intervention that went unused, which might have saved lives at relatively little cost. The very unwillingness to employ these options convinced the perpetrators that the international community did not care about the Tutsis, and thus they had no reason to change course.

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Finally, Kuperman essentially adopts a consequentialist logic. He is so insistent on demonstrating that the United Nations or the United States could not have done much that he fails to ask whether they were obligated to try. The effect is to let off the hook those who were in positions of responsibility at the time of the genocide; they can now find comfort in Kuperman's claim that it didn't really matter whether they tried or not. The outcome would hardly have been any different. On this score, it is important to remember that Kuperman's book is a thought experiment. At no time did policy makers actively consider an intervention; they did not even ask defense planners to draw up possible plans. Instead, they were busily trying to avoid an intervention and telling themselves that such indifference was proper and legitimate. In the end, I worry that policy makers might read Kuperman's book and conclude that the next time crimes against humanity erupt they should do very little because little can be done and they are under no obligation to try.

MICHAEL BARNETT
University of Wisconsin–Madison

The Making and Breaking of the Soviet System: An Interpretation *by Christopher Read. New York, Palgrave, 2001. 259 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $20.95.*

Christopher Read has produced an excellent interpretative history of twentieth-century Russian history. His lively account of the rise and fall of the Soviet system will surely be of interest not only to undergraduates studying Russian politics historically but also to a more general readership.

The book contains nothing new for specialists, but that is not its purpose. Read is anything but bland. His opinions of people and events are expressed boldly, and his judgments are extremely shrewd and firmly based on an understanding of the differentiated constraints imposed by the Soviet system at different times. If Read is most on top of the scholarly literature on the first half of the twentieth century, his writings on the Gorbachev era are nevertheless marked by uncommon sense and perceptiveness. They are notably free from the retrospective determinism, which imputes an inevitability to a sequence of events that in many respects was highly contingent.

There are occasional dubious assertions and a few factual errors. To take just one of the former, it is surely an overstatement to say that though the changes introduced under Leonid Brezhnev were "less spectacular" than those under Nikita Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachev, they were "in many ways equally influential" (p. 153). Even here, Read is right in emphasizing that Soviet society changed during the Brezhnev era. Some of the preconditions for the transformation of the second half of the 1980s may be detected in those years—the growth of cynicism, the decline of ideological belief, and the spread of

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higher education, among them. Yet the institutional system remained remarkably constant during Brezhnev's eighteen years at the helm, and the exceedingly modest policy innovation of those two decades should hardly be mentioned in the same breath as the turning of Soviet ideology on its head and the dismantling of the pillars of the Soviet system which occurred under Gorbachev.

Three factual errors would be worth correcting in any future edition of this textbook. An ambiguous sentence on page 173—"Soviet society was declared to have achieved 'developed socialism' or, literally translated, 'actually existing socialism'"—seems to conflate two different concepts elaborated in the Brezhnev era: *razvitoy sotsializm* (developed socialism) and *real'nyy sotsializm* (actually existing socialism). Read is wrong when he states that Yury Andropov, during his brief tenure as general secretary of the Communist party from November 1982 to February 1984, "brought into the Politburo" Mikhail Gorbachev (p. 197). Gorbachev achieved that particular goal under Brezhnev. He became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979 and a full member in 1980. What Andropov did do was to extend his responsibilities and repose such trust in him that he was already a potential general secretary in 1984 and the most powerful claimant to the party leadership when Andropov's successor, Konstantin Chernenko, died just one year later.

Read is also wrong to say that Gorbachev was elected president of the Soviet Union by "the partially reformed Supreme Soviet" (p. 216). He was elected in March 1990 by the new legislative body created a year earlier, the Congress of People's Deputies (a large assembly which elected an inner body that retained the old name of Supreme Soviet but was different in kind from its supine predecessor). On the more substantial issue that Gorbachev lost ground to Yeltsin by opting for indirect election, rather than election by the whole people, Read is, of course, right.

The very occasional error of fact should not obscure the fundamental point that Christopher Read has produced an admirably informative overview of Russian politics in the twentieth century that should appear on many a reading list.

ARCHIE BROWN
Oxford University

Judging the Past in Unified Germany *by A. James McAdams. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 244 pp. Cloth, $52.95; paper, $19.95.*

In formerly authoritarian or communist societies, few issues spark such passionate and politicized debate as that of retrospective justice. How should the former leaders, supporters, beneficiaries, and also victims of immoral and repugnant regimes be treated in a newly democratic society? Post-transitional

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countries as geographically diverse as Argentina, the Czech Republic, El Salvador, and South Africa have been confronting these difficult questions in recent years, and many more will likely do so in the near future.

Among the actual and potential cases of retrospective justice, Eastern Germany stands out for at least three reasons. First, the country once known as the German Democratic Republic (GDR) disappeared from the map after German unification in 1990—an altogether anomalous occurrence in a world where national separatism has become the norm. As a result, most decisions involving how to judge the East German past have been made by West Germans, who never actually lived in the society whose former citizens they are evaluating. Second, the horrific cloud of the Nazi past hangs over any discussion of retrospective justice in Germany, particularly since many analysts feel that the prosecution and punishment of Nazi officials did not go far enough. Third, the scope and magnitude of the German process of carrying out retrospective justice have been the most extensive and thorough of any case thus far. Despite much public and political fascination with retrospective justice in contemporary Germany, it has received little systematic scholarly analysis. Most accounts that consider this topic are either written by protagonists with their own clear agenda and not much concern for the larger theoretical and comparative context, or by relative outsiders who have little knowledge of the main issues, actors, and subtleties involved.

A. James McAdams, however, has written an engaging book that sets a new standard for research on retrospective justice in Germany and elsewhere. One of the book's many strengths is its careful attention to historical context. Because McAdams understands the complex and often contradictory laws and norms that existed in the GDR, he is able to contextualize the moral arguments about right and wrong. This permits him to avoid taking sides in these often vitriolic debates. Instead, he tries to find the "common ground" shared by otherwise strongly opposed views, and to identify and pinpoint the foundations for disagreement. At the same time, however, McAdams does not shy away from making appropriate criticisms of both the supporters of a harsh condemnation and punishment of East Germans and those who dismiss any judgmental examination of the GDR past as victor's justice.

The core of the book consists of four substantive chapters, each devoted to a different type of retrospective justice. After a chapter on criminal justice, which examines the prosecution of those GDR officials who may have violated the GDR's own laws, a chapter on disqualifying justice addresses the process of vetting out people who collaborated with the infamous Stasi, or secret police. A third chapter takes on the issue of moral justice, as posed by the public examination of the complete historical record of the GDR by a deeply politicized commission of the federal parliament. Finally, the issue of corrective justice considers the complex and historically entangled question of property ownership and restitution. Each chapter in and of itself contains enough rich material to form a book. That McAdams has managed to include them all within a larger coherent framework that unites them is a major contribution.

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Although the four types of retrospective justice are quite distinct from one another, McAdams describes a common pattern that occurred for each: the process began in a way that offended and alienated many East Germans, but ended with solutions that were actually quite fair and reasonable. The problem, though—which McAdams recognizes, but does not confront as directly as he might have—is that what remains in the memories of most East Germans is the initial resentment, rather than the eventual fair outcome. Many West Germans have little sympathy for East German complaints, and they criticize the process for not going far enough. In short, the product of this process is that despite its many undeniably important achievements, "judging the past" has served to further polarize, not unify, the two German societies.

McAdams has written a powerful and provocative book that will surely serve as a model for future studies about Germany and many other countries that have sought—or will seek—conciliatory and fair processes (and products) of retrospective justice.

MARC MORJÉ HOWARD
University of Maryland

Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.–China Relations, 1989–2000 *by David M. Lampton. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001. 497 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

This book offers a close and systematic analysis of turbulent U.S.–China relations from the June 1989 upheaval in Beijing to about 2000. This work is probably the best of a half-dozen or so recent studies of Sino–U.S. relations during that period. Even though Lampton's work is a self-conscious contribution to the evolving U.S. policy debate over relations with China, it is evenly argued. Lampton does not believe China is a threat to the United States, a peer-competitor, or probable future aggressor in Asia. Yet, he does not ignore aspects of Chinese behavior that might challenge that assumption. *Same Bed, Different Dreams* places Lampton squarely at the golden-mean of the Red Team-Blue Team debate over China policy in the United States. Lampton presents a complex analysis of the deterioration of Sino-American relations since 1989. He recognizes clashes of interest over Taiwan, the role of military alliances in the international order, and the U.S. desire to maintain its global preeminence juxtaposed to China's desire to reestablish its "rightful place" in the world. But these clashing interests are offset by complementary and parallel interests in other areas, including but not limited to the economic. Moreover, clashes arising out of conflicts of interest have been greatly exacerbated by inept handling, especially on the U.S. side according to Lampton, misperceptions on both sides, and different values and expectations arising out of very different civilizations.

Lampton lays great stress on the role of domestic politics in determining the policies of both sides and in driving the post-June 1989 deterioration of rela-

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tions. The domestic political cycles of the two countries were out of sync; when the leaders of one side were able and willing to improve relations, political conflict and uncertainty on the other side prevented this. After a while, the roles of the two countries would be reversed. Thus, when the Bush administration was prepared to develop relations during the six months after June 1989, deep divisions in Beijing prevented a positive response. By the time politics in Beijing in 1992 inclined China's leaders to desire forward progress in bilateral relations, a U.S. presidential campaign with "China" playing a role and a new president committed to linking most-favored-nation status and human rights, disinclined the U.S. side to respond to Chinese initiatives. Only after the Taiwan Strait crisis of early 1996 made clear to both sides the potential costs of military conflict, did the domestic politics of the two countries come into sync, according to Lampton.

Lampton's analysis of domestic political pressures on the U.S. side is far stronger than his analysis of comparable dynamics on the Chinese side. His analysis of the role of congressional-executive competition, electoral pressures and strategies, and the role of interest and lobbying groups in the context of different styles of U.S. presidential leadership is superb. Analysis of the Chinese domestic scene is much weaker. Strong Peoples Liberation Army lobbying for tougher policies toward the United States, elite competition for succession to the position of paramount leader, the role of anti–U.S. nationalism in rallying popular support are mentioned in passing at several points. But these elements are not elaborated on, woven into a rich analytical fabric, or elucidated in action in the Chinese policy process, as the author does on the U.S. side of the equation. Lampton does, however, clearly delineate a number of Chinese misperceptions regarding U.S. policy, especially imputing containment motives to U.S. moves clearly inspired largely by domestic political considerations.

Same Bed, Different Dreams is also a call for doing better in managing Sino-American relations. Lampton believes that "the future [of Sino-U.S. relations] must be shaped; it is not preordained." He concludes that a mixed relationship, sometimes cooperative, sometimes conflictual, is the most likely future relationship. But he believes that it could veer toward either a "broadly conflictual" or a "broadly cooperative" relationship given poor or wise handling by the two sides. Lampton distils the experience of the 1989–2000 period into seven "guidelines" for better management of the relationship, which, if adhered to, will move in a more cooperative direction. Paraphrased, these guidelines are: don't posit goals that will be very difficult to achieve or abandon; provide coherent policy leadership; be clear about priorities and opportunity costs; be sensitive to cultural differences and take a long-range view; don't make threats you are not prepared to carry out; be sensitive to the political circumstances of the other side; and educate public opinion about the need for and possibility of a cooperative relation.

JOHN W. GARVER
Georgia Institute of Technology

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Chinese Democracy after Tiananmen *by Yijiang Ding. University of British Columbia Press, 2001. 172 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $24.95.*

Yijiang Ding gives one of the more comprehensive, if brief, overviews of democratic thinking, practice, and attitudes in China, not just since Tiananmen (as the title says), but since the beginning of reform. Ding begins with a short but solid discussion of the development of democratic thinking in the 1980s and then looks at the continuation of democratic discussions in the post-1989 period. While pre-1989 democratic thinking is well known, one achievement of this book is the citing of several important and generally unknown contributions to the discussion on democracy that appeared only a year or so after Tiananmen. Ding is able to discuss the development of democratic thinking as a continuity over a two-decade span of time.

In the midsection of the book, Ding turns his attention to the development of democratic practice in China, particularly the explosion of associations in the 1990s and the rapid development of village elections. Although village elections have been explored in a number of good studies, the literature has generally paid less attention to the growth of associations. Ding discusses whether such associations should be viewed in corporatist terms (as some authors have argued) or whether they suggest an emerging civil society. Although he notes that the state tries to force associations into a corporatist mold, he argues that associations are frequently able to escape such constraints. Thus, with some reservations, Ding inclines toward the civil society side of the debate.

Finally, Ding draws on survey research to look at changing attitudes and argue that Chinese citizens today are more politically alienated from the state, more individualistic, and more materialistic than they were two decades ago. A sense of the private realm, not simply the withdrawal of the state, seems to have emerged.

Although short, this is a useful and generally well researched book. Yijiang Ding seems convinced that China is moving in a democratic direction, and one would like to be convinced by his research and logic. Certainly the state is less penetrating into society than it was a decade or more ago, and reform ideas (including democracy) have made a comeback since Tiananmen. But other things are going on in Chinese society as well. Many people have commented on the rise of the New Left and nationalism, but except for one brief reference in this book, these ideas are not addressed. At one point, Ding argues that attitudinal surveys reveal "the failure of the official patriotism propaganda" (p. 112). This is not self-evident. Much nationalist thinking has an antistate edge to it, as all nationalist movements in twentieth-century China have had. So it would be useful to explore more fully the interaction or antagonism between democratic and nationalist ideas. In other words, it is necessary to place democratic ideas and actions within the broad spectrum of intellectual and popular thinking in China today.

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Not all the social changes in China today are inherently conducive to the building of a democratic society. The emergence of labor movements and strikes appears to move China in the civil society direction, but the strong reaction of the state suggests that authoritarian responses to popular action are hardly passé. Similarly, the emergence of Falun Gong and other *qigong* associations suggests not only that "civil" associations are not necessarily democratic but that the state retains a striking capacity to suppress popular movements that it sees as threatening. The weakening of social control at the local level could suggest an opening for democratic initiatives, but it can also open the way for some very nondemocratic alternatives. The private economy has developed impressively over the past decade or so, but the middle class in sociological terms remains quite weak. Moreover, private entrepreneurs have not been in the forefront of democratic action, frequently preferring collusion to confrontation with the party-state.

All in all, *Chinese Democracy After Tiananmen* is a very useful book, but it is only a starting point in understanding the complexity of post-Tiananmen China.

JOSEPH FEWSMITH
Boston University

Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo
by Chris P. Ioannides. New York, Pella Publishing Company, Inc., 2001. 523 pp. $30.00.

Many observers of the Cyprus conflict point to the fact that parties to the conflict lack a shared vision. Greek Cypriots focus attention on the Turkish invasion and occupation, and on the violation of international law and human rights in the period since 1974. Turkish Cypriots focus on the period before 1974, beginning with a massacre of men, women, and children in the Nicosia suburb of Omorphita in December 1963, after which they were dominated and oppressed by the Greek Cypriot leadership in its pursuit of *enosis* (union).

This long, extended polemic by Chris P. Ioannides is sympathetic with the first point of view and has little appreciation for the plight of the Turkish Cypriots or the Turkish government's legitimate concern for that minority, which is mentioned cursorily. He characterizes Turkey as concerned primarily with a false, if not contrived threat of encirclement by Greece and as waiting only for the "long-sought opportunity to invade" (p. 126). Nikos Sampson, designated by the junta in Athens as the head of the puppet regime in Cyprus at the time of the 1974 coup, receives brief mention as a "controversial figure" who "had taken part in the intercommunal fighting in 1963 and 1964" (p. 75). Ioannides makes no mention of Sampson's leadership role in the massacre in Omorphita, on whose ruins he was photographed waving a Greek flag. Ioannides, ironically,

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accuses President Jimmy Carter of engaging in a revision of history, redefining the essence of the Cyprus question "from being an issue of an illegal invasion and occupation to being a mere communal dispute" (pp. 409–410). One might equally observe that Ioannides's characterization of the problem as primarily a legal issue ignores the fact that it grew out of a communal dispute in the first place.

Although it ignores the Cyprus conflict's complex contexts, Ioannides's lengthy book is nonetheless interesting for its insight into the concerns, obsessions, and self-justifications of Greeks, Greek Cypriots, and Greek-Americans, and for its reminder that in the eyes of many of them, Britain and the United States bear much of the responsibility for the current situation in Cyprus. Allegedly they fomented ethnic discord and polarization before the republic was created, engineered the 1967 coup, supported the Greek junta, contributed to the prolongation of the junta's rule, making possible the coup against Makarios, condoned the first phase of the Turkish invasion, or facilitated its second phase. Even Makarios's heart attack in 1977 can be attributed to Clark Clifford's framework for negotiation. There is always some truth in these assertions, but, unfortunately, it is only part of the truth. When Ioannides periodically acknowledges that the Greeks, too, share responsibility for the current situation, it is more in the manner of a rhetorical acknowledgment.

Ioannides covers the period from the beginning of the 1974 Cyprus crisis to the repeal of the U.S. congressional embargo in 1978. He indulges in numerous digressions and repetitive arguments, going back and forth in time, saving most of his salvos for the Carter administration in general and Carter in particular, whose *realpolitik* efforts to lift the embargo are compared unfavorably with his idealistic campaign rhetoric. Ioannides's preference for dealing with the Turks would have been for the United States to be tough with them, as President Lyndon Johnson was in his famous letter to Turkey's Prime Minister Ismet Inonu in 1964. Once the embargo was in place, he would have rejected the Carter administration's unnecessarily "alarmist" concerns about the Turkish drift toward the Soviet Union and its giving in to "Turkish blackmail." As a fallback, he would have lifted the embargo only conditionally on concessions by the Turks; and he would have had Carter devote the kind of time and energy to the Cyprus question that he did to the Palestinian-Israeli problem through the Camp David accords. U.S. presidents, in short, are to be blamed both for much of the problem and for not providing the solution.

BRUCE KUNIHOLM
Duke University

Egypt During the Sadat Years *by Kirk J. Beattie. New York, Palgrave, 2001. 284 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.00.*

Light on theory and heavy on description, this is a book most political scientists without a compelling interest in recent Egyptian politics are likely to ignore.

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Although that is a shame, it is probably unavoidable given the avidity with which comparative politics often devours the cake of theory at the expense of empirical substance. Kirk Beattie has produced a thoughtful and meticulous political narrative of Egypt during the years Anwar Sadat was president—1971–1980. Beattie lived in Egypt for many of those years and met many of the key figures in Egyptian politics of the time. Interviews with Egyptian participants and copious reading of the secondary literature and the press inform the book.

Beattie reviews the tumultuous decade after the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser during which Sadat consolidated power, dismantled much of the authoritarian apparatus he inherited, reopened the economy to foreign investment and private enterprise with less than satisfactory effects, fought a major war with Israel, and signed the first peace treaty between that country and an Arab state. It strains the imagination simply to list the decade's events into one paragraph, and although Beattie manages economically to describe the events from the viewpoint of the political elite in one book, it is a rapid *tour d'horizon.*

There is no doubt that specialists on Egypt or the Middle East will find Beattie's account a valuable one. Besides the obvious value of the account itself, specialists may also find it useful to have Beattie's accounts of how various political actors—friendly or inimical to Sadat—remembered and evaluated the events of the decade. Why would anyone else want to read it? Beattie, the author of a previous volume on the Nasser years, is aware of the narrow path Sadat trod throughout the decade he held power. It was, in Beattie's estimate, touch and go from the moment Sadat formally assumed the reins of power on Nasser's death until his own assassination a decade later. It was a tumultuous decade punctuated by war (1973), prolonged military tension (1970–1973 and 1974–1978), economic upheaval including riots in 1977, and isolation from Egypt's Arab allies (1978–1980). Sadat frequently employed coercion; he arrested opponents and brought tanks into the street when his power was threatened.

Nevertheless Beattie makes a compelling case that Sadat's substantive political decisions ensured his longevity and argues that had he managed to survive until the return of the Sinai peninsula from Israel, he might have been able to undertake even more far-reaching reforms. Sadat himself was able to consolidate his power after Nasser's death because he had some appeal with the public and he was, in Beattie's eyes, quite attentive to the public implications of choices he made. That Beattie presents an image of politics in an authoritarian regime is an attractive feature of the book. What is missing, however, are the murkier decisions made by Sadat in the year before his assassination: to forbid the sale of meat in Egypt for a month, to bury the Pharaonic mummies in the Egyptian museum, and the attempt to force Egyptian shop-owners to open for business on European hours (9–5:00) rather than Egyptian hours (9–1:00 and 5–9:00 with a break during the hottest part of the day). These suggest a less disciplined and more arbitrary hand on the rudder.

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What one has to wonder, even more, is how the regime has managed such longevity. Egypt's current President Husni Mubarak assumed his post when Sadat was murdered and has been Egypt's third leader since Nasser led the 1952 coup against the monarchy. Although coercion probably accounts for a lot, this is nevertheless a remarkable record of institutional longevity if one compares it to Latin American dictatorships, for example. Juan Peron lasted barely a decade in power, and Argentina has had little stability since he was driven from power in 1955; Peron was exceptional in creating the kind of durable populist institutions that Beattie describes as the basis of the Egyptian regime for the past five decades. One might point to Augusto Pinochet's Chile or Fidel Castro's Cuba, but in the former case the regime did not survive its master's decision to leave power and it seems unlikely the latter will survive its master's death. Yet authoritarian governments in Egypt and other parts of the region have a remarkable longevity. In at least one case—Syria—the regime appears to have transformed itself into a monarchy, where the son has succeeded the father and there are intimations that something similar may happen in Egypt and Iraq.

Beattie, regrettably, does not consider why the regime should have been sufficiently durable to outlast the murder of its second incumbent, but his book will prove a fruitful source of information for anyone wishing to understand why authoritarian governments in the parts of the Arab Middle East have proved to be so much more robust than those elsewhere. Beattie, the author of a book on the Nasser period and now Sadat, might consider turning his attention to this question in a third book. We would, I think, all be in his debt.

ELLIS GOLDBERG
University of Washington

Mandates and Democracies: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America
by Susan C. Stokes. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 220 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $19.95.

A quarter century since the most recent wave of democratization began to sweep Latin America, the results of democratization have been uneven. In some countries, constitutional rule has proved to be remarkably resilient, even amid economic crisis. In others, similar challenges appear to have eroded public support for democratically elected governments. The types of studies that have dominated the field that chart the support of key groups for democratic regimes or the institutional configurations that underpin effective governance have little to say about what might account for different levels of citizen support for democratic regimes in the region. Recent arguments that attribute popular disenchantment with democracy to the dislocations caused by neoliberal economic policies are similarly limited in that they neither differentiate when publics ac-

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tually do support executives who implement economic reforms and when they do not; nor have they received much empirical support. In this void, Susan Stokes's *Mandates and Democracy* is a landmark that illuminates the dynamics of voter support and opposition for political leaders in Latin America, especially in three troubled democracies—Peru, Argentina, and Venezuela.

Stokes begins her account with the observation that in these and other cases (a dozen in the past twenty years), politicians have promised one thing in campaigns and switched policy course once elected. They have "violated" their mandates. She first sets out to understand why. Do they do so to conceal their true governing intentions or because they genuinely changed their minds once in office and discovered the magnitude of the constraints they faced? Is it the case that they are more likely to do so where parties are young, weak, or not well institutionalized? Her second objective is to understand the implications of these switches for democracy. How does the electorate receive these switches? Do voters reward politicians who switched policy course but delivered good government or do they cast their votes to remove a chief executive who violated his mandate?

The book provides persuasive answers to these questions. Successive chapters tell us that candidates are more apt to hide their neoliberal policy intentions in close races than in ones in which they expect to win by a comfortable margin. Policy switches happen in countries with relatively well institutionalized parties (Venezuela, Argentina, and Costa Rica) as well as in those with uninstitutionalized parties (Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia). Voters tend to support a government that changes course when outcomes are sufficiently good, as they were in Argentina when prices stabilized, but they abandon a government that does the same when the outcomes of unmandated policies are bad, as they were in Venezuela. The outcome of elections may also be sealed by the ability of governments to focus voters on issue areas other than the one where the government imposed unmandated policies. In Peru, the Fujimori government successfully diverted attention from the economy to peace and rallied support by defeating the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla rebellion and embarking on a spending program just before election time.

Stokes's work is impressive for its all-too-rare combination of posing questions inspired by normative theory. She frames—but does not seal—the answers by the formal logic of positive theory, and derives results from a sophisticated empirical analysis of electoral and public opinion data. Few scholars have a comparable vision and set of tools with which to address the implications for democracy when citizens are deprived of the opportunity to express themselves on the political alternatives available to them. With *Mandates and Democracy*, the capstone of her recent research on political representation and democracy accountability, Stokes cements her position as one of the leading contemporary scholars of comparative democracy.

FRANCES HAGOPIAN
University of Notre Dame

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Politics After Neoliberalism: Reregulation in Mexico *by Richard Snyder. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 245 pp. $60.00.*

This book challenges traditional assumptions about postneoliberal political economy, revealing an environment in which governments, far from receding from economic management, have found new ways to reregulate markets in the wake of neoliberal reforms. Specifically, Richard Snyder explores how four Mexican states have used the space created by the abolition of the Mexican Coffee Institute at the national level to build regulatory institutions of their own. Working with a relentless attention to detail, Snyder wades through the rich experiences of Oaxaca, Guerrero, Chiapas, and Puebla, creating not just a compelling narrative but also deriving a more generalizable framework for understanding the factors that shape postneoliberal political economy. In particular, Snyder argues that the choice of reregulatory projects depends first on the relative strength of producer groups. Where the oligarchy is strong and small producers are weak, politicians cater to elites by introducing crony capitalist institutions (Puebla). Where the balance of political strength is reversed, politicians attempt to incorporate small producers by introducing neocorporatist institutions (Guerrero). Where both oligarchs and small producers are strong (Chiapas and Oaxaca), one must look to each governor's policy repertoire: "neoliberal" politicians are likely to choose crony capitalist projects (Chiapas), while "statist" politicians choose neocorporatist projects (Oaxaca).

The outcomes of these policies are determined by their interaction with the strength and strategies of small-producer groups, leading either to participatory or exclusionary institutions. Where strong organizations of small producers chose an engaged productivist strategy (challenging the project in a nonpartisan way and demanding inclusion in neocorporatist institutions), a participatory policy framework resulted (Oaxaca). Where strong organizations of small producers chose a disengaged productivist strategy (ignoring the state's new institutions) in the face of a crony capitalist strategy, this initially led to stalemate, but after federal intervention, a participatory policy framework also resulted (Chiapas). Where strong organizations of small producers engaged in a partisan strategy (challenging the project and building an alliance with an opposition party) to counter a neocorporatist project, an exclusionary policy framework resulted (Guerrero). Finally, where weak small-producer organizations adopted a disengaged productivist strategy in the context of a crony capitalist approach, they ended up with an exclusionary policy framework. Clearly, no one of these three variables alone predicts the regulatory outcome: strong small producer organizations are a necessary but not sufficient condition for a participatory outcome; disengaged productivist strategies led to both types of outcomes; and neocorporatist and crony capitalist projects are each associated with both possible outcomes. Richard Snyder convincingly shows that it is the interplay between these factors that determines outcomes.

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Given two possible state strategies, two levels of strength for small-producer organizations and at least three possible strategies they might pursue, there are twelve possible combinations of variables and only four cases. While this limits his ability to test his theory, Snyder meticulously analyzes these cases over time, providing at least some suggestive ideas about other combinations of the variables. Still, these in-depth case discussions raise further sources of variation across the four cases that one might elevate to explanatory status: states differ in their access to funds from the central government, in the abilities of producer groups to gain support from federal officials, in the territorial scope of small-producer associations and the coincidence of their geographical spread with municipal political boundaries within the state, and governors differ in their connection to the state they are governing and the stage of their careers in which they find themselves. While this book cannot confidently confirm its hypotheses, it points out an extremely puzzling finding, provides a solid foundation for investigating it, thoroughly researches four cases in great depth, and ends with a well-crafted agenda for future research in this field. Altogether, it is theoretically and empirically interesting and important.

KATHLEEN O'NEILL
Cornell University

The Limits of Convergence: Globalization and Organizational Change in Argentina, South Korea, and Spain *by Marco F. Guillén. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001. 282 pp. $35.00.*

Does globalization—increasing transnational flows of goods, capital, services, information, people, and culture—induce convergence in the organization of production in developing countries? Several theoretical perspectives, including modernization theory in political science and neoclassical economics, suggest that the answer is yes. But in this study of the development trajectories of Argentina, South Korea, and Spain between 1950 and 1999, Marco F. Guillén argues that such a conclusion is incorrect. Based on rich qualitative case studies, the book's argument is that globalization encourages divergence in development paths and that each country studied has combined organizational forms in different ways, leading to corresponding strengths and weaknesses in the national economy. The book also takes aim at dependency and world systems theory. This theoretical approach may provide an accurate survey of inequality in the world economy at any given time but the author argues it is unable to account for countries such as South Korea, which has broken through the glass ceiling of poverty in only a few decades.

Guillén is persuasive when he argues that his comparative institutional approach is best able to account for the divergence among the three countries' cases. A professor at the Wharton School, Guillén is most interested in business

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organizations. He defines multinational enterprises, small and medium enterprises, and business groups (collections of firms bound together in formal and/or informal networks) as three distinct organizational forms in modern capitalism. He highlights the differential combination of each in shaping each national development trajectory. This tripartite division allows Guillén to illuminate key differences among the cases. Spain's current "pragmatic-modernizing" development path involves an alliance between large multinationals, small and medium enterprises, and large oligopolistic firms that has created a strong financial sector, facilitated integration with Europe, and enabled Spanish firms to invest abroad. But it has also produced high unemployment and technological dependency. South Korea's "nationalist-modernizing" policies reflect a pact between the state and giant conglomerates (*chaebols*) that has kept multinational firms at arm's length, producing greater technological self-sufficiency and a more successful export sector than Spain's, but also weak small and medium enterprises, a shaky financial sector, and repressed labor unions. Finally, Guillén sees an Argentine political economy dominated by multinational enterprises and large domestic firms that has largely excluded small and medium-sized businesses and failed to improve export performance outside the agricultural sector.

Guillén's argument, as suggestive as it is, reveals the theoretical underdevelopment of comparative institutionalism. It lacks a central concept such as equilibrium in neoclassical economics or world system theory with which to simplify the complexity of real political economies. There is too much indeterminacy in the approach. Researchers using the comparative institutional perspective need to work harder to refine key concepts, especially those derived from theories of path dependency, and to detect recurring patterns in their empirical work so as to sharpen their theoretical rigor.

There are problems with some points made in the book. It is hard to understand why Guillén classifies Argentina as having "pragmatic populist" economic policies, given the radical nature of the neoliberal reforms enacted since 1989. His conclusion that the country has achieved "financial stability" was overtaken by the recent debt default and profound economic crisis, although his overall assessment that Argentina represents the least successful development path among his three countries is reinforced.

The argument in the final chapter that authoritarian regimes are not more successful developers than democratic ones seems plausible. But it has a tacked-on feel to it, because the democracy-development nexus is not explored earlier in the work, and Guillén adds little new to the debate. But overall, this book offers a sophisticated and lively analysis of three well-researched and important cases of distinctive political economies. It is a valuable contribution to the debate about the impact of globalization on national development trajectories and the varieties of capitalism in the modern world.

ANTHONY W. PEREIRA
Tulane University

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Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation *by Cecilia Albin. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 268 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $21.95.*

In this excellent addition to the Cambridge Studies in International Relations series, Cecilia Albin asks why and how notions of justice and fairness matter in international negotiations. Her goal is not to articulate or to test any particular theories of international justice but instead to explore the contours of moral psychology. Hers is an empirical task, not a philosophical one.

Albin asks a series of questions and runs them through four complex international negotiations in various issue areas. Her questions include: What motivates international negotiators to take justice or fairness into account? How do they understand those concepts in the particular circumstances of particular negotiations? How do they deal with competing conceptions of justice or fairness? How do negotiators' concerns with justice or fairness interact with considerations of power, self-interest, or domestic politics? To what extent, and in what ways, is it important to satisfy negotiators' concerns for justice or fairness if the agreements they reach are to be effective? Her cases include negotiations to combat acid rain, to manage international trade (specifically, in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), to lay the foundations for a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace in the Oslo Accords and after, and to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Albin's case studies are detailed, thorough, and richly informative; and they yield a number of fascinating insights. For example, she discovered that "Virtually all practitioners interviewed denied that [considerations of justice and fairness] had been the primary concerns prompting their entry into and conduct during negotiations" (p. 218), but that these considerations nevertheless had a powerful effect on their decision making at every stage, influencing both substance and process. Substantive notions of justice and fairness predictably varied widely from case to case, reflecting the circumstances of particular issues and problems, while procedural concerns for impartiality, reciprocity, and mutual advantage were evident in all cases. Albin convincingly shows that these concerns interact in interesting and complicated ways with concern for narrow material self-interest, and that they are not simply reducible thereto. Moreover, "ideas about justice and fairness can have almost any conceivable impact. They may serve as external referents guiding the bargaining dynamics, or become subject to negotiation themselves. They influence the positions and proposals brought to the table, the exchange and evaluation of concessions, and the formulation of agreements. They may trigger the onset of dialogue and facilitate its progress, or cause deadlocks and stalemates which bring the entire process to the brink of collapse. They may constrain the freedom of action of parties, or be used and abused tactically in the pursuit of individual advantage. They may prompt parties to sign or comply with an agreement, or provoke condemnations which threaten its very existence and effectiveness" (pp. 228–229).

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Albin's study represents an important corrective to two unfortunate tendencies: one for empirical political scientists to ignore the role and importance of moral considerations in political behavior, and the other for normative political theorists to ignore the nuances and complexities of real-world moral judgments when attempting to articulate abstract principles. On this latter, while Albin does not assign herself the task of refereeing between competing theorists of international justice, she notes that her findings give more aid and comfort to the pragmatic procedural liberalism of Brian Barry than to anything else. Negotiators are more likely to be motivated by concern for justice and fairness and to abide by the terms of agreements they reach, if they feel that others take their concerns seriously, negotiate in good faith, and demonstrate a willingness to compromise for the sake of reaching an agreement, even if the end result does not quite satisfy some *ex ante* set of abstract principles or demands. In short, here—as in so many other places—the perfect is the enemy of the good. Small wonder philosophers have found international justice such a tough nut to crack.

DAVID A. WELCH
University of Toronto

The New Politics of the Welfare State *edited by Paul Pierson. New York, Oxford University Press, 2001. 528 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $19.95.*

This outstanding book challenges the widely accepted notion that globalization will lead advanced industrial countries to roll back their welfare states and converge on a uniform, neoliberal model of social provision. More than that, it well-nigh demolishes that simplistic idea and shows decisively that national political and economic structures will largely determine how countries respond to the common challenges of economic openness, interdependence, and austerity.

The book's title signals a dual emphasis. It is, first, a work about the *new* politics of the welfare state. Building on the extensive literature on the welfare state's origins and growth, it develops new insights about how states will cope with pressures for retrenchment, reform, and renewal in a new era. At the same time, it is a book about the new *politics* of the welfare state. It puts politics front and center in the analysis of the welfare state and asks how variations in national political structures and processes affect welfare politics and policy. To this question it applies new analytical tools, notably considerations of timing, sequence, history (such as path dependence), and the links between political institutions and economic regimes.

The book is an exemplary edited volume. It is truly a collective effort to puzzle over these problems. Although they draw on a variety of methods and approaches—from large-N statistical studies (chapters by Torben Iversen and Duane Swank) to qualitative comparisons of a few countries (chapters by Giuli-

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ano Bonoli and Stewart Wood, among others), from broad looks at a wide variety of welfare policies (Evelyne Huber and John Stephens, for example) to focused analyses of single policy areas (John Myles and Paul Pierson on pensions, Susan Giaimo on health care)—the authors clearly have a common purpose. The chapters speak to each other, and the authors have obviously thought carefully about one another's arguments, as evidenced by the frequent citations to other chapters. Framed by Pierson's cogent introduction and conclusion, the book develops a cumulative impact that is unusual for such a wide-ranging collection of papers.

Some of the chapters, it must be said, advance the book's purpose more effectively than others. Particularly outstanding are the essays by Pierson on the post-industrial pressures facing contemporary welfare states, Iversen on the impact of de-industrialization on welfare policies, Bonoli on veto points, Herbert Kitschelt on party competition, and Wood on labor-market policies. Each is a model of clear analytic exposition despite the differing approaches. Other essays do not quite offer the same kind of crisp analytical focus and occasionally lose themselves in descriptive drift. But this is really setting the bar exceptionally high; there is not a single dud in the bunch.

So what, in the end, does the new politics of the welfare state look like? Despite the book's analytical coherence we are not left with terribly clear answers. The authors agree that "globalization" will not have a uniform impact, that most welfare states retain the allegiance of citizens, and that reform and restructuring are more likely than retrenchment and rollback. But like the welfare states they analyze, they do not converge on a single set of factors that shape, constrain, or enable particular national responses to contemporary challenges. Nevertheless, the book squarely frames and boldly accents a set of indispensable questions for further inquiry. At a moment when in the United States alone social security privatization, the reauthorization of welfare reform, and prescription drug coverage (among other things) are all on the table simultaneously, no task could be more important. No one who aspires to understand the challenges of the welfare state can afford to ignore this book.

ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN
Columbia University

Public Administration and the State: A Postmodern Perspective *by Michael W. Spicer. Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 2001. 157 pp. $34.95.*

This short and well-written volume provides a framework for understanding the role of the state in contemporary public administration. It begins by discussing the neglect of explicit discussion of the state in the literature of public administration. It then posits two alternative visions of the state. The first is the

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purposive state—a government designed to accomplish public purposes. The second is the state as a civil association—a government designed to facilitate free individual expression within a system of laws and norms. The book begins by criticizing public administration scholars for neglecting consideration of this issue. In the author's view, students of American public administration implicitly and inadvertently adopt the purposive state as their model. He devotes a chapter to the Prussian experience in establishing a purposive state and then discusses the influence of the Prussian model on scholars and practitioners of American public administration.

Michael Spicer is concerned that the purposive state contradicts the American political tradition of limited government powers and competition between branches of government. He believes that the diversity of postmodern culture and values and pluralism makes it impossible to identify purposes that government can pursue without impinging on the rights of individuals. According to Spicer, "I am simply suggesting that, with the emergence of the postmodern condition it becomes increasingly likely that acts of public administrators, when directed toward the achievement of particular substantive purposes and values, will inevitably come to be seen as repressive by those who do not share these purposes and values" (p. 101).

It is here that the book's central argument breaks down, and Spicer's interesting discussion loses its way. Spicer does not take account of the fact that one of the major purposes of government in the modern world is the management of the national economy. The power of private corporations in the market place is held in check by the power and sense of purpose of the modern state. In the modern age, individual liberty is not only threatened by government power, but by corporate power. The influence of the modern consumer economy on individual behavior dwarfs the influence of government, but it is not mentioned in this work.

I do not know what "post modern condition" Spicer is referring to, but the American society I live in shares a number of common substantive purposes and values. We have built a number of government organizations to manage programs that pursue these collective purposes. Given a political system that rewards moderate majorities, some of these purposes may seem commonplace, but they should certainly not be taken for granted. In the interest of being explicit, let me mention a small sample of these programs: the interstate highway system; the programs that protect our air, water, and soil; the programs that ensure that our food is not poisoned; social security; medicare; and our system of public education. There is a broad consensus in this country that poor children should be fed, that homeless people should be given at least modest shelter, and that it is the government's job to reduce crime and evacuate innocent people from buildings under attack by terrorists. In my home city of New York, we are grateful for the sense of mission of our police force, and I see no post-

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modern demand to increase crime. The contemporary state cannot avoid being an expression of our shared values and purposes. The field of public administration correctly attempts to improve our ability to turn our ideals into actions.

STEVEN COHEN
Columbia University

Spin This! All the Ways We Don't Tell the Truth *by Bill Press. New York, Pocket Books, 2001. 241 pp. $26.00.*

This book is as entertaining as CNN's *Crossfire* and *The Spin Room*, both of which Press has cohosted. Press tells us that there is no good definition of "spin," and through his discussion and examples, he expands the definition so broadly that this badly over-used term loses any remaining meaning. Press tells us that there is good spin and bad spin. Bad spin is a lie. "But, most of the time, spin is an innocent form of speech. It gets us by when the whole truth is too awkward, too embarrassing or too painful . . ." (p. 241). Press provides examples of spin ranging from the old testament and the gospels to sex: ". . . you can never have sex without spin" (p. 240).

Of course, the core of the book is about political spin. Here, Press has amassed numerous examples, many of them amusing or outrageous. He identifies "Ten Essentials of Spin" (pp. 3–21). These include: happy-face spin (putting the best face on the information), boy-scout or girl-scout spin (pious denial of intentional misconduct), blame-it-on-my-youth spin, victim spin, and statistics spin (all self-explanatory). He has also sought nominations from his fellow pundits for a "Spin Hall of Fame."

By conceding the world to the spin doctors and counseling his readers to relax and enjoy it, Press contributes to a fundamental problem of political communication. He points out that much of today's sloppiness with our understanding of truth can be ascribed to our constant bombardments by advertising techniques that encourage faulty inference, but he uses the same techniques in many of his arguments. He is by no means alone in doing so. These are the same techniques of insinuation, juxtaposition, and overgeneralization that have come to dominate political rhetoric since the 1980s. The style has become the hallmark of talk radio and all news cable channels like Fox News, MSNBC, and CNN; and it is making substantial inroads into the traditional networks.

Spin This! provides some entertaining insights into the marketing of politicians and their ideas. Press describes the chaotic world of the modern political propagandist with some style and wit. This is a world where "everybody spins" and "everybody" is sophisticated enough to properly discount what appears in the media. It is a fairly small world in which players slip easily between government and the political entertainment industry, where the task of scoring political points happily merges with the imperative of scoring TV ratings points, and

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where individuals who portray themselves as rabid ideological enemies in the media may be dinner companions or even spouses. It is a world, however, that seems to be increasingly disconnected from and alienating to the public at large.

KATHLEEN KNIGHT
Barnard College
Columbia University

Missed Opportunity: Gore, Incumbency, and Television in Election 2000
by E. D. Dover. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2002. 216 pp. $64.95.

In this study of the election of 2000, Dover provides two useful frameworks for analyzing presidential campaigns and a heap of detailed rubble. The basic framework is built on the strategic situations of the candidates in contests, such as 2000, where the incumbent president is not a candidate. In all of these elections since 1956, the candidate of the presidential party has been the incumbent vice president— Richard Nixon in 1960, Hubert Humphrey in 1968, the senior George Bush in 1988, and Al Gore in 2000. The opposition candidate has been a relatively nonideological person who could unify his party and promise new initiatives to the electorate—John F. Kennedy in 1960, the "new" Nixon in 1968, Michael Dukakis in 1988, and Bush II in 2000.

These nominees must resolve contrasting dilemmas, Dover persuasively argues. The vice president has the problem of "mediated incumbency": he "must convince voters that he is more than a mere surrogate of a retiring incumbent, but he must do so without undermining the value of incumbency." The opposition candidate must overcome the very blandness that brought him the nomination; he "must convince voters who become increasingly skeptical as the campaign develops that he is personally and politically qualified for the presidency" (p. 172).

The campaign is mediated by the intervention of television. In line with previous research, Dover shows that television coverage followed familiar scripts. The nominations were simplified battles between a designated front-runner and one selected adversary. The media were "so preoccupied with the 'horse race' that they often depicted these campaigns as little more than strategic battles of solitary individuals who lacked meaningful connections to any ideological or partisan contexts" (p. 43). In the general election contest, two similar themes dominated: "the status of the horse race and the personal combat of the candidates." These scripts reduced Gore to "a coequal aspirant for the presidency along with Bush and undeserving of any special treatment because of his office" (p. 111).

The two frameworks provide insights into the 2000 election, but are ultimately unconnected. Gore lost the election (and I agree that he lost, not that Bush won, Florida aside) not because he was vice president and not because

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television coverage was superficial. Gore lost because of his own failings, not the limitations of his office. He did not make good use of his advantages, particularly the economic successes of the Clinton presidency. Dover himself seems to agree: "Gore needed to link his promises for the prosperous future with the successful policy record. . . . Instead, he all too often spoke as if he were simply another Democratic congressman running for president" (p. 179).

Beyond these valuable perspectives, the book's quality is severely damaged by its information overload, a numbing accumulation of excessive detail. Dover lengthily repeats academic studies of such topics as the evolution of the vice presidency, largely relying on a single source. Most of the book consists of summaries of television broadcasts, virtually day-by-day, repetitiously recounting television's emphasis on polls and personal combat and annoyingly repeating the correspondents' first names in every paragraph. These media reports could be easily summarized in as little space as one table on the content of the broadcasts and one graph of trends in voter preferences. Although the chapters abound in statistical reports, there is not a single table or chart in the entire book. Recounting the election of 2000 is painful, if necessary. Living through its television coverage was agony. But repeating the trivialities of broadcasts and polls is cruel and unnecessary punishment.

GERALD M. POMPER
Rutgers University

Rethinking Democratic Accountability *by Robert D. Behn. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 317 pp. Cloth, $44.95; paper, $18.95.*

This book takes an in-depth look at the issue of democratic accountability. The book goes through various understandings of the term "accountability" from its traditional definition in public administration to the present day usage in the new public management paradigm. The author declares that an individual is either a "holder of accountability or accountable holdee." These terms are then transcribed into the definition of accountability as Behn defines it to be focused in three areas: finances, fairness, and performance. Behn openly states his thesis that the traditional public administration paradigm places too much emphasis on finances and fairness, and not enough on performance. There is more emphasis on rules than results; consequently what is meant by democratic accountability must be reexamined.

Behn begins the book by briefly defining the three terms of accountability: financial accountability, which may be dictated or implied by law, regulations, or agreement; accountability for fairness, when government organizations are held accountable to the norms of democratic governance through a fairness procedure by applying rules with fairness and equity; and accountability for performance, which involves fulfilling expectations of the citizens in a satisfactory manner and being accountable to the entire citizenry. However, the au-

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thor adds a fourth dimension: accountability for personal probity, because he believes that the accountability for finances, fairness, and performance are not enough. While the traditional public administration paradigm emphasized efficiency, hierarchical authority, professional accountability institutions, and competition, the emergence of the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm has brought a greater emphasis on accountability of performance and cooperation.

In Chapter Two, Behn examines the notion of NPM's impact on the public administration field. He discusses the history of public administration as a discipline and how people like Woodrow Wilson saw a separation between politics (meaning policy making) and administration could prevent personal favoritism and patronage from meddling in administrative decisions about personnel, procurement, finance, and service delivery. Behn also contends that the new public management paradigm is in direct response to the inadequacies of traditional public administration, especially the performance sector. Consequently, the new public management is designed to improve performance and produce results.

Chapter 4 raises four questions. The first is who decides what results are to be produced? In answer, the author recognizes that while civil servants are not supposed to make policy, they nevertheless do. He believes that although in the traditional public administration, this role of civil servants is not recognized, the new public management does think seriously about the relationship between the effectiveness of the management strategy and the need for democratic accountability. The time has come to recognize the policy role for civil servants while preserving the requirements for democratic accountability. The second question relates to who is accountable for producing results? Behn's view is that instead of blaming any individual, one should consider the failures of performance as a collective failure of everyone, including those superior officers and managers who were supposed to provide the necessary cooperation, collaboration and resources. From Behn's perspective, a failure in performance to produce the results expected by citizens is collective. The third question raised is about who is responsible for implementing the accountability process. Behn reminds us that in a traditional public administration system, there is a hierarchical chain of accountability from civil servants to political appointees to elected officials to the electorate. However, this does not occur systematically, since individuals are unable to devote time to comprehensive oversight. Consequently, this further supports Behn's contention that civil servants end up making policy decisions. He notes, for example, that members of Congress in the United States spend little attention, time, and energy on oversight duties and leave it up to the civil servants. The fourth question is how will that accountability process work. Behn notes that elected officials are supposed to perform the oversight role in implementing policy, although this does not occur in practice; the accountability process works primarily out of the constitutional framework that fails to incorporate the broad interests of all the citizens.

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Chapter 11 effectively ties in the main argument of this book by revisiting the issue of democratic accountability. The concept of "360-degree performance feedback" means that people are not merely evaluated by their hierarchical superior; rather, they are evaluated by their subordinates, peers, and people with whom they have worked. "360-degree feedback" is about performance and improving performance. It gives leaders a picture of what they need to do to improve organizational performance for effective team and individual performance. Consequently, the author expects that the 360-degree feedback will result in 360-degree (that is, complete and full) accountability.

Overall, the book presents a sophisticated and insightful discussion of improving performance and accountability by challenging those who are the managers of the public sector. It also deals with differences between the traditional public administration and new public management paradigms, and offers an incisive analysis of the flaws of the traditional school. Behn makes a powerful claim that accountability of performance will increase collective responsibility. However, if he could have offered some personal insights and examples from various countries this book would have been an invaluable addition to the literature of comparative public policy and administration. The book does provide thoughtful discussion of the problems with current public service accountability practices and suggests ways and means to bring improvements in the new public management paradigm. In sum, the main merit of this book lies in presenting a coherent account of democratic accountability. It is well written and ought to be assigned to public administration students, though mostly for senior undergraduates and graduates. More importantly, Behn succeeds in his mission of provoking the reader to think seriously about the fundamental issue of democratic accountability, rather than remaining obsessed with the procedural and financial domains of public accountability. Finally, this book will be equally useful for leaders of business seeking to understand the changes sweeping the world of public sector management.

O. P. DWIVEDI
University of Guelph, Canada

Gun Violence in America: The Struggle for Control *by Alexander DeConde. Boston, Northeastern University Press, 2001. 394 pp. $29.95.*

Three decades ago, the political historian Richard Hofstadter famously observed that the United States was the quintessential "gun culture," clinging with "pathetic stubbornness" to outdated laws that helped criminals and terrorists, rather than enacting tough firearms-control policies as other Western nations had. Ironically, polls conducted before and since have consistently found that most Americans are deeply concerned about gun violence and favor stricter firearms laws. Yet, not much has been written about what Alexander DeConde

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calls the American "struggle for control." An historian, DeConde seeks to fill that void with a sweeping overview of the social, legal, and political clashes that guns have inspired from the colonial era to the present. In twenty chapters, the book covers everything from "wild west" shootouts to the landmark firearms laws of the 1920s and 1930s to the present political debate over massacres in schools.

DeConde's work is impressive on several counts. First, its panoramic scope and clear presentation make it a nice primer for scholars interested in the evolution of the gun issue. The book also lacks the advocacy bent that characterizes most scholarship on the issue, though the author's sympathies do come through, particularly in the concluding chapter. The book is especially informative in recounting the pre-1960s period, to which most other works give short shrift.

That said, the book is more helpful as an historical overview than as an analytic contribution. DeConde is not interested in generating a theory, testing it with new data, or resolving an empirical puzzle—which is fine. But as a work of history, the book should uncover previously unknown facts and put them together in a novel or illuminating whole. Here, one wishes the author had spent more time analyzing the material: How did pivotal events influence the evolution of the gun-control struggle, for example? Or how have common patterns characterized gun politics over time?

The most frustrating aspect of the book—and perhaps its biggest irony—is that while it purports to be about the struggle for control, one usually is left wondering about the "who, what, and why" of that struggle. Repeatedly, DeConde refers to "the gun control movement" without answering questions: Who are its leaders and foot soldiers? How expansive is it? How coordinated is it? What are its resources and strategies? Why does it fail? At times, "gun control movement" appears to be just misleading shorthand for a new piece of legislation or a congressional debate.

This problem is particularly acute in DeConde's treatment of the modern era. Although he briefly reviews the formation of the two major gun-control lobbies in the mid-1970s, he spends virtually no time on the state groups that were also emerging in that period and again in the 1990s. This is an odd omission given that most criminal-justice policy, including gun policy, is produced at the subnational level.

Nor does DeConde discuss the strategies of, or relationships among, the national and state organizations, which have had their own storied internecine battles over the decades—a struggle for control in a different sense. It is telling that DeConde's treatment of the most active period of gun-control organizing and agitation—from 1975 to the present—includes just four pages on the pro-control forces but more than 90 pages on the National Rifle Association and its skirmishes with Congress and the president.

These criticisms perhaps ask too much of a work whose ambition is to cover centuries of history in a manageable number of pages. DeConde has produced a unique introduction, a must-read for any scholar interested in gun politics.

KRISTIN A. GOSS
Harvard University

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The War Against the New Deal *by Brian Waddell. De Kalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 2001. 226 pp. $39.00.*

The military industrial complex that Dwight D. Eisenhower warned his countrymen about in his 1961 farewell address, claims Brian Waddell, arose out of an unholy alliance between corporate executives and military leaders during World War II. In a lucid but narrowly-focused study, the author sees World War II as resolving the political stalemate of the late 1930s in favor of a national security "warfare" rather than "welfare" state. Conservative opponents of the New Deal, who opposed expanding federal power, lost out; but so did liberals who wanted to carry out domestic reforms. The villains, according to Waddell, were the representatives of monopoly capitalism—dollar-a-year men such as James Forrestal, Robert Patterson, and Ferdinand Eberstadt. The victims included small businessmen, faithful New Dealers like Leon Henderson, organized labor, and above all, the American people.

Despite the moralistic tone, Waddell does make a strong case for the way in which businessmen used wartime mobilization to advance their own long-term economic interests. By joining with military leaders (largely nameless and faceless in this book), they succeeded in having large industrial corporations monopolize wartime production and kept civilian (that is, New Deal reformist) controls at a minimum. Not only did this military-industrial alliance allow big business to profit at the expense of smaller competitors and workers, it ensured the rise of the postwar national security state. The result, Waddell argues, was a compromise that both conservatives and liberals could accept—a powerful federal government that focused its main energy on international affairs during the ensuing cold war years. The cost, unfortunately, was the government's relative inaction and neglect of major domestic issues. A nation strong enough to win the cold war was unable to find a way to deliver basic medical care to all its citizens or to insure that every American child had access to a first-rate school.

The author, however, badly overstates his case. World War II did not end the New Deal reform impulse, which had already stalled in the late 1930s. Harry Truman expanded the liberal agenda with his Fair Deal proposals for federal action on education, health care, and civil rights. Initial defeat finally gave way to success with Lyndon Johnson's Great Society legislation in the 1960s. The war on poverty, Medicare, federal aid to education, and voting rights and affirmative action measures are all evidence of the postwar survival of the progressive tradition.

Waddell's narrow focus on state formation leads him to ignore the more positive aspects of the corporate-military alliance he deplores. American industry performed miracles during World War II, fulfilling FDR's promise that the United States would become the "arsenal of democracy" by supplying allies as well as its own troops with the weapons needed to defeat the Axis powers. American military contributions were relatively modest compared to those of Britain and the Soviet Union; it was the huge output of American factories that

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proved decisive. And it was the wartime mobilization of American industrial potential that not only overcame the lingering effects of the Great Depression but fueled the prosperity the nation would enjoy in the postwar years.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin, Emeritus

Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks *by Michael R. Gardner. Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 2002. 300 pp. $35.00.*

With his training in the law clearly on display, author Michael R. Gardner presents a forceful case for why Harry Truman deserves recognition as one of history's great champions of civil rights. Truman's personal journey from his "slave-owning heritage" (p. 70) to his emergence as a foremost civil rights reformer is indeed a captivating story. And Gardner tells it well. Born and reared in a former slave state, Truman was the child of an "unreconstructed rebel" mother (p. 4). He would nevertheless come to use the powers of the presidency to advance African-American rights to an extent unseen since the days of Abraham Lincoln. But the soul of Gardner's analysis is his controversial assertion that President Truman, despite being "conditioned to be a racist" (p. 4), was driven to act on civil rights mainly out of his moral vision and in the face of great political risk.

As Gardner writes, when Truman took his first major rights-expanding step on 5 December 1946 by establishing a Civil Rights Committee, he was under "little, if any, serious nationwide political pressure" (p. 19). When he issued two executive orders in the summer of 1948, he did so "without any major national political pressure" (p. 106). Later in his analysis, Gardner goes even further to minimize such pressure, labeling it as "irrelevant" (p. 202) to Truman's 1948 introduction of a ten-point legislative program. Instead, in Gardner's view, Truman was a "politically fearless" and/or "reckless" leader (pp. 15, 80) who eagerly took on the "unholy alliance of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans" (p. 149), risking both his 1948 bid for the presidency and his standing with the public in order to do what was "morally right" (p. 219).

In making such a contention, Gardner's book teeters on the edge of becoming a detailed advocacy brief rather than a work of objective social scientific analysis. The author either deemphasizes or artfully spins clear evidence of significant political forces pressuring Truman to advocate for civil rights reform. One such force was the cold war. While Gardner acknowledges that the ideological warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union helped define the Truman administration's civil rights activism, he fails to directly confront powerful evidence recently developed by scholars—most prominently Mary Dudziak—who argue that cold war concerns drove America's post-World War

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II commitment to the expansion of African-American rights. According to these scholars, America's new role in world affairs made domestic incidents of racial violence, which arose after World War II, and continued segregation policies much greater international concerns for the United States than they had been in the past. In addition, rights advocacy groups—understanding this new geopolitical landscape—more aggressively highlighted such democratic inconsistencies in their calls for reform.

Gardner also gives short shrift to the "balance of power" African-American voters held in the 1940s, a power Harry Truman and his advisers understood quite well. As a senator, Truman once told a southern colleague that while he opposed the NAACP's antilynching bill, he would vote in favor of it because of the importance of the black vote in Kansas City and St. Louis. As president, his advisor Clark Clifford helped write a memorandum concluding that wise electoral strategy dictated that Truman make a strong statement on civil rights to secure the White House on his own terms. And in the end, African-American support for Truman proved to be the margin of victory in California, Illinois, and Ohio, three states essential to his success.

Along with his conclusion that President Truman "did not need political pressure to do what he felt was morally right and constitutionally mandated for black Americans" (p. 12), Gardner's analysis of the Truman/Vinson Supreme Court will also raise some eyebrows. To be sure, the author convincingly argues that legal commentators have unduly devalued the role a Fred Vision-led Court played in the development of civil rights doctrine. But in deriding others for failing to properly account for the importance of Earl Warren's predecessor, the author makes the same mistake with regard to the Justices Truman's appointees replaced. Specifically, three of the four Truman Justices (Vinson, Tom Clark, and Sherman Minton) were more conservative than their predecessors (Harlan Stone, Frank Murphy, and Wiley Rutledge). One might even argue that if these three Roosevelt justices had lived longer lives and continued to serve on the Court, Jim Crow would have met an earlier death.

Michael Gardner's book is at its best when he is conveying the extent of President Truman's commitment to civil rights reform. And this commitment is certainly an essential part of the civil rights story. But like many books that morph into legal briefs, Gardner too often fails to adequately consider competing arguments that add pieces of the puzzle; these arguments suggest that Truman's actions were less courageous and more politically astute than the author would have us believe.

KEVIN J. MCMAHON
State University of New York, Fredonia

Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American Citizenship *by T. Alexander Aleinikoff. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002. 306 pp. $45.00.*

We live in a world of shifting and multiplying identities. After three centuries of centralization, nation-states are both devolving power to subnational units

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of government and civil society, and relinquishing it to supranational entities. Sovereignty is being redefined and reallocated in unsettling and unexpected ways. The United States is no exception. Just within the last decade, the Supreme Court has redefined federal-state relationships under the Commerce Clause and the Eleventh Amendment, while Congress has delegated much regulatory authority to states, localities, and private actors.

T. Alexander Aleinikoff, a law professor at Georgetown, wants the federal government to do some more reshuffling. Specifically, he proposes to "decenter" citizenship by altering the conception of national sovereignty that supplies citizenship's ideological and legal meaning. This project has two main goals. First, he would demolish the "plenary power doctrine," which enjoins courts from applying the usual constitutional constraints to Congress when it legislates in certain policy areas deemed constitutive of national sovereignty. The doctrine has a dubious pedigree in late nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions upholding the infamous Chinese Exclusion laws. "Despite tectonic shifts in our constitutional law," Aleinikoff claims, plenary power remains "largely untouched" in three important areas where it has no place: immigration law, regulation of Native Americans, and territorial governance (p. 5). Aleinikoff's demolition project succeeds. As he and other scholars have shown, the doctrine is supported neither by constitutional text nor by special concerns about foreign affairs and political questions. It is inconsistent with established constitutional norms and has spawned a triumphalist, racist rhetoric of sovereignty. Even today, it protects some exclusionary, undemocratic policies from review on the merits.

Second, Aleinikoff wants to promote an egalitarian ideal of citizenship that fully includes aliens, Native American tribes, and territorial residents. The Warren Court, he argues, was the first since *Dred Scott* to focus on citizenship, but in expanding citizens' rights and equal status, it also entrenched aliens' inferior status. It kept Native Americans and Puerto Ricans, who are U.S. citizens, outside the charmed circle of full membership and self-government. The Burger Court extended the rights of aliens, language minorities, and territorial residents, but not of Native Americans. To the Rehnquist Court, he says, citizenship's purpose is to serve individual rights. With a decentered citizenship, however, less would turn on this status; resident aliens ("denizens") would enjoy equal rights, and tribes and territories would govern themselves.

What links Aleinikoff's attack on the plenary power doctrine and his vision of decentered citizenship? It must be his view that courts, freed from the former, should actively help shape the latter by invalidating laws impeding such citizenship. Here, however, his prescriptive analysis falters. His alternative conceptions of sovereignty, citizenship, equality, self-determination, and national community are so abstract that they conceal the hard empirical questions and value trade-offs. For Puerto Rico, he wants "enhanced Commonwealth status" whose terms will be negotiated and constrained by international human rights norms, not the Constitution. But why, then, shouldn't the United States go all the way and grant it independence, especially if they are not going to pay fed-

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eral taxes? He would give Native American tribes sovereignty over their territories. But how would he define the rights of the many non-Native Americans who live there and cannot vote on tribal governance? He would grant aliens the same rights as citizens to claim welfare, sponsor family members from abroad, and perhaps vote. But why should immigrants admitted only on an express promise to be self-sufficient receive a general entitlement to welfare?

Aleinikoff advances a powerful critique of categorical judicial self-abnegation, but finesses many substantive issues of this kind. For many readers, the former will be justification enough for this ambitious, well-written book.

PETER H. SCHUCK
Yale Law School

"Belonging to the World": Women's Rights and American Constitutional Culture *by Sandra F. VanBurkleo. New York, Oxford University Press, 2001. 409 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

Since the British established their first colonies, American women have been governed by a set of laws and social norms that are so different from those governing men that it makes the pledge of allegiance asserting "one nation, indivisible" one of the most successful "spin" jobs in history. Sandra VanBurkleo's book—a combination of historical descriptions, legal analyses, and personal stories—documents the origins of these political and family governments and the persistent rebellion of women against them. The deft use of stories and words of the women who participated in debates and in claims against the power structure allows the reader to enter the lives of many brave women (and a few men), past and present, and puts a personal face on the establishment and development of constitutional culture pertaining to gender roles and women's rights. There is much detail and an almost breathless urgency to temper generalizations about American law with attention to variations among states, regions, classes, and races.

The book is organized chronologically in three sections. Each ends with the establishment of a settlement, defined as the "dynamic process of renegotiating basic terms of legal-political discourse and the concrete results . . ." (p. xi). Part One, "The Way of Obedience," covers British North America leading up to the Revolutionary settlement. English common law of coverture and Puritan fear of the "disorder of women" in the seventeenth century gave way in the eighteenth century to the Revolutionary Settlement—Republican Motherhood and Lockean separation of public and private spheres, the latter being woman's domain.

Part Two, "'Talk Is the Fountain-Head of All Things': Republican Speech Communities and Coequality," includes chapters on developments in family law and property rights, the exploration of speech communities which invented a common language, the foundation of American feminism, and the formation

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of the first wave of the women's movement beginning around the 1830s. The section ends with the Civil War settlement. After the war, the courts ruled that women were citizens, but this carried no political or economic rights other than to speak and petition. Movement leaders abruptly shifted from the wide-ranging agenda of the first wave—improving women's status in law, religion, family, education, sexuality—to a growing singular focus on suffrage.

Part Three, "'Governments Try Themselves': Democratic Suffrage Communities and Equality," begins with the last decades of the suffrage campaign and its aftermath, followed by a very useful chapter on the origins of protective legislation campaigns and the basic feminist rift over equal rights. The section ends with a long chapter entitled, "Civil Rights Settlement," which summarizes the current law. The author struggles to come to terms with the vitality of the equality/difference debate and its effects on every area of law.

Part Two is both the center and heart of this book. Here the author fully develops her framework of linking speech communities with women's activism and constitutional settlements. This provides a rich example of Jane Mansbridge's conceptualization of the women's movement, not in terms of organizations and activism, but as a discourse: "a set of changing, contested aspirations and understandings" (p. 27). By defining women's movements in terms of discourse, debate, and ideas, we have a tool arranging the movement in periods and an explanation for the diversity of feminist activism on specific court cases and policy debates.

DOROTHY MCBRIDE STETSON
Florida Atlantic University

Communities and the Environment: Ethnicity, Gender, and the State in Community-Based Conservation *edited by Arun Agrawal and Clark C. Gibson. Piscataway, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 2001. 205 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $23.00.*

For the last decade, scholars, policy makers, advocates, and social commentators across the political spectrum have applauded community-based resource management as a way of averting the polarization and gridlock associated with top-down environmental policy making. Proponents contend that community-based approaches yield environmentally protective solutions that are more likely to be implemented successfully. Support for community-based approaches often rests on a notion of communities as small, homogeneous entities with widely shared values—qualities that are thought to facilitate collective decision making. As the authors of the edited volume *Communities and Environment* point out, however, this assumption is flawed; real communities are likely to be heterogeneous in ways that may impede their ability to conserve resources.

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In their clearly written introduction, editors Arun Agrawal and Clark C. Gibson argue persuasively that in order to understand the propensity of a community to conserve resources one must investigate its internal attributes and decision-making processes as well as its relationships with outside institutions. They propose a framework that comprises the multiplicity of interests within communities, the processes by which those interests interact, and the institutions within which those interactions occur. In particular, they draw attention to gender and ethnic relations within communities and interactions between the market, the state, and the community.

The remaining chapters provide interesting descriptive detail about a variety of communities in the developed and developing worlds. Taken together, they suggest that communities often have deep internal divisions and may not adhere to norms of resource conservation. For instance, Melanie Hughes McDermott finds that many groups in Palawan, the Philippines, do not have long-standing ties to a particular place and have little interest in environmental protection. Because it mistakenly presupposes the existence of homogeneous, territorially-fixed indigenous communities with a strong conservation ethic, a government program aimed at creating community-based forest management fails to promote either social justice or environmental protection. On the other hand, as Sara Singleton's discussion of salmon fisheries management in the Pacific Northwest reveals, the region's diverse Native-American tribes manage to settle distributional conflicts among themselves and act collectively in negotiating with the state to conserve salmon populations.

While informative, this book suffers from a problem that afflicts many edited volumes: several of the cases need to be linked much more explicitly to the framework laid out in the introduction. Most importantly, while each chapter explicates key attributes of a particular community, those qualities are not always explicitly related to the community's ability or propensity to conserve resources. For example, in his chapter on irrigation management in Morocco's Ziz Valley, Hsain Ilahiane provides a fascinating glimpse of how the Arab and Berber minorities control access to water for agriculture, yet the implications of this arrangement for water conservation are unclear. Furthermore, given the authors' objective of policy relevance, it is particularly important that cases are written in clear, simple language; yet academic jargon occasionally impedes the reader's progress.

Without question this volume accomplishes its primary goal: it thoroughly dispels the mythical concept of small, place-based, homogeneous communities that operate according to shared norms. The cases should give serious pause to policy makers interested in crafting community-based resource management schemes; they suggest that such approaches must be carefully designed to accommodate the characteristics—both internal and external—of particular communities. At the same time, the book does not wholly succeed in explaining the relevance of community attributes to resource conservation, thereby neglecting many readers' main concern.

JUDITH A. LAYZER
Middlebury College

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Corporate Power and the Environment: The Political Economy of U.S. Environmental Policy *by George A. Gonzalez. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001. 160 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $21.95.*

This is an unusual volume that will appeal to some students of environmental politics and policy and disappoint others. The title suggests that the book is a broad treatment of the role of corporate power in environmental policy. One expects to find an investigation of the intriguing question of how and to what extent corporations shape environmental policy, and perhaps a discussion of differing perspectives on the legitimacy of the corporate role. Surprisingly, there has been little systematic analysis of corporate influence in environmental decision making, whether legislative or administrative. Such an assessment could do much to clarify why environmental policy takes the form that it does as well as to address normative questions surrounding the exercise of corporate power. With many policy makers today calling for collaborative decision making and public-private partnerships to address environmental challenges, such a study would be particularly timely and interesting.

George Gonzalez has a different purpose in this slim book. He approaches the subject of corporate power from the perspective of elite theory, using case studies involving primarily natural resource issues. Four of his five cases concern early to mid-twentieth-century policy developments in forestry, parks, and wilderness conservation, and one examines Congress's adoption of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments. Gonzalez finds strong evidence of elite dominance in policy making in these cases. An economic elite, corporate decision makers and other individuals "of substantial wealth," were the "dominant influences in the formation and development of U.S. environmental policies" (p. ix). One wonders whether another group of cases, especially if focused on environmental protection policy since 1970, would have led to different conclusions.

The argument about elite domination is linked explicitly to a broader assertion that pluralist assessments of U.S. policy making fail to account for policy results. In light of the case material used here, this is a long reach. Gonzalez asserts that environmental activists, elected policy makers, and agency officials are not as important in shaping policy as economic elites and producer groups. More evidence could have been marshaled in support of this conclusion, which flies in the face of a large number of policy enactments and regulatory decisions over the past three decades that were stoutly resisted by business interests.

Gonzalez sets out his argument in six chapters and a brief conclusion. The introductory chapter deals with contrasting pluralist and elite models of policy making, and especially economic elite theories associated with Gabriel Kolko, William Domhoff, and Clyde Barrow. This chapter and the subsequent case studies raise interesting questions, but they would benefit from a clear framework that permits more systematic assessment of elite dominance. For instance, what kinds of action and what kinds of results constitute evidence of such dominance? What evidence would point toward a different conclusion? How do we

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get around the subjectivity of such interpretation? The case study chapters offer anecdotal evidence and insights on the role played by various corporations and individuals who are said to act through "an upper-class and corporate-based policy network" (p. 23). Gonzalez finds this network to be of overriding importance. Some readers will find the historical record persuasive in this regard and others will not. Even those who do might wonder whether the contemporary period reveals the same kind of elite dominance found in the early twentieth century.

Despite its flaws, the book is refreshing in its unusual criticism of mainstream pluralist assumptions about environmental politics and policy. The next step should be to anchor that criticism more firmly in empirical data.

MICHAEL E. KRAFT
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay

Environmental Policymaking in Congress: The Role of Issue Definition in Wetlands, Great Lakes and Wildlife Policies *by Kelly Tzoumis. New York, Routledge, 2001. 133 pp. $65.00.*

Kelly Tzoumis examines the linkages between issue definition and agenda setting in Congress, and how those connections shape policy outcomes. To do so, she compiles and analyzes an impressive data set on congressional hearings and witnesses on three separate natural resource issue dimensions over two hundred years (1799–1999).

Tzoumis finds that wetlands policy making fits under what she calls a "dominance" model of issue definition; that is, long-dominant developmental values are eventually challenged by emergent environmental concerns, which form the new dominant issue construct. By contrast, Great Lakes policy making fits what Tzoumis calls a "bounded" model of issue definition, in which a long-dominant developmental construct is challenged but not replaced by environmental and health concerns. The result is a policy realm where both sets of values coexist during issue debate. Finally, wildlife fits a "valence" model of issue definition because the dominant protection construct retains such symbolic power that it remains essentially unchallenged by contrasting private property values. After comparing the three models, Tzoumis concludes, "the link between issue definition and agenda setting in Congress is shown to be critical to implementation of public policies . . ." (p. 113).

Tzoumis is a protégée of Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, and in conceptual and methodological terms the apple does not fall far from the tree. Anyone familiar with *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (1993) will find in Tzoumis a similar focus on the impacts of problem definition on policy change over time and the same attention to collecting, coding, and analyzing longitudinal data. These strengths make the book a useful primer for any graduate student.

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Yet, I have concerns. First, the distinction between the three issue models could be sharper. What is the practical difference between the dominance and valence models when both describe a condition whereby one issue construct dominates debate, although not necessarily policy outcomes? Tzoumis argues that in the former the dominant issue construct is eventually dislodged, while in the latter its symbolic power keeps it safe from challenge. Yet in practical terms, neither environmental construct can be said to dominate: wetlands and wildlife continue to disappear, after all.

Second, the issue dimensions Tzoumis selects may not be sufficiently comparable. In this regard, "wetlands" and "wildlife" seem sufficiently bounded as issue dimensions, but "Great Lakes" strikes me as more problematic. After all, if Great Lakes policy is marked by co-existing sets of policy tones and images, might it be because the issue itself is so broadly construed so as to guarantee such agenda sharing? Or is it because, unlike more finite wetlands or wildlife, the Great Lakes aren't disappearing, so both sets of perspectives must coexist?

Finally, the book is a struggle to read. Tzoumis makes the kinds of writing errors common with young scholars—yours truly included, if memory serves—but Routledge apparently did not bother to spend one cent on copyediting. The result is a frustrating journey through awkward syntax, grammatical errors, and sentence fragments, thus undermining the methodological strengths of the book. If Routledge did pay for copyediting, it should demand its money back. Given the price for what is a rather slim volume, such editorial neglect does a great disservice to both author and reader.

The book's strengths make it useful as a supplemental work in selected graduate research seminars, but its weaknesses recommend against course adoption. Order it for your library and put it on reserve.

CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO
Northeastern University

Environmental Injustice in the United States: Myths and Realities *by James P. Lester, David W. Allen, and Kelly M. Hill. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2001. 216 pp. Paper, $27.00.*

This book is one of the first quantitative investigations of potential racial and class inequities in the distribution of environmental risk—noxious facilities, pollution levels, etc. The first three chapters define the problems of environmental racism, equity, and justice; provide a thorough review of the existing literature on these topics; and describe the environmental justice movement and its political successes and failures. The next five chapters offer a conceptual model for investigating inequities in the distribution of environmental risk; model the distribution of several sources of environmental risk across the American states, counties and metropolitan areas; and draw conclusions from these analyses. The final two chapters examine existing U.S. environmental justice policies and offer recommendations for crafting better policies.

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The book has several strengths, but I will highlight only four. First, the authors provide a comprehensive review of the existing environmental justice literature through 2000. Second, the book offers an excellent conceptual model for environmental justice research and a superb summary of the environmental justice movement, eloquently placing it within the context of John Kingdon's theory of agenda setting and policy change. Third, the book offers an ambitious empirical plan that examines the distribution of several sources of environmental risk at three levels of analysis. Finally, the book exhibits a high degree of academic integrity. The authors are not ax-grinders, and their conclusions are driven by their evidence, not by ideology.

Unfortunately, the statistical analyses suffer from three problems that will lead careful readers to question the validity of the book's conclusions. The first is with the units of aggregation employed in the book. In general, research into environmental inequities employs small units of analysis (for example, census tracts, Geographic Information System units) to avoid the pitfalls of aggregation bias. Counties are often viewed as too large to generate useful conclusions regarding the distribution of environmental risk, and metropolitan areas and states are definitely too large. Variation with respect to race, ethnicity, and class is simply too great. The second problem stems from construction of the statistical models. The authors employ uncounted dozens of interaction terms and introduce these terms individually in a search for "conditional effects." The few interaction terms that turn out to be significant are imbued with importance, meriting their own tables and discussions. However, given the numbers involved, these few significant coefficients are almost certainly the result of random chance—a possibility the authors never consider. Moreover, the authors make no effort to adjust the significance levels to account for the multiple tests conducted on each variable. The third problem stems from an unsettling lack of concern for data integrity. The authors recode in a seemingly arbitrary fashion scores (perhaps hundreds) of "extreme outliers"—even factor scores based on data that itself was transformed in this fashion. Fabricating data in the pursuit of univariate normality is unnecessary, given that regression requires only that all variables in models be jointly normal, and that regression is very robust to violation of this requirement; outliers often provide variation to be explained, not noise to be eliminated; and there are a host of techniques to assess and control for the effects that outliers may have on regression results. Given these problems, I don't believe that the empirical results presented in Chapters 5-7 hold much meaning.

Readers looking for brief but thorough summaries of existing environmental justice research and current environmental justice policies, coupled with a nuanced description of the political importance of the environmental justice movement, will be well served by this book. Unfortunately, because of substantial data analysis limitations, the book can do little to resolve existing uncertainties regarding the existence of environmental inequities.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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